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MONITORING REPORT ON INTEGRATION 2022

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Department of Children, Equality,
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FOREWORD

I welcome the publication of the Monitoring Report on Integration 2022. This research series has given invaluable insight into outcomes for migrants in Ireland over more than a decade now. Evidence-based policymaking is key to ensuring the government is addressing the most critical issues and making changes that can have a real impact. As we are growing more diverse as a nation, and with the increased inward migration seen in the past 12 months, this report is especially timely.

The context of this year's report is particularly interesting. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on work and life, coupled with the ongoing effects of Brexit, have all contributed to a very different landscape to that reviewed in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration. These factors have caused serious challenges for migrants as well as for many other groups in Ireland. The current cost-of-living issues and the ongoing war in Ukraine are likely to further increase these challenges.

The integration indicators in this report show frequently less favourable outcomes for residents in Ireland who were born abroad. This is across a broad range of categories, including education, employment and social inclusion. And, as evidenced by this and other research, while Ireland has become increasingly diverse, racism is an issue in Ireland, as it is in many other EU Member States. Unfortunately, some people who live in Ireland feel the impact of racism on their day-to-day lives in a variety of ways. Racism impacts many different groups – both migrant and non-migrant. The government has just launched Ireland's National Action Plan Against Racism, aimed at eliminating racism in all its forms. We sincerely hope and believe that this plan will prove to be an important tool in our ongoing work to improve the lives of those from diverse backgrounds living in this country.

This latest Monitoring Report on Integration, which has been produced under the ESRI's Equality and Integration Research Programme and funded by the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, provides the government and government departments with high-quality data to make informed decisions on migrant integration policy. I am pleased to support this research, and I would like to thank the ESRI for their work in this field. It is likely that inward migration will continue in Ireland, and it is vital that we support the integration of migrants into Irish society. A diverse cultural heritage benefits us all.

Minister Joe O'Brien, Minister for Community
Development, Integration and Charities

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ABBREVIATIONS

AROP	At risk of poverty
CSO	Central Statistics Office
CTA	Common Travel Agreement
EAL	English as an additional language
EEA	European Economic Area
EMN	European Migration Network
EPIC	Employment for People from Immigrant Communities
ESOL	English for speakers of other languages
ETB	Education and training board
EU	European Union
GUI	Growing Up in Ireland
ILO	International Labour Office
LFS	Labour Force Survey
LTR	Long-term residence
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
NAAO	North America, Australia and Oceania
NAPAR	National Action Plan against Racism
NARIC	National Academic Recognitions Information Centre
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PPSN	Personal Public Service Number
PRSI	Pay-related Social Insurance
PUP	Pandemic Unemployment Payment
QQI	Quality and Qualifications Ireland
SILC	Survey on Income and Living Conditions
TPD	Temporary Protection Directive
TWSS	Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Integration not only allows migrants to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political life of their host country, but it is also important for social cohesion and inclusive growth. Keeping an ongoing record of differences in outcomes between the foreign-born and Irish-born population in these domains provides both policymakers and the general public with important information to assess integration outcomes and to respond to policy challenges.

The 2022 Monitoring Report on Integration is the eighth in a series of published Monitoring Reports since 2011. Previous reports examined outcomes for Irish nationals and foreign nationals; in view of the increasing acquisition of Irish citizenship among migrants, this report distinguishes migrants based on their place of birth (Ireland or abroad). Like before, the report considers indicators proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration held in Zaragoza in 2010 and examines how migrants compare to the Irish-born population in four key domains: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship (European Commission, 2010).

While Ireland's migration landscape is constantly changing, the years since the 2019 data presented in the 2020 Monitoring Report on Integration have been particularly turbulent for Irish society. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns had a major impact on work and life in Ireland; Brexit continued to play an important role in migration trends. This report is also set against a backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and associated immigration flows and a cost-of-living crisis. These factors will cause serious challenges for migrants as for many other groups in Ireland. While much of the analysis in this publication predates the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the cost-of-living crisis, the impact of Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic on migration and migrant integration outcomes in Ireland is very much in evidence.

The discussion of the key findings (presented in Table A below) focuses on overall differences between migrants and the Irish-born population. However, migrants to Ireland are diverse in terms of country of origin, and outcomes vary across groups. The individual chapters give more information on differences between migrant groups – those born in the United Kingdom (UK), EU-West, EU-East and those born outside the EU/UK – the latter distinguished where possible into more meaningful country-of-origin groups.

TABLE A KEY INTEGRATION INDICATORS AT A GLANCE

Domain	Irish-born	Foreign-born
Employment, working-age population (2022)		
Employment rate	71.6	76.4*
Unemployment rate	4.6	5.9*
Activity rate	75.0	81.2*
Education (2020–2022, pooled)		
Share of 25–34 age group with third-level education	56	67*
Share of early leavers from education (20–24 age group)	3.3	4.6
Social inclusion (2020 and 2021 pooled)		
Median annual net income (adjusted for household composition)	€25,107	€22,802*
AROP rate	11.6	16.8*
Consistent poverty rate	4.1	5.3*
Share of population (aged 16+) perceiving their health as good or very good	81.9	84.9*
Proportion of households that are property owners	76.6	42.8*
Proportion of households spending more than 30 per cent of their income on housing	8.5	29.3*
Active citizenship (end 2021)		
Annual citizenship acquisition rate		3.4
Ratio of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship since 2005 to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at end-2021		38.2
Share of non-EEA adults with live residence permissions holding long-term residence (LTR)		0.7

Sources LFS Q1 2022 for employment indicators; LFS Q1 2020–2022 (pooled) for education indicators; EU-SILC 2020–2021 (pooled) for social-inclusion indicators. Citizenship and LTR indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Citizenship Service, Eurostat. The ratio of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship since 2005 to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at the end of 2021 is adjusted for naturalised persons leaving the State (see Chapter 5 for details). UK nationals are excluded from these indicators. Political participation indicator: Immigrant Council of Ireland. See Appendix 2 (p. 115) for further details of sources.

Note * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < .05$ level.

MONITORING REPORT ON INTEGRATION: KEY FINDINGS

Chapter 1 provides the context for the indicators used in the report, which is particularly important in light of the changing migration landscape in Ireland. In 2021, Ireland continued to have one of the highest percentages of foreign-born residents (18 per cent) among EU member states. However, in contrast to previous years, the share of migrants from outside the EU is now larger than the share of migrants from other EU countries, which likely reflects the effect of Brexit, as the

sizeable number of UK migrants in Ireland now count as non-EU. Net migration stayed positive in the years 2020–2022. However, there was a notable dip in migration in 2020 and 2021, which was followed by a large increase in inward migration in 2022. This likely largely reflects the impact of the COVID-19 restrictions and border closures, with 2022 figures representing a ‘catch-up’ effect. Some of those displaced from Ukraine are included in the migration figures if they arrived before end April 2022.

The significant social and political events that have taken place since the previous Monitoring Report on Integration also bear consequences for the integration outcomes in the domains of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. Key indicators are presented in Table A.

Chapter 2 compares the labour-market outcomes between the Irish-born and foreign-born populations in the first quarter of each year: Q1 2020 (pre-pandemic), Q1 2021 (pandemic) and Q1 2022 (post-pandemic). Migrant labour-market outcomes were more affected by the pandemic than those of Irish-born, with larger falls in employment and a bigger rise in unemployment between Q1 2020 and Q1 2021. Nevertheless, since then employment rates among the migrant population have risen remarkably. By Q1 2022, at 77 per cent, the migrant employment rate exceeded both migrant employment rates in Q1 2020 (71 per cent) and the Irish-born employment rate in Q1 2022 (72 per cent) (see Table A). Particularly notable is the increase in employment rates among the African-born population, from 56 per cent in Q1 2020 to 74 per cent in Q1 2022. This change requires further investigation, ideally over a longer period, but if it persists it shows considerable progress by this group.

Chapter 3 considers differences in educational attainment and early school-leaving by place of birth. In line with findings from previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, the migrant population appears to be faring reasonably well in terms of education. Young migrants in Ireland have early school-leaving rates that are similar to those of Irish-born students (see Table A). Even though the Irish population is one of the most highly educated in the EU, the level of education among the migrant population tends to be higher than among Irish-born: in the 25–34 age group, 67 per cent of those born abroad have a tertiary degree compared to 56 per cent of those born in Ireland. Analysis from the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) ’98 cohort of children living in Ireland since at least age nine finds no difference in the proportion of migrant and Irish-born young people sitting the Leaving Certificate examination (around 95 per cent of both groups). There is also no significant difference in mean Leaving Certificate points between migrant-origin and Irish-origin young people.

Chapter 4 examines poverty and social inclusion. The migrant population had a lower median annual net income than the Irish-born population and higher ‘at-risk of poverty’, deprivation and consistent poverty rates (see Table A). Non-EU migrants were particularly disadvantaged. Migrants overall were also less likely to own their home and faced more issues relating to housing affordability than the Irish-born population, yet the migrant population tended to be healthier. The high rates of private renting and associated affordability issues mean many migrants are particularly exposed to current problems in the private rental market, characterised by limited availability, insecurity of tenure and affordability issues. The focus in this chapter is on private households: the specific accommodation issues faced by international-protection applicants and Ukrainian refugees are discussed in Chapters 1 and 6.

Chapter 5 focuses on the ‘active citizenship’ domain, reporting on naturalisation rates, permanent and LTR permits and political participation. Since the last Monitoring Report on Integration, there has been a significant increase in citizenship acquisitions, following a freeze in processing during 2019, while the share of LTR holders remains low (0.7 per cent). It is estimated that 3.4 per cent of the non-European Economic Area (EEA) population holding permits acquired Irish citizenship in 2021. Between 2005 and 2021, the total number of non-EEA nationals who had acquired Irish citizenship since 2005 represents 38.2 per cent of the resident adult population of non-EEA origin at the end of 2021. This assumes that those naturalised in the period did not leave Ireland so is likely to be an upper-bound estimate. A significant increase in processing delays for citizenship applications (to 30 months on average in 2021) impede access to naturalisation, though multiple reforms have now been implemented to tackle this.

FUTURE DATA COLLECTION

The usefulness of monitoring integration outcomes is only as good as the data and evidence on which it is based and an understanding of the strengths and limitations of the data. The indicators used in this report allow for consistent monitoring over time. However, they are limited in scope, thus neglecting important areas of integration, and are largely based on repeated national household surveys, which were not designed to survey migrants. This raises the question of how well the migrant population is represented, particularly harder-to-reach groups such as those seeking international protection, and analyses are often limited by small sample sizes.

There is a clear need for more and better data on migrants and their situation in Ireland. Existing surveys could be improved by the inclusion of migrant and ethnic-minority boost samples. This would be helpful in addressing the issue of small sample sizes. Collecting good data on ethnicity is also increasingly urgent as

documenting the extent of discrimination and disadvantage over time forms an integral part of any anti-racism strategy.

Some indicators of integration are specific to the migrant population and, as such, will never be collected in national surveys. There is a need for a large representative survey of the migrant population, as is common in many other European countries, yet still lacking in Ireland. Additionally, exploiting administrative data sources in areas such as education, health and social welfare would enhance our understanding of migrant integration from survey data. Combined with survey data, administrative data could be particularly helpful for tracking the integration of refugees into Irish society.

POLICY ISSUES

The Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2020, which was then extended to 2021, represents a significant statement of policy intent and brought new energy and focus into efforts to integrate migrants in Ireland. However, it has now expired and has not yet been renewed. As a consultation process begins for renewing and improving the strategy, it is an opportune time to reflect on the policy implications of research evidence presented in this report.

On employment, statistics presented in Chapter 2 show that even though migrants tended to be harder hit by the pandemic than Irish-born people, employment rates among the migrant population have risen remarkably in 2022. However, not all groups are faring well, so it is important that the jobseeker engagement and labour-market activation policies described in the Migrant Integration Strategy are effectively implemented. It is also important to focus attention on discrimination in the labour market and beyond. The ongoing development of a National Action Plan against Racism (NAPAR) represents a significant opportunity, as long as it is effectively implemented and monitored (McGinnity, Quinn et al., 2021).

In terms of education, the findings from Chapter 3 suggest that migrants who were educated abroad and students of migrant origin who are going through the Irish education system are faring well. Findings from earlier Monitoring Reports on Integration and other research studies highlight the role of English-language skills, with findings suggesting that those who speak a foreign language at home may face disadvantages. This underlines the importance of monitoring needs, spending and effectiveness of English-language tuition in Irish schools. Host-country language skills are also key for facilitating economic, social and cultural integration among adults (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2020), so the lack of any coordinated strategy for English as a second language in Ireland is of concern.

Housing and homelessness are not identified as issues in the Migrant Integration Strategy. Yet findings from Chapter 4 suggest that migrants are much more likely to be in private rented accommodation than Irish-born in 2020–2021, and also more likely to experience affordability problems associated with housing. McGinnity et al. (2022) found that migrants are more likely to be in overcrowded accommodation and living in homeless shelters. Finding suitable and affordable accommodation is particularly challenging for those moving out of Direct Provision centres. Together, these findings underscore the importance of including housing in the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 as a matter of urgency.

Finally, targeted supports may be needed for specific groups, such as international-protection applicants and Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection. Previous research indicates that these migrants may need extra support to facilitate their integration (McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020). In the context of an unprecedented increase in refugees and international-protection applicants in Ireland in 2022, providing additional support to these groups places considerable demands on resources. However, it is likely to yield benefits for the integration of these migrants, and Ireland, for years to come. Whether this is as part of the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 or as a separate refugee strategy matters less than that effective targeted supports are provided. It may also be that lessons from the rapid introduction of supports for Ukraine arrivals can be incorporated into the implementation of ongoing reform of the international-protection system.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction, policy and context

Frances McGinnity and Stefanie Sprong

Increased immigration has brought increased diversity to Irish shores (McGinnity, Grotti et al., 2018; McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020). The increased diversity is associated not only with many opportunities but also with challenges and questions. Integration has important consequences for the well-being of migrants and their descendants, with greater integration allowing them to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political life of their host country (OECD, 2018; Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas, 2016). Integration also has important consequences for the host society, for example affecting social cohesion, intergroup relations and inclusive growth (Alba and Foner, 2015). It is therefore crucial to gain an understanding of how migrants are faring and to study the degree of closeness or similarity between migrant groups, on the one hand, and the Irish-born majority population, on the other hand.

The 2022 Monitoring Report on Integration presents an overview of the integration outcomes of migrants in Ireland in several key areas and is the latest in a series of seven annual Monitoring Reports on Integration published between 2011 and 2020 (see McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). The Monitoring Reports have sought to measure the integration of migrants into Irish society in four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. Keeping a continuous record of differences in outcomes between people born in Ireland and abroad in these domains provides both policymakers and the general public with important information to assess integration outcomes and to respond to policy challenges. The Monitoring Report on Integration is funded by the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth as part of a programme of research on migrant integration. Other reports in the research programme complement the Monitoring Reports by focusing in more depth on topics of policy or research interest, for example housing and family among migrants (McGinnity et al., 2022) or wages and working conditions (Laurence et al., 2023).

Ireland's migration landscape is constantly changing, and the Irish context is rather different from the context in which the previous Monitoring Report was written. While the COVID-19 pandemic and Brexit continued to play an important role, the 2022 Monitoring Report on Integration is also set against a backdrop of the war in Ukraine and its associated immigration flows and a cost-of-living crisis. These factors will cause serious challenges for migrants, as for many other groups in Ireland.

This chapter provides an introduction to and context for the indicators used in the Monitoring Report. Section 1.1 considers the benefits and challenges of monitoring integration. It starts with a discussion on the definition and measurement of integration, followed by an overview of the indicators and their strengths and limitations and, finally, a review of the challenges of monitoring outcomes among migrants, particularly in relation to defining the migrant population. Section 1.2 presents an overview of the current main trends in migration in Ireland, which will help inform our understanding of both the composition of the migrant population and how it is changing over time. The chapter's appendix (see p. 21) provides some information about the composition of migrants in terms of region of origin, duration of residence, age, gender and nationality to provide some context for other chapters.

This Monitoring Report sets out to retain continuity with the previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, and the structure of the report is designed to replicate that of previous Monitoring Reports to be able to assess change over time. However, this report is the first to use place of birth instead of nationality in order to more accurately capture those born abroad who have naturalised. Additionally, there are some innovations to individual chapters, such as a new measure of housing affordability to better capture inequalities in housing (Chapter 4).

1.1 THE BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF MONITORING INTEGRATION

1.1.1 Defining and measuring integration

Integration is a complex and often highly disputed term, meaning that defining integration is not straightforward. What it means to be 'integrated' into a society is different for different people, for example, depending on their perspective, what they value, where they are living and how long they plan to stay. When migrants arrive in a country, they need to 'find a place for themselves' – find a home, a job, income, schools and access to health care in their host country. Accordingly, scholars have defined integration as 'the process of becoming an accepted part of society' (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016, p. 14), both as an individual and as a group.

Integration is a two-way street (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016), and the definitions of integration used by the European Union (EU) and in Ireland also emphasise that integration is a process that involves adjustments following the arrival of migrants. According to the EU's 2004 Common Basic Principles of Integration, integration is 'a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all migrants and residents of Member States' (see Appendix 1, p. 114), and this is reflected in the new EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021–2027)

(European Commission, 2020).¹ In Ireland, integration is defined as the ‘ability to participate to the extent that a person needs and wishes in all major components of society without having to relinquish his or her own cultural identity’ (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017, p. 11).

As a benchmark for how migrants are faring, the social and economic outcomes of Irish-born residents are compared to foreign-born residents in this report. This is less in a normative sense – that they ‘should’ appear the same – but more to see in which areas they face disadvantages and identify where additional measures may be required to tackle social inequality. It is important to acknowledge that migrants also face unique challenges, such as discrimination and racism (McGinnity, Quinn et al., 2021). There is little focus on racism in the Migrant Integration Strategy, but, following a consultation, a NAPAR is currently being developed and is due to be released in early 2023 (Anti-racism Committee, forthcoming).

Monitoring integration can be particularly important when approaches are ‘mainstreamed’ within government departments, that is, located in the department delivering the service (education, social welfare, health, etc.), as opposed to having a dedicated ‘ministry for integration’. Mainstreaming is the main policy approach in Ireland in the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021, although the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth has oversight of integration issues. While mainstreaming can be an effective policy approach to the integration of migrants, particularly in the longer term, it is not without risks. Mainstreaming approaches have been criticised for ignoring the specific needs of migrants, such as host-country language provision and other settlement services (Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021; Scholten et al., 2016).

Monitoring integration in one central place, in a report like this, across several dimensions, using nationally representative data on a regular basis, ensures that focus on migrant integration does not get lost. This can help identify areas where migrants are struggling and their needs not being met, as well as keeping integration on the policy agenda. In addition to the policy argument for monitoring, Bijl and Verweij (2012) highlight the benefits of providing factual information about immigrants and integration to inform political and public debate on the issue. Of course, any monitoring exercise is only as good as the indicators on which it is based. This is the subject of the next section.

1 This was adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic policies to promote the integration of third-country nationals in Member States.

1.1.2 Integration indicators

Good indicators are necessary for adjusting policy and assessing progress on integration. The framework for this monitoring report on integration is based on the set of integration indicators known as the ‘Zaragoza indicators’ which arose from the EU’s Common Basic Principles and are consistent with them (see Appendix 1, p. 114).² Table 1.1 presents the indicators used in this Monitoring Report on Integration, which draw on those proposed at Zaragoza (see also Appendix 2, p. 115). This section considers the rationale behind the indicators and some of their strengths and limitations.

TABLE 1.1 OUTLINE OF CORE INDICATORS, BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO ZARAGOZA INDICATORS

1. Employment	Employment rate Unemployment rate Activity rate
2. Education	Highest educational attainment Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment Share of early leavers from education and training Mean English reading and mathematics scores for 15-year-olds (PISA)*
3. Social inclusion	Median net income (household income and equivalised income) AROP rate Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population
4. Active citizenship	Ratio of non-EEA immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population (best estimate) Share of non-EEA immigrants holding permanent or LTR permits (best estimate) Share of immigrants among elected local representatives

Note In some instances, the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2, p. 115). For example, updated PISA data is not available for 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Non-EEA migrants are the focus for citizenship acquisition indicator (see Chapter 5 for discussion).

First, the indicators used in this report are the best that are currently available and are largely focused on outcomes in key domains of integration. For each indicator,

² Adopted in April 2010 by EU ministers with responsibility for integration at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration, Zaragoza, Spain (April 2010) and approved in the Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies. See European Commission, 2010.

outcomes for the foreign-born population are compared with those for the Irish-born population.³

Second, there is a limited number of core indicators that are largely drawn from existing nationally representative data. This is a cost-effective strategy that provides reasonably up-to-date information and permits a comparison of the situation of immigrants to that of Irish-born. By using representative, randomly sampled data, inferences can be made about the whole migrant population living in Ireland, not just a small, specific group. Nonetheless, the reliance on ongoing, large-scale survey exercises also has several disadvantages:

1. The core indicators principally measure the ‘structural’ dimensions of integration – aspects such as labour-market outcomes, educational attainment, income and poverty. Subjective indicators, such as sense of belonging, identity or the experience of discrimination, are important to people’s experiences (see Diehl et al., 2015). Yet these are not measured on an ongoing basis. Similarly, English-language skills have a salient impact on a range of outcomes (for the labour market, see McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020) but are not regularly measured in social surveys.
2. All these indicators study integration at the individual level. As such, this overlooks the role that local communities play in the integration of migrants. In some countries, migrant communities can be spatially segregated in or concentrated in disadvantaged areas.⁴ This report measures integration at a national level, though we acknowledge that integration often takes place at a local level and can vary across neighbourhoods and across the country (Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021).
3. The focus on nationally representative survey and administrative data means that the Monitoring Report on Integration lacks a sense of the lived experience of integration, which is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies (e.g., Lima, 2020; C. Murphy et al., 2022).

A third principle is that indicators should be simple to understand, accessible and transparent. In order to make sure that indicators are meaningful for both policymakers and the general public, they need to be based on concepts familiar to people and defined clearly (see Appendix 2, p. 115). For this reason, statistical modelling is kept to a minimum in this Monitoring Report on Integration, although there are some exceptions to this where background characteristics, such as age

3 The two exceptions to this principle of comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning citizenship and long-term residence (see Table 1.1), which describe the context and opportunities for integration rather than measure empirical outcomes.

4 Fahey et al. (2019) find that there is no evidence that migrants in general are concentrated in disadvantaged areas in Ireland. However, they find that migrants with poor English language skills tend to live in areas of higher unemployment, particularly in the urban areas of Dublin, Cork and Limerick.

and education, are likely to play a substantial role in understanding outcomes (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4).

Finally, the indicators are designed to be comparable over time in order to track change. This emphasis on change is crucial for two reasons. First, from a policy perspective, the direction of change is important because it can identify trends and signal whether certain policies are having an effect. Second, from a measurement perspective, monitoring change over time can detect meaningful trends, even when an indicator might not accurately capture the absolute levels of an outcome.

Yet it is important to acknowledge that keeping the indicators consistent over time to allow for monitoring also brings disadvantages. It means that certain indicators are given prominence, such as employment rates, poverty and deprivation and early school-leaving, while others, such as overeducation, job quality or English-language skills, tend to get neglected (see also Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021). Earlier versions of the Monitoring Reports on Integration included a special theme to partly address this. Themes included migrants in the workplace, migrant children, migrants' sports participation, attitudes to migrants and migrant skills and competencies.

More recently, separate detailed analytic reports have been produced to complement the indicators in the Monitoring Reports on Integration and to provide a more comprehensive assessment of migrant integration. These topics include the residential concentration of migrants (Fahey et al., 2019), citizenship acquisition (Groarke et al., 2020), COVID-19 and foreign nationals (Enright et al., 2020) and, more recently, housing and family (McGinnity et al., 2022), wages and working conditions (Laurence et al., 2023) and trends in international-protection applications (Cunniffe et al., 2022). Future Monitoring Reports might consider some expanding of scope, reorientation or incorporating migrants themselves in the selection of indicators through a consultation process (Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021; McGinnity, Russell et al., 2021). We return to this point in the conclusion.

1.1.3 Challenges of monitoring outcomes among migrants

Even when indicators are agreed and defined, monitoring migrant outcomes is challenging. This is related to how migrants are defined, how they are represented in survey data and how the nature and composition of the group changes over time.

In the Monitoring Reports on Integration, EU migrants are distinguished from non-EU migrants as they have very different rights to live and work in Ireland. Immigration from the UK has a longer tradition in Ireland, and the profile of UK migrants is very different from that of EU migrants. Thus, as in previous Monitoring Reports, UK migrants are separately distinguished. The withdrawal of the UK from

the EU in 2020 makes this even more important.⁵ EU-West migrants and EU-East migrants are also distinguished separately.⁶ In this Monitoring Report on Integration, where data permit, we distinguish non-EU migrants into the following groups: Africa; North America, Australia and Oceania (NAAO); Asia, which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; Other Europe;⁷ and Rest of the World, which comprises Central America and the Caribbean, South America, the Near and Middle East, and other countries based on distinctions in the Labour Force Survey (LFS). However, where data from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) are used (Chapter 4), these latter groups are aggregated into a ‘non-EU’ category because the smaller sample sizes do not allow for finer-grained distinctions.

The current report relies on the same distinction of migrant groups as previous reports but makes an important change to how migrants are defined. In the previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, the general definition of migrants was based on nationality (see Table A1.5, p. 25, for the overlap). This meant that migrants who had settled in Ireland and who had since naturalised as Irish citizens were identified as Irish nationals rather than as migrants. To capture the migrant population more accurately, the 2022 Monitoring Report on Integration therefore moves to a definition based on their place of birth. Thus, while the overall structure of the report is designed to replicate that of previous Monitoring Reports, the nationality definition is changed to a place-of-birth definition to include migrants who are Irish nationals. However, as we discuss below, this new definition still comes with several limitations.

A first challenge is that the place-of-birth definition does not count the second generation: those born in Ireland to migrant parents count as Irish-born. This means that the report only measures integration outcomes of people who migrated themselves and does not look at the outcomes for their descendants.

A second challenge is that defining migrants by place of birth includes not only those who were born abroad who have become naturalised Irish citizens but also those born outside the Republic of Ireland who are Irish nationals by birth (in Northern Ireland) or descent (mainly the children of Irish emigrants to the UK, but also other destinations). (See Groarke and Dunbar, 2020, for a detailed discussion

5 Note the UK is not separately distinguished in Eurostat statistics on immigration flows (see Fig. 1.1 and accompanying discussion).

6 EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises EU Member States that joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia).

7 This category includes people born in Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Turkey, Serbia, Albania, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Faroe Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gibraltar, the Vatican/Holy See, San Marino, Monaco and Kosovo.

of citizenship acquisition in Ireland.) This means that it is particularly important to separate the UK-born migrants from other migrant groups, but also to be aware that the composition of this group in particular has changed since previous Monitoring Reports which defined migrants on the basis of nationality. Many UK migrants are Irish nationals, and the UK-born make up one-third of migrants in Ireland in 2020–2022.

A third challenge is that large surveys do not always effectively collect information on migrants. Large, nationally representative datasets are designed to represent and record details not of migrants but, rather, of the whole population. Small numbers, in particular migrant groups or small samples, mean disparate groups need to be combined into larger composite categories based on regional groupings. For example, in the analysis of poverty, the small sample size means that Brazilians, Indians and Nigerians need to be combined, with many other countries of origin, into one ‘non-EU’ group, which is clearly problematic. McGinnity, Privalko et al. (2020) show that these regional groupings can hide considerable variation between those from different countries. We return to this point in Chapter 6. A related concern is the tendency for certain groups to be under-represented in survey data, either because of language skills or fear of ‘official’ surveys. Besides, surveys such as the LFS and SILC only interview private households by design. This means that they exclude some potentially very vulnerable groups by design: the homeless and those living in residential homes or in Direct Provision centres.

A fourth challenge with monitoring integration is the change in size and composition of the migrant population over time. Recent migration flows to and from Ireland illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic conditions: economic growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates immigration, whereas recession and falling labour demand typically stimulates emigration.⁸ The COVID-19 pandemic and associated travel restrictions had a major impact on migration trends (see Box 1.1, p. 12). This is why migration flows are so important for understanding changes in the characteristics of migrants living in Ireland; this is discussed in the next section.

Notwithstanding the challenges and limitations of a monitoring exercise such as this, this report is the only one of its kind in Ireland, allowing for comparisons over time and across life domains in key indicators of migrant integration and, as such, is an important resource for policy, research and public debate.

8 Even if economic conditions remain stable, the rising cost of living and the difficulties in finding accommodation due to the housing crisis in Ireland could have a significant impact on future migration patterns.


1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN IRELAND

In this section, we discuss the main trends in migration in recent years with a particular focus on developments since the 2020 Monitoring Report on Integration.

In 2021, Ireland had one of the highest percentages of migrant residents among EU Member States. At 18 per cent of the total population, Ireland ranked eighth in the EU (see Fig. 1.1).⁹ Previously, most migration to Ireland was from within the EU, with a large share of the migrant residents born in other EU Member States. However, in 2022, the proportion of residents born outside of the EU had overtaken the proportion of migrants from within the EU (see Fig. 1.1). The percentage of migrants from other EU countries decreased from 13 per cent in 2019 to 6.7 per cent in 2022, while the share of migrants from outside the EU increased from about 4 per cent to 11 per cent. This change largely reflects the effect of Brexit since residents who were born in the UK were now counted as born outside of the EU whereas they would have been recorded as born in another EU country in previous years.¹⁰

9 Source: Eurostat. Note that 'foreign-born' are typically first-generation immigrants and may consist of both non-Irish nationals and foreign-born nationals of the host country.


10 Foreign-born also includes those born in Northern Ireland.

FIGURE 1.1 FOREIGN-BORN RESIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION IN EU COUNTRIES, 2021

Source Eurostat (MIGR_POP3CTB). Data include those who were usually resident in the reporting country at 1 January 2021.
Notes The following data for Luxembourg are excluded: 34 per cent born in other EU Member States, 15 per cent born in non-EU Member States. Stateless residents not included. Following the UK's departure from the EU, people born in the UK are counted as born outside of the EU in these statistics.

Ireland has experienced extensive migratory change over the past two decades, linked to changing economic conditions and the expansion of the EU (see Fig. 1.2). Prior to the mid-1990s, Ireland was a country characterised by net emigration, but this changed during a period of economic growth from the early 1990s. In 2004, the enlargement of the EU led to particularly high net inward migration, and immigration peaked during the economic boom in 2006/2007 (see Fig. 1.2). However, as Ireland entered recession in 2008, immigration fell dramatically, and, by 2010, Ireland re-entered a phase of significant net emigration, across all groups.¹¹

¹¹ All groups (Irish, UK, EU-West, EU-East and Rest of the World) saw an increase in emigration between 2010 and 2011 (Irish, UK, EU-West, EU-East) and between 2011 and 2012 (Irish, EU-West, EU-East and Rest of the World).

FIGURE 1.2 IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION, 1997–2022

Source Central Statistics Office (CSO) 'Population and Migration Estimates',¹² various releases.

Note The reference period for the population estimates is the end of April of each year, so 2022 estimates include the first wave of arrivals from Ukraine. See www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-pme/populationandmigrationestimatesapril2022/backgroundnotes/ for further details.

Since 2015, the number of immigrants has been larger than the number of emigrants. Net migration remained positive during the years following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, though estimates provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) presented in Figure 1.2 show that net migration declined in 2020 and 2021 before increasing substantially in 2022. The 2022 net migration figure stood at an estimated 61,100, meaning that 61,100 more people came to Ireland to live than those who emigrated.

The changes in the net migration numbers were mostly related to changes in the number of incoming migrants rather than to the number of emigrants. In the period between 2020 and 2022, the trend of decreased emigration stopped and more or less stagnated, while immigration declined slightly in 2020, then dipped in 2021 before rising again in 2022.

While there was a decline in the number of incoming migrants in 2020 and 2021, likely due to the COVID-19 restrictions and border closures (see Box 1.1), there was a big increase in inward migration in the 12 months to April 2022, which includes

12 The CSO creates these population and migration estimates using the LFS and the Census, when available. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the number of Personal Public Service Numbers (PPSNs) allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued or renewed and the number of asylum applications. Updated estimates are expected in 2023, following a thorough analysis of the final detailed 2022 Census results.

the arrival of the first Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection. Compared to 2019, immigration flows were estimated to have increased by about 36 per cent in 2022 (from around 88,600 to 120,700), though they are still 20 per cent lower than the immigration flow recorded before the Great Recession (2007; 151,100). Meanwhile, emigration flows have also increased by 9 per cent from 2019 to 2022 (from around 54,900 to 59,600) and are currently 29 per cent higher than the emigration flow recorded in 2007 (46,300).

BOX 1.1 THE IMPACT OF COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic had broad consequences for all areas related to migration, and the results contained in this report, such as the sharp decline in net inward migration in 2020 and 2021 and the subsequent increase in 2022, likely reflect some of the impacts of COVID-19. While some of these social and demographic changes may be permanent, others may have been more temporary and directly related to the measures taken to protect public health.

Residence permits and entry conditions

In 2020, a total of 43,872 entry visa applications were received, of which 37,592 were approved. This represents a marked decrease from the 155,761 applications received in 2019, and likely reflects the effects of several measures taken by the government to combat COVID-19, which directly impacted on entry conditions and the issuance of residence permits. Among those measures were:

- The introduction of travel restrictions and testing and quarantine requirements. For certain periods of time, all persons arriving from a third country were required to present a completed Passenger Locator Form and a negative PCR test and were subject to quarantine if they had been in a designated state in the 14 days preceding their arrival. Various countries were also added and removed from the lists of countries requiring an entry or transit visa. Unaccompanied minors and anyone who indicated they needed international protection were exempt from this quarantine.
- Restrictions on visa processing. The acceptance of visa applications was paused in March 2020. The processing of long-stay visas and visas for certain emergency and priority categories was resumed on a limited basis from the summer of 2020 but remained paused for short-stay visas until September 2021.
- Automatic extensions for those with valid permissions to reside in Ireland. To ensure that those affected by the restrictions did not fall into an irregular situation and that people who required an immigration permission to work in the State could continue to do so, a series of notices were issued granting automatic temporary extensions for

residence permissions valid in March 2020. The final extension expired in May 2022.

- The suspension of deportation orders and deportations. Deportations were only carried out in very restricted circumstances in the context of the pandemic. The Department of Justice also stopped processing voluntary return applications. The issuing of negative international-protection decisions was also paused because they led to an automatic process of voluntary return or deportation.

Estimates presented in Figure 1.3 show that the absolute number of immigrants increased for all national groups from 2019 to 2022, except for British nationals for whom it decreased by about 39 per cent from 2019 (7,400) to 2022 (4,500).¹³ However, for some migrant groups, the incoming number increased at a faster rate than for others. Immigration by (returning) Irish-born individuals increased by 7 per cent from 2019 (26,900) to 2022 (28,900). Among non-Irish groups, the largest change was among non-EU migrants whose immigration rate grew by roughly 106 per cent in 2022 (63,000) compared to 2019 (30,600). For the EU-West, immigration increased by 2 per cent in 2022 compared to 2019, and for the EU-East it grew by 4 per cent.

BOX 1.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN IRELAND

The Advisory Group on the Provision of Support including Accommodation to Persons in the International Protection Process published its report on reform of the process and accommodation for international-protection applicants in 2020. In 2021, the government published a White Paper to End Direct Provision and to Establish a New International Protection Support Service with detailed plans for the new system of accommodation for international-protection applicants. The White Paper was based on principles of integration from day one, human rights and equality, community engagement, high standards and a professional service. The White Paper sought to end Direct Provision by 2024, but in light of the arrival of Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection, which has put pressure on the reception system and responsible government departments, implementation will likely be delayed.

The White Paper is part of a process to improve the international-protection system, another part of which was an end-to-end review of the international-protection process conducted in 2021. The review aimed to identify ways to reduce

13 Note that migrants from the UK who are of Irish nationality will count as Irish in these flows, and it may be that some of this fall is due to the increasing number of UK nationals invoking their Irish nationality by descent or acquiring citizenship by naturalisation in recent years (see Chapter 5).


the processing time for international-protection applicants and made extensive recommendations, prioritising areas of the process at which significant delays occurred. This review took place in the context of increases in processing times during the COVID-19 pandemic, with an average processing time of 23 months for all initial cases and 14.7 months for appeals in 2021.

Multiple improvements were made for international-protection applicants since the last Monitoring Report on Integration. Labour-market access was made easier, with the waiting time before applicants can access the labour market reduced from nine months to six months and permits being valid for longer (12 months compared with six months previously). Following a Court of Justice of the EU decision, applicants who are subject to a transfer decision under the Dublin III Regulation are also entitled to labour-market access. Applicants were also granted access to driving licences and bank accounts, and funding has been announced specifically for civil-society organisations to work on the integration of international-protection applicants. Vulnerability assessments were also piloted and subsequently rolled out to all applicants in 2021.

A regularisation scheme for long-term undocumented migrants was announced in 2021. One strand of the scheme was specifically for international-protection applicants who had been in the international-protection process for a minimum of two years. Successful applicants will receive immigration permission that counts towards citizenship and unrestricted access to the labour market. In total, 3,193 applications were received, and, as of 9 December 2022, 1,375 positive decisions were issued through the scheme and a further 1,017 applicants were granted an equivalent permission by the International Protection Office.

At the time of writing, the reception system for international-protection applicants is under significant strain for multiple reasons. The first is the arrival of 74,458 Ukrainians as of 24 February 2023 (see Box 1.3). The second is the accommodation crisis across much of Ireland with severely restricted supply and high prices, which means that a significant amount of capacity in Direct Provision is used to accommodate people who have been recognised and can therefore leave Direct Provision but who cannot find housing. The third is the large increase in international-protection applications in 2022, with 13,651 applications until the end of 2022, a 186 per cent increase from the same period in 2019. As a result of this, and indications that many beneficiaries of international protection in other European countries were entering the country, the government suspended visa-free travel for people granted refugee status by other European countries for 12 months.


Due to the pause on issuing negative decisions in the context of the pandemic (see Box 1.1), 95 per cent of first-instance decisions and 99 per cent of final decisions issued in 2021 were positive – an artificially high recognition rate.

FIGURE 1.3 NATIONALITY OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS, 2012–2022

Source CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates', various releases.

Notes Year to end April of reference year. EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises EU Member States that joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia). The reference period for the population estimates is the end of April of each year. This means that the 2022 estimates include the first wave of arrivals from Ukraine. See www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-pme/populationandmigrationestimatesapril2022/backgroundnotes/ for further details.

Figure 1.4 shows the nationality breakdown of emigration flows from 2012 to 2022. The overall downward trend in emigration flows seems to have stagnated, although they are still substantially lower in 2022 (59,600) than at the peak in 2012 (83,000). However, there was substantial variation in the emigration trend across the different migrant groups. From 2019 to 2022, the outward flow of Irish nationals and the EU-East group decreased by 5 and 34 per cent, respectively. In contrast, the emigration flows of non-EU groups increased by 65 per cent (from an estimated 11,200 to 18,500), by 7 per cent for the EU-West group (from 4,500 to 4,800) and by 28 per cent for the UK group (from around 3,200 to 4,100).

FIGURE 1.4 NATIONALITY OF EMIGRATION FLOWS, 2012–2022

Source CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates', various releases.


Notes Year to April of reference year. EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises EU Member States that joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia).

Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of all registrations, or residence permissions, of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over for the period 2012–2021.¹⁴ This can give some indication about reasons for migration of non-EEA nationals living in Ireland, though this is not the primary purpose of these data.¹⁵ In 2021, there were 169,687 people with a residence permit in Ireland (see Fig. 1.5), representing a considerable increase since 2012 (120,281) but only a slight increase of 8 per cent compared to 2019 (168,297). The largest proportion of residence permissions issued were for other reasons (30 per cent), followed closely by remuneration reasons (work-related) (27 per cent), education reasons (20 per cent), family reasons (21 per cent) and protection reasons (3 per cent).¹⁶

14 The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals aged under 16 are not required to register and therefore are not included.

15 Stamp 4 is a very diverse category, for example, and some non-EEA nationals may have naturalised since coming to Ireland and thus not require a residence permit (see Chapter 5). Initial migration motives may also be mixed and may change over time (Platt, 2019).

16 The 'Other Reasons' category contains a diverse group of permits that do not fit into the main categories. These include permits issued to persons admitted under the Syrian Humanitarian Admission Programme, individuals who

FIGURE 1.5 RESIDENCE PERMISSIONS (NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER), 2012–2021

Source Eurostat (table: migr_resvalid).

Notes All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year.

There was an increase in the number of issued residence permissions in three of the five categories. First, the number of residence permissions issued for the purpose of work reasons increased by 15 per cent from 2019 (39,404) to 2021 (45,409). This is in line with the general trend of increasing residence permissions issued for work, which might be due in part to economic recovery and reforms of employment permit legislation in Ireland (see Barrett et al., 2017, for details of these reforms). Total employment permits issued rose from 5,200 in 2011 to over 16,000 annually in the 2019–2021 period (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, n.d.). An increasing share of permits in the period were also the more advantageous Critical Skills Employment Permit, making up just under half of all permits issued by 2018 (Laurence et al., 2023, Table 1.1).¹⁷

Second, the number of residence permissions issued for protection reasons went up by 28 per cent (from around 3,211 in 2019 to 4,448 in 2021). However, while the share of residence permissions issued for protection reasons increased slightly from 1.9 per cent in 2019 to 2.6 per cent in 2021, the share of residence permits for protection reasons continues to be very low, though these numbers do not include Ukrainians (see Box 1.3).

BOX 1.3 THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND ASSOCIATED MIGRATION FLOWS TO IRELAND

Arrivals from Ukraine

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and ensuing war, displaced persons from Ukraine are an important driver of the increased inflow of immigrants born outside of the EU into Ireland in 2022. Based on the number of issued PPSNs, the CSO estimated that 74,458 people from Ukraine arrived in Ireland in the period since the onset of the war on 24 February 2022 up to 24 February 2023. The majority of people arriving from Ukraine are women aged 20 years and over (46 per cent) and young people (male and female) under 20 (33 per cent). Of arrivals from Ukraine, 83 per cent showed activity in administrative data after 30 November 2022, implying that they are still in Ireland.

The Temporary Protection Directive

To provide immediate protection in EU countries for people displaced by the war in Ukraine, the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) (2001/55 EC) was activated on 4 March 2022 by EU Council Decision EU 2022/382. Temporary protection applies to the following three categories of people: (1) Ukrainian nationals residing in Ukraine on or before 24 February 2022; (2) stateless persons and nationals of third countries other than Ukraine, who benefitted from international protection or equivalent national protection in Ukraine before 24 February 2022; (3) family members of the above-mentioned groups where the family already existed in Ukraine prior to 24 February 2022.

People covered by the TPD initially received permission to reside in Ireland for one year. This was extended in February 2023 until March 2024. They can move through the EU with similar rights as an EU citizen, have access to employment, housing and education, and may claim child benefit for dependent children as well as working-age income supports such as jobseekers allowance or basic supplementary allowance. Thus, the rights of most Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection are different from those of international-protection applicants. Most of the people displaced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine are not counted in the regular asylum statistics because they are covered under the TPD. However, some Ukrainians still apply for asylum in Ireland, with 422 applications lodged in 2022.

Finally, the number of residence permits issued for other reasons increased by 25 per cent in 2021 (50,335) compared to 2019 (40,419). The number of residence permits issued for family reasons increased slightly between 2019 and 2021 (from around 34,317 to 35,440), even though migration for family reasons in Ireland remains comparatively low – one of the lowest in OECD countries (OECD, 2018). Moreover, the number of residence permissions issued for education reasons decreased sharply by 33 per cent between 2019 (50,946) and 2021 (34,055), making it the lowest number of issued residence permits for education reasons in more than ten years. This is likely related to the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted educational systems and saw many borders close (see also Box 1.1).

On residence permits, data released by the Department of Justice indicate that at year-end 2020, the top ten registered nationalities, accounting for over 60 per cent of all persons registered, were: India (21 per cent), Brazil (14 per cent), China (7 per cent), USA (6 per cent), Pakistan (5 per cent), Nigeria (4 per cent), Philippines (4 per cent), South Africa (3 per cent), Malaysia (2 per cent) and Canada (2 per cent) (Department of Justice, 2022).

CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX

In 2022, about one in five Irish residents (19.2 per cent) was foreign-born according to LFS data, and 13 per cent of all people living in Ireland was a non-Irish national (see Table A1.1). Of all residents in Ireland, the largest proportions of foreign-born people were those born in the UK (5.5 per cent) and EU-East (5.2 per cent). This is in line with the patterns observed in 2019 when UK and EU-East nationals also were the two largest groups of non-Irish nationals (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020).

TABLE A1.1 PLACE OF BIRTH (AND NATIONALITY) OF POPULATION BY YEAR, LFS Q1 2020–Q1 2022

Place of birth	Q1 2020		Q1 2021		Q1 2022	
	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count
Ireland	80.6	29,685	80.5	24,333	80.8	25,566
Born abroad	19.4	5,134	19.5	3,636	19.2	4,171
Of which:						
UK	5.2	1,575	5.8	1,648	5.5	1,506
EU-West	1.8	455	1.8	302	1.7	322
EU-East	5.5	1,271	5.3	587	5.2	848
Other Europe	1.2	343	0.6	81	0.8	165
NAAO	0.8	255	1.1	242	1.0	279
Africa	1.3	351	1.5	263	1.2	264
Asia	2.6	622	2.4	378	2.5	543
Rest of the World	1.1	262	1.1	135	1.2	244
Total	100.0	34,819	100.0	27,969	100.0	29,737
Nationality	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count
Irish	87.0	31,950	88.6	26,482	86.7	27,551
Non-Irish	13.0	2,881	11.4	1,318	13.3	2,380
Total	100.0	34,831	100.0	27,800	100.0	29,931

Source Own calculations from LFS microdata based on Q1 for the years 2020, 2021 and 2022.

Notes Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

However, it is worth noting that the proportion of the population that was UK national was 2.3 per cent in 2019, which is substantially lower than in 2022, with 5.5 per cent born in the UK. This likely reflects the change to the use of place of birth in place of nationality, which means that those born abroad who have naturalised are now identified as migrants. Indeed, 60.5 per cent of people born in the UK and residing in Ireland are Irish nationals (see Table A1.5) and would not have been captured as migrants in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration.

Compared to the Irish-born population, smaller proportions of the foreign-born residents were in the two youngest age groups (0–14 and 15–24 years) and the

oldest age group (65+ years) (see Table A1.2). Most foreign-born residents were aged 25–44 years (35.6 per cent), with migrants from the Rest of the World category (50.6 per cent), EU-East (46.1 per cent) and Asia (17.5 per cent) recording the highest proportions in this age range.

TABLE A1.2 PLACE OF BIRTH (AND NATIONALITY) BY AGE, LFS Q1 2022

Place of birth	0–14 years	15–24 years	25–44 years	45–64 years	65 + years	Total %	Total count
Ireland	22.0	11.8	17.3	26.1	24.6	100.0	27,551
Born abroad	7.1	9.1	35.6	30.4	10.2	100.0	2,380
Of which:							
UK	5.6	6.3	18.6	47.7	26.1	100.0	1,506
EU-West	6.7	7.4	39.5	29.0	8.0	100.0	322
EU-East	7.7	8.9	46.1	21.3	1.8	100.0	848
Other Europe	8.7	11.4	39.4	27.0	1.4	100.0	165
NAAO	13.3	14.3	25.7	30.6	11.3	100.0	279
Africa	4.0	11.4	32.3	39.1	5.3	100.0	264
Asia	7.8	12.5	45.2	17.5	2.6	100.0	543
Rest of the World	7.9	9.3	50.6	13.7	2.6	100.0	244
Nationality	0–14 years	15–24 years	25–44 years	45–64 years	65 + years	Total %	Total count
Irish	21.0	11.6	17.8	27.4	23.8	100.0	25,566
Non-Irish	10.0	8.6	40.0	23.3	7.9	100.0	4,171

Source Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2022.

Notes Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

However, these percentages are lower than in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration. This is likely because it takes time for migrants to be in a position where they can choose to become an Irish national, and the place-of-birth indicator captures those born abroad who have naturalised and who would have been missed by the old indicator. Accordingly, in 2022, the proportion of foreign-born residents aged 25–44 is, for example, lower (35.6 per cent, Table A1.2, row 3) than the proportion of non-Irish nationals in the same category (40 per cent, Table A1.2, final row). Likewise, the proportion of foreign-born aged 45–64 is larger (30.4 per cent) than the proportion of non-Irish nationals in that age group (23.3 per cent) (see also Table A1.2, final row).

Overall, the gender of non-Irish nationals and foreign-born residents in Ireland is largely balanced across all groups in 2022 (Table A1.3). However, two migrant groups stand out: the groups of migrants born in Africa or 'Other Europe' had greater proportions of males than females.

TABLE A1.3 PLACE OF BIRTH (AND NATIONALITY) BY GENDER, LFS Q1 2022

Place of birth	Male	Female	Total %	Total count
Ireland	48.7	51.3	100.0	25,566
Born abroad	48.5	51.5	100.0	4,171
Of which:				
UK	47.8	52.2	100.0	1,506
EU-West	49.4	50.6	100.0	322
EU-East	47.9	52.1	100.0	848
Other Europe	54.2	45.6	100.0	165
NAAO	47.3	52.8	100.0	279
Africa	52.6	47.3	100.0	264
Asia	47.4	52.6	100.0	543
Rest of the World	49.3	50.7	100.0	244
Nationality	Male	Female	Total%	Total count
Irish	48.6	51.4	100.0	27,551
Non-Irish	49.1	50.9	100.0	2,380

Source Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2022.

Notes Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

Among those born abroad, there is considerable variation in how long they have been living in Ireland (see Table A1.4). Migrants from the UK were the greatest proportion of individuals who had been living in Ireland for more than 20 years, at 82 per cent, followed by migrants from NAAO at 46.7 per cent. The largest proportions of recently arrived migrants (those who had lived in Ireland for less than five years) were recorded for the Rest of the World category (41.8 per cent) and Asia (30.8 per cent). The majority of migrants from EU-East, who constitute the largest part of the foreign-born population in Ireland, had been in Ireland for between 11 and 20 years (56.9 per cent).

TABLE A1.4 PLACE OF BIRTH (AND NATIONALITY) BY DURATION OF RESIDENCE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN IRELAND, LFS Q1 2022

Place of birth	<5 years	5–10 years	11–20 years	>20 years	Total (%)	Total count
UK	6.7	9.0	17.2	82.0	100.0	1,462
EU-West	19.7	23.6	24.2	30.0	100.0	317
EU-East	8.6	19.2	56.9	7.6	100.0	838
Other Europe	26.9	27.6	19.2	20.0	100.0	160
NAAO	21.6	13.5	21.2	46.7	100.0	277
Africa	16.3	18.0	31.2	34.0	100.0	255
Asia	30.8	27.1	19.8	14.0	100.0	530
Rest of the World	41.8	26.8	12.2	8.3	100.0	243
Nationality (of those who are foreign-born)	<5 years	5–10 years	11–20 years	>20 years	Total (%)	Total count
Irish	4.5	8.3	27.0	72.6	100.0	1,835
Non-Irish	21.7	23.1	31.4	17.7	100.0	2,247

Source Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2022.

Notes Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

Of the foreign-born residents in Ireland, 33.2 per cent was an Irish national (see Table A1.5). Of the foreign-born population, the group of migrants from NAAO had the largest proportion of Irish nationals, at 63.8 per cent, followed by the group of migrants from the UK at 60.5 per cent, and Africa at 43.7 per cent. About three in ten people who were born in Asia or an 'Other Europe' country were an Irish national. The migrant groups with the smallest proportions of Irish nationals were the EU-East and EU-West at 9.9 and 10.0 per cent, respectively. This might be because the incentive to naturalise is smaller for them than for non-EU nationals because migrants from within the EU enjoy rights and entitlements that are very similar to those held by Irish citizens (also see Chapter 5 on active citizenship).

TABLE A1.5 PLACE OF BIRTH BY (IRISH) NATIONALITY, LFS Q1 2022

	Irish national%	Total count
Irish-born	99.4	25,566
Foreign-born	33.2	4,171
Of which:		
UK	60.5	1,506
EU-West	10.0	322
EU-East	9.9	848
Other Europe	30.5	165
NAAO	63.8	279
Africa	43.7	264
Asia	29.7	543
Rest of the World	17.1	244
Total	86.7	29,737

Source Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2022.

Notes Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

CHAPTER 2

Migrants' employment and integration

Sarah Curristan, James Laurence and Stefanie Sprong

As outlined in Chapter 1, employment is an important reason for migration, and many migrants arrive in Ireland on an employment permit (see also Box 2.1). Through both their skill contributions and economic contributions, migrants are a vital component of the labour market of all European states (Taran, 2012). In addition to the obvious financial benefits, engagement in the labour market can offer migrants access to social networks and the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the host society. As such, employment is an essential strand for the social integration of migrants within their host country (OECD, 2018). In this regard, the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 has highlighted the essential role of employment for the purposes of social integration (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). Of course, jobs vary considerably according to wages and working conditions: this chapter does not explicitly focus on job quality but summarises key findings from a recent programme publication on wages and working conditions among non-Irish nationals (Laurence et al., 2023).

To contextualise our analysis, the period since the 2020 Monitoring Report on Integration has seen significant social and political events that have greatly affected migration. Chief among them are the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated public-health restrictions (see section 2.1); the war in Ukraine, which has resulted in the large-scale migration of Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection (see Box 1.3); as well as the ongoing consequences of the UK's departure from the EU. Each of these has, in its own way, affected migration flows to Ireland (see Chapter 1). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions on work had a significant impact on the Irish labour market. All these factors may bear consequences for labour-market composition and employment outcomes for migrants.

This chapter examines key indicators of employment integration including rates of employment, unemployment, labour-market activity and self-employment between migrant and Irish-born workers. The data analysed within this chapter are drawn from the Irish LFS. The LFS is a large-scale nationally representative household survey. It is administered by the CSO on a quarterly basis. Our analysis relies on Quarter 1 (Q1) of the years 2020, 2021 and 2022 to examine these employment indicators over this period. We use respondents' place of birth as opposed to nationality to identify migrants but show differences by nationality at the bottom of key tables for reference.

Section 2.1 examines employment, unemployment and activity rates. Consistent with previous Monitoring Reports in the series, we adhere to the same definitions of these concepts, as set out by the International Labour Office (ILO). Section 2.2 further examines potential differences in these labour-market outcomes by both age and sex and considers self-employment. Sector and occupational differences are not presented, but we discuss previous recent research on wages and working conditions among non-Irish nationals (see Laurence et al., 2023) to supplement the analysis of key labour-market indicators.

BOX 2.1 ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT

All nationals of the EEA may migrate to Ireland, without restriction, to take up employment. Ireland also receives a substantial number of migrants from the UK. The Common Travel Agreement (CTA) between Ireland and the UK grants citizens of both states the right to live, work, travel and study anywhere within the CTA.

For non-EEA nationals, permissions are required to reside and to work in Ireland. Most newly arrived non-EEA workers hold a Stamp 1 registration certificate and an employment permit. The employment permit system has been revised several times, and permits differ, but broadly the system requires many non-EEA nationals to have an employment permit for a specific job with a specific employer before entering the country.¹⁸ There are nine types of permits, the two most common of which are the Critical Skills Employment Permit and the General Employment Permit.¹⁹

The Critical Skills Employment Permit is linked to occupations that the Irish government have recognised as essential for economic growth, or occupations facing a skills shortage, including occupations in the areas of information and communications technology, engineering and health care. The Critical Skills Employment Permit is intended to attract highly skilled workers to the Irish labour market and to encourage them to reside permanently in the State.²⁰ Critical Skills Employment Permits are issued to non-EEA workers earning a minimum of €64,000 per year; or, for jobs that are linked to recognised skills shortages, the job must offer remuneration of at least €32,000 per year, and relevant qualifications are required.²¹ General Employment Permits are available for occupations with an

18 The most recent substantial revision to work permits was with the enactment of the Employment Permit (Amendments) Bill in 2014.

19 For more details on the nine permit types, see <https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/What-We-Do/Workplace-and-Skills/Employment-Permits/Permit-Types/>

20 After two years, they can be issued with a residence permit to work in the State without an employment permit. Since March 2019, spouses/partners of Critical Skills Employment Permit holders may work without an employment permit.

21 Certain occupations are deemed ineligible (see <https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/what-we-do/workplace-and-skills/employment-permits/employment-permit-eligibility/ineligible-categories-of-employment/>). All salary thresholds quoted refer to regulations at the time of writing (October 2022).

annual salary of €30,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations with salaries below this.²² In general, holders of General Employment Permits may only change employers after 12 months and must apply for a new permit to do so.

In total, 16,275 employment permits were issued during 2021. In response to the COVID-19 restrictions, from March 2020, a series of temporary extensions were granted by the Minister for Justice to existing permit-holders. The ninth such extension was granted in December 2021 for those whose permits were due to expire on 31 May 2022, and included individuals whose permits had previously been extended (Murphy and Sheridan, 2022).

Support with accessing employment

Several support organisations may be accessed by migrants in Ireland, including Intreo, a service of the Department of Social Protection. Intreo offers job advertisements, advice for jobseekers and upskilling courses among other services. Migrants who are in receipt of jobseeker's payments may also be referred to JobPath, a job-seeking support service provided by private companies on contract from the Department of Social Protection. These supports are available to EU citizens and non-EEA citizens with Stamp 4 residence permission. The EPIC (Employment for People from Immigrant Communities) Programme is a migrant employability programme funded by the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth; it is specifically targeted towards international-protection applicants and offers career guidance, interviewing and CV skills, and work-experience opportunities.

Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) has a range of responsibilities, including facilitating the recognition of qualifications gained outside the State, through the National Academic Recognitions Information Centre (NARIC), located within the QQI. NARIC maintains an online international qualifications database, which lists certain foreign qualifications and provides advice regarding the comparability of a qualification to one gained in Ireland. Individuals whose qualifications are not listed in the database may apply to NARIC to have their qualification recognised.²³

2.1 THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND MIGRANT EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES

Owing particularly to the impact of COVID-19, the time period under examination (2020–2022) has been one of substantial change for employment and working conditions in Ireland. To curtail the transmission of COVID-19, the national stay-at-

22 Spouses and partners of General Employment Permits may not work unless they hold their own employment permit (Arnold et al., 2019; see <https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/what-we-do/workplace-and-skills/employment-permits/permit-types/general-employment-permit>).

23 NARIC Ireland is charged with implementing the Lisbon Recognition Convention which is primarily concerned with recognition for the purposes of higher education, though obviously not only used for those purposes.

home order was issued by then Taoiseach Leo Varadkar on 29 March 2020. Therefore, we consider the data from Q1 2020 of the LFS to be largely unaffected by the impact of public-health restrictions.²⁴

From 29 March onwards, public-health restrictions meant that many workers were obliged to work from home where possible, except essential front-line workers (Redmond and McGuinness, 2020). Those unable to work because of COVID-19 were offered government supports (Enright et al., 2020). Income supports were made available to both Irish-born and migrants through two schemes: the COVID-19 Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) and the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS). Certain sectors of employment were more affected by public-health restrictions than others – with entertainment, the arts, hospitality and non-essential retail worst affected. In 2021, for the duration of Q1, the country was under strict Level 5 public-health restrictions to mitigate the spike in cases following the 2020 Christmas period. This included instruction to work from home unless employed in health, social care or other essential roles (Department of the Taoiseach, 2020).

Data from Q1 of 2022 reflects a period in which there was a considerable easing of restrictions. Although COVID-19 transmission remained high within the community, Taoiseach Micheál Martin announced the easing of public-health restrictions from 22 January 2022.²⁵ The emergency legislation implemented through the Health (Preservation and Protection and Other Emergency Measures in the Public Interest) Act 2020, which gave the Minister for Health power to introduce regulations and measures to mitigate the spread of the virus, expired on 31 March 2022.²⁶ As such, with consideration of the impact on employment and working conditions, we view these three time points as reflective of pre (Q1 2020), mid (Q1 2021) and late pandemic/normalisation (Q1 2022) stages.

Employment is defined as an individual of working age who carried out paid work in the week prior to the survey. An unemployed individual is one who, in the week prior to the survey, was without work and who was available for work in the next two weeks, and who actively sought work in the preceding four weeks. Because workers receiving COVID-related income supports were on temporary layoff and did not count as unemployed under this definition, the ILO indicators do not fully

24 See also note by the CSO on the impact of COVID-19 on LFS Q1 data: www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/lfs/labourforcesurvey/lfsquarter12020/

25 This included, inter alia, scrapping of early closure times for hospitality venues, scrapping of capacity reductions for indoor and outdoor events and phased return to work for those in offices. See www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/time-to-be-ourselves-again-taoiseach-confirms-end-to-almost-all-covid-19-restrictions-1.4782227

26 See Citizens Information, 'Public Health Measures for COVID-19', www.citizensinformation.ie/en/health/covid19/public_health_measures_for_covid19.html

capture the impact of COVID. Table 2.1 thus presents the overall employment rate for those aged 15–64 years in Q1 of the LFS for each of the years 2020, 2021 and 2022. This is presented alongside the COVID-19 adjusted estimate; this estimate was calculated by the CSO by subtracting those who received the PUP at the end of each quarter of the corresponding year from the numbers in employment as measured in Q1 of the LFS.²⁷ The adjusted figure provides a lower bound estimate for the numbers in employment. In Q1 of 2021, the employment rate is 69.8 per cent. This decreases to approximately 61.1 per cent when those on PUP payments at the end of the quarter are accounted for. In Q1 of 2021, the effect of the pandemic is more readily observable. The employment rate is lower than that of the previous year at 65.6 per cent, with an estimated lower bound of 52 per cent when the COVID-19 adjustment is applied. In Q1 of 2022, the employment rate has increased to 72.8 per cent, 3 per cent higher than that of 2020.

TABLE 2.1 EMPLOYMENT RATE AND ADJUSTED ESTIMATE FOR Q1 2020–2022

	Q1 2020	Q1 2021	Q1 2022
Employment rate (%) (standard LFS methodology)	69.8	65.6	72.8
Employment rate (%) (COVID adjusted rate by CSO)	61.1	52.0	N/A

Source LFS, Q1 2020–2022.

Note Employment rate restricted to individuals from 15 to 64 years.


International research has indicated that employment outcomes for migrants were disproportionately affected by COVID-19 (Fassani and Mazza, 2020). In Ireland, using LFS data, Enright et al. (2020) found a substantial decrease in employment for all workers from Q1 to Q2 of 2020; however, Eastern European nationals experienced the most significant drop in employment during this period, with a particularly significant decline experienced by women from Eastern Europe. By comparison, Western Europeans were less affected by the decline in employment levels – possibly because of their high prevalence in sectors where the nature of the work facilitated remote working. The inclusion of data from Q1 2022, aligning with this ‘late pandemic/normalisation’ stage, allows us to examine whether these negative effects have in any way subsided.

We turn now to examine the employment rate, unemployment rate and labour-market activity among foreign-born and Irish-born individuals of working age (15–

27 Further details on the CSO’s adjusted estimate for the employment rate can be found at CSO, ‘Information note on implications of COVID-19 on the Labour Force Survey,’ www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/lfs/informationnoteonimplicationsofcovid-19onthelabourforcesurvey/

64 years), using the ILO definitions described above.²⁸ Figure 2.1 illustrates key employment indicators for the years 2020 to 2022, using respondents' place of birth to determine Irish and migrant individuals. In general, the data indicates that the migrant population has higher rates of employment, unemployment and labour-market activity compared to the Irish-born population. This is consistent with the findings of previous Monitoring Reports on Integration (for example, McGinnity, Fahey et al., 2018; McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020), with the caveat that previous Monitoring Reports in the series identified migrants on the basis of nationality rather than place of birth.

FIGURE 2.1 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS FOR IRISH-BORN AND MIGRANTS, 2020–2022



Source Q1 of LFS 2020, 2021, 2022, working-age population (15–64). Employment, unemployment and labour-market activity are defined using the ILO definitions (see text for details).

Note Sample restricted to individuals aged 15–64 years. * denotes where migrants significantly differ from Irish-born.

Migrants demonstrate significantly higher levels of employment than Irish-born individuals in both 2020 and 2022. Notably, the employment rate for both groups dips slightly in 2021 – likely due to the effects of the pandemic-related restrictions described above – and the two groups did not significantly differ in terms of their employment rate. Note that, as Table 2.1 shows, the overall COVID-adjusted employment rate was lower than the ILO employment rate: this chapter presents the ILO definition of employment to be consistent across years and to be consistent with previous reports in this series. In 2022, the employment rate increased to 72 per cent for Irish-born and 76 per cent for foreign-born individuals, higher than that

28 Employment and activity rates are calculated as the percentage of the population of working age, while the unemployment rate is the proportion of the labour force (employed and unemployed) who are unemployed.

recorded pre-pandemic. In relation to unemployment, migrants and Irish workers differed significantly across all three years, with higher rates of unemployment observed among migrants than among those who were born in Ireland. As anticipated, we see an increase in the unemployment rate during 2021, with 6 per cent unemployment recorded among Irish-born individuals and 9 per cent among those born outside of Ireland. In 2022, the levels of unemployment are very similar to that of pre-pandemic levels observed in the 2020 data, at approximately 5 per cent for Irish-born and 6 per cent for foreign-born.

Finally, Figure 2.1 illustrates that the activity rate is significantly higher among migrants for each of the three years. As with the other indicators, the activity rate dips slightly in 2021, to 70 per cent for Irish-born and 72 per cent for foreign-born individuals. By Q1 2022, the activity rate stood at 75 per cent for Irish-born and 81 per cent for foreign-born. This reflects a respective 3 per cent and 6 per cent increase on the rates for these groups as recorded in Q1 2020. Considering all migrants, it seems that while they were disproportionately impacted by restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, early indications from 2022 are that migrant employment has recovered. Note these are not necessarily the same individuals; this is a point we return to in the conclusion.

Previous research has indicated that employment outcomes for migrants can differ greatly depending on their country of origin (Bartolini et al., 2022; Laurence et al., 2023; McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020). In particular, unemployment rates have been found to be higher among migrants in many EU countries when compared to nationals of the host country, particularly among non-EU migrants (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; Li and Heath, 2020). In Table 2.2, we examine key employment indicators further by breaking these figures down by the regions of respondents' place of birth. Table 2.2 also includes employment indicators for Irish nationals and non-Irish nationals for comparison with previous Monitoring Reports on Integration: these indicate very small differences related to whether we consider nationality or place of birth.²⁹

29 Comparing those born in Ireland with those who are Irish nationals across the three years, the rates of employment, unemployment and activity are similar for both groups – within 0.5 per cent difference.

TABLE 2.2 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS, 2020–2022

Place of birth	Employment (%)			Unemployment (%)			Activity (%)		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Ireland	69.2	65.6	71.6	4.4	6.5	4.6	72.4	70.1	75.0
Born abroad	71.0*	65.8	76.4*	5.8*	9.1*	5.9*	75.4*	72.4*	81.2*
<i>Of which, born:</i>									
UK	70.5	65.2	74.6	5.1	8.4*	4.8	74.3	71.2	78.4*
EU-West	81.8*	75.6*	84.5*	3.6	8.0	7.1	84.9*	82.2*	90.9*
EU-East	74.8*	67.3	78.9*	5.6*	9.3*	6.1	79.3*	74.2	84.0*
Other Europe	63.9	[65.4]	76.1	8.3	[11.7]	8.6*	69.7	[74.1]	83.2*
NAAO	70.1	55.4*	74.7	7.4	8.4	4.0	75.8	60.5*	77.8
Africa	55.7*	59.0	74.1	11.4*	15.0*	7.7*	62.9*	69.5	80.3
Asia	66.4	62.9	71.8	5.9	7.6	4.4	70.6	68.1	75.0
Rest of the World	72.4	70.8	75.1	4.2	[7.3]	7.9*	75.7	76.4	81.5*
Nationality	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Irish	69.1	65.5	71.9	4.6	6.8	4.7	72.4	70.3	75.5
Non-Irish	72.6*	66.6	77.3*	5.7*	9.4*	5.9*	76.9*	73.5*	82.1*

Source LFS Q1 (2020, 2021, 2022), working-age population (aged 15–64).

Note Estimates in squares brackets have low denominators and should be read with caution [>50 and <100]. Denominators for 'employed' and 'active' is 'total working-age population'; denominator for 'unemployed' is 'total active population'. * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p<.05$ level.

Table 2.2 indicates that those born in EU-West and EU-East countries tend to have significantly higher levels of employment than Irish-born individuals. This finding is congruent with previous Monitoring Reports in the series (McGinnity, Fahey et al., 2018; McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). Generally, Irish-born individuals have similar levels of employment to those born in the UK, Other Europe, NAAO, Asia and the Rest of the World categories across the three years.

Past Monitoring Reports on Integration highlighted that African nationals have tended to have lower employment rates than Irish nationals (see, for example, McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). Table 2.2 demonstrates that in 2020 employment rates were indeed significantly lower among individuals who were born in Africa (55.7 per cent) when compared to Irish-born individuals (69.2 per cent). Yet, for the years 2021 (59 per cent) and 2022 (74.1 per cent), employment rates for this group have steadily increased and do not significantly differ from that of Irish-born (65.6

per cent and 71.6 per cent in 2021 and 2022 respectively).³⁰ Further analysis using principal economic status allows us to investigate non-work statuses in more detail. This reveals a similar pattern of increasing employment rates among African-born migrants to that in Table 2.2. And, while 17.5 per cent of African-born migrants reported they were in home duties in 2020, this fell dramatically in subsequent years: to 7.9 per cent in 2021 and 4.6 per cent in 2022. The proportion of the African-born group who were students also fell from 16 per cent in 2020/2021 to 10.5 per cent in 2022. The proportion of Asian-born migrants who were students also fell, but not as sharply (from 16.5 per cent in 2020 to 13.5 per cent in 2022). The fall in the proportion of students is consistent with the fall in student migration as a result of the pandemic-related restrictions on migration described in Chapter 1. Regarding the fall in those recording home duties, it could be that the changes to rules regarding work for those in the international-protection system has influenced African-born employment (see Box 1.2 and Cunniffe and Polakowski, 2023, for further discussion), with the caveat that the LFS samples private households and not those currently living in Direct Provision centres.³¹ Or it may simply be that a buoyant labour market has offered jobs for those previously unable to find work. Analysis including later waves of the LFS 2022 (LFS 2022 Q1–Q4) suggest that this pattern of higher African employment is maintained throughout 2022 (see Cunniffe and Polakowski, 2023). Thus, higher employment is not simply a feature of LFS 2022 Q1, though it remains to be seen whether the effect persists in 2023 and beyond.

Next, we examine unemployment rates, a key indicator of labour-market disadvantage. As displayed in Table 2.2, those born in the UK, EU-West, NAO and Asia categories tend to display similar rates to that of Irish-born in 2022. Individuals in the Other Europe and Rest of the World categories display similar unemployment rates in 2020 to that of Irish-born. However, in 2022, their rates of unemployment (8.6 per cent and 7.9 per cent for those born in the Other Europe and Rest of the World regions, respectively) are significantly higher than for Irish-born (4.6 per cent). In contrast, those born in EU-East countries had high unemployment rates in 2021 (9.3 per cent). By 2022, the group's unemployment rate was 6.1 per cent. This was higher than the Irish-born unemployment rate in 2022 (4.6 per cent), although the difference is not statistically significant. Past research has found that African nationals experienced greater unemployment in the Irish labour market and, in particular, African nationals of Black ethnicity (McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020) who are also much more likely to experience discrimination when seeking employment in Ireland (McGinnity, Grotti et al., 2018). Table 2.2 shows that African-born

30 Checks reveal an almost identical pattern in the years 2020, 2021 and 2022 using a nationality definition (that is, comparing Irish nationals to African nationals, as in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration).

31 Since the LFS only surveys private households, people living in Direct Provision centres are by definition not included. However, the survey could include people who had recently left Direct Provision and asylum applicants who do not reside in Direct Provision.

individuals also experienced higher unemployment rates in the period 2020–2022. That said, in 2022, the African unemployment rate, at 7.7 per cent, while significantly higher than the unemployment rate for Irish-born, is similar to those born in the Other Europe or the Rest of the World regions.

On activity rates for 2020–2022, the rates for individuals born in the EU-East and EU-West regions are consistently higher when compared to people born in Ireland (75 per cent). For example, in 2022, the activity rate was 90.9 per cent for those born in EU-West countries and 84 per cent for those born in EU-East countries. This finding is consistent with the activity rates reported in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). In contrast, for those born in UK, Other Europe, NAAO, Africa, Asia, and Rest of the World regions, the activity rate is broadly similar to that of Irish-born.

2.2 KEY LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS BY AGE, GENDER AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT

Table 2.3 shows the employment, unemployment and activity rates by place of birth for different age groups. Generally, the lowest employment and highest unemployment rates are observed for the youngest age group (aged 15 to 24). Many in this age group are still in education, and some may be seeking their first job. The highest employment and lowest unemployment rates are found for the prime working-age category (age 25–44). This pattern applies both to those born in Ireland and abroad. However, within the 25–44 age category, significantly lower employment and activity rates are found among migrants compared to Irish-born for 2020 and 2021, although no significant difference is observed for 2022. Furthermore, for the older working-age group (aged 45–64), migrants have significantly higher unemployment rates than Irish-born, even though their employment rates are similar. Higher unemployment and high employment/activity rates among older working-age migrants (45–64) is consistent with findings in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration. Reasons for this would require further investigation.³²

32 Russell et al. (2019) find that lower activity among older working-age adults in Ireland may stem from early retirement, early leave for family reasons or disability. It may be that we observe higher labour-force activity rates among older migrants because the reason they migrated to Ireland was for work, and they are highly work-motivated. Or it is because migrants cannot afford to take early retirement, or migrants may be less prone to disability as they are healthier, on average, than Irish-born (see Chapter 4). It may also be related to the countries of origin of the older working-age group (see Table 1.3).


TABLE 2.3 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY PLACE OF BIRTH AND AGE, 2020–2022

		Employment (%)			Unemployment (%)			Activity (%)		
15–24	Irish-born	41.9	34.5	47.3	10.6	14.9	7.3	46.9	40.6	51.0
	Born abroad	35.9*	32.0	49.4	10.4	19.4	8.2	40.1*	39.7	53.8
25–44	Irish-born	81.9	79.6	83.3	4.1	6.0	5.0	85.4	84.8	87.7
	Born abroad	78.0*	71.8*	82.3	5.2	7.8	5.4	82.3*	77.9*	86.9
45–64	Irish-born	71.9	69.4	74.0	2.6	4.4	3.1	73.8	72.5	76.4
	Born abroad	72.2	67.4	76.7	6.0*	9.4*	6.2*	76.8*	74.4	81.8*

Source LFS Q1 (2020, 2021, 2022)

Note Estimates in squares brackets have low denominators and should be read with caution [>50 and <100]. Denominators for 'employed' and 'active' is 'total working-age population'; denominator for 'unemployed' is 'total active population'. * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < .05$ level.

Figure 2.2 depicts employment indicators by place of birth separately for males and females. The highest levels of employment are recorded for migrant men; in 2022, their employment rate stood at 82 per cent compared to 76 per cent for Irish-born males. Overall, women's employment rates are lower than men's but do not differ substantially between migrant women and Irish-born women in 2020 and 2021. However, in 2022, the employment rate for migrant females (72 per cent) is significantly higher than that of Irish females (68 per cent). A similar pattern can be observed for activity rates: migrant men have consistently higher activity rates than Irish-born men while migrant women have activity rates comparable to those of Irish-born women in 2020 and 2021, though in 2022 their activity rate (76 per cent) becomes significantly higher than that of Irish-born women (71 per cent). Finally, the unemployment rate increased for all groups in 2021, but the increase was particularly notable for migrant men, for whom the rate doubled from 5 per cent in 2020 to 10 per cent in 2021. However, while migrant women did not seem to be particularly hard-hit in 2021, at least using the ILO definition of unemployment, they have higher unemployment rates than Irish-born women in both 2020 and 2022. Laurence et al. (2023) find that migrant women also face a double wage penalty – for being female and for being migrant – earning 30 per cent less than Irish men in the period 2011–2018 (see further discussion below).

FIGURE 2.2 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY GENDER, 2020–2022

Source Quarter 1 of LFS 2020, 2021, 2022.

Note Sample restricted to individuals aged 15–64 years. * denotes where migrants significantly differ from Irish-born.

Table 2.4 presents self-employment rate by place of birth. As farming can account for a large proportion of self-employment, the findings are presented both with and without the inclusion of this sector. Self-employment is generally lower among migrants (9.3 per cent in 2022) than among Irish-born individuals (12.3 per cent) when the agricultural sector is included. However, excluding farming from self-employment, there is no significant difference in the self-employment rate between individuals born in Ireland (10.2 per cent in 2022) and abroad (9 per cent), suggesting that most of the difference in self-employment is accounted for by low farm ownership among migrants.

However, there is variation in the self-employment rate across the different migrant groups. Two groups are particularly notable within the data on self-employment: those born in the UK and those born in the EU-East. For the period 2020–2022, individuals born in the UK demonstrate higher rates of self-employment than Irish-born when agriculture is excluded. Most recently, in 2022, the rate of self-employment (without agriculture) was 12.1 per cent among UK-born individuals compared to 10.2 per cent among those born in Ireland. Conversely, for those born in EU-East countries, rates of self-employment tend to be much lower; for 2022, rates for self-employment stood at 6.9 per cent for those born in the EU-East when compared to 10.2 per cent for Irish-born (see Table 2.4).

TABLE 2.4 SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATES, 2020–2022

	Self-employment (%)			Self-employment without agriculture (%)		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Born in Ireland	13.6	11.4	12.3	11.2	9.2	10.2
Born abroad	10.1*	10.1	9.3*	9.8*	9.6	9.0
Of which:						
UK	16.8*	13.5	13.1	16.0*	12.4*	12.4*
EU-West	8.7*	12.3	8.8	8.7	12.2	8.2
EU-East	5.8*	7.9	6.9*	5.9*	7.9	6.9*
Other Europe	12.4	[7.9]	11.5	12.4	[7.9]	11.5
NAAO	13.5	12.0	13.2	12.5	11.5	12.9
Africa	8.6	7.7	10.8	8.6	7.7	10.9
Asia	8.9*	8.5	5.6*	8.9	7.1	5.6*
Rest of the World	8.5*	[7.1]	8.0	8.5	[7.1]	7.6
Irish national	13.6	11.4	12.3	11.4	9.3	10.3
Non-Irish national	8.2*	9.2	8*	8.1*	8.9	7.9*

Source LFS Q1 (2020, 2021, 2022)

Note Estimates in squares brackets have low denominators and should be read with caution [>50 and <100]. Denominator is all people in employment. * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < .05$ level.

Sectoral differences were included in some previous Monitoring Reports on Integration (e.g., McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020) as well as in Laurence et al. (2023), with the latter being able to distinguish more national groups. Overall, employed non-Irish nationals show a relatively similar sectoral profile to Irish nationals, though they are over-represented in accommodation and food (18 per cent work in this sector, compared to 5 per cent of Irish nationals) (Laurence et al., 2023).³³ There is also considerable variation across national groups – for example, 20 per cent of EU-West nationals work in the information and communications sector, compared to 4 per cent of Irish nationals. Almost one in three (32 per cent) of Asian nationals work in human health and social activities, compared to 15 per cent of Irish nationals and 10 per cent of non-Irish nationals overall.

33 Laurence et al. (2023) is based on pooled Labour Force Survey Earnings Analysis from Administrative Data Sources data from 2011 to 2018.

Laurence et al. (2023) also find that patterns of job quality vary significantly depending on country of origin in the same period (2011–2018). Nationals from Asia, NAO, EU-West countries and the UK (including Northern Ireland) actually have more advantageous working conditions compared to their Irish counterparts. These migrant groups are generally more likely than Irish nationals to be found in professional/managerial occupations and are more likely to have supervisory responsibilities, to be employed full-time, with longer than usual working hours and to be working for larger firms. On the other hand, nationals from EU-East countries, ‘Other Europe’ (mostly non-EU Eastern Europe), Africa and the ‘Rest of the World’ (mainly Central and South America) have, on average, lower quality jobs compared to Irish nationals. These migrant groups are less likely to have high-status occupations or roles with supervisory duties and are more likely to be on shift work than Irish nationals. They are much less likely to be members of a trade union and much more likely to work in the private sector and to have short job tenures (see Laurence et al., 2023, chapter 4, for further details).

Analysing wages, Laurence et al. (2023) find that, on average, in the period 2011–2018, non-Irish nationals earned 22 per cent less per hour than Irish nationals. EU-East nationals had the largest wage gap, earning 40 per cent less than their Irish counterparts. For other groups, the wage gap is much smaller. This report also finds that non-Irish women experience a double earnings penalty. This includes a penalty for being women coupled with a penalty for being migrants: non-Irish women earn 11 per cent less than non-Irish men, and non-Irish men earn 18 per cent less than Irish nationals. In fact, non-Irish women earn 30 per cent less than Irish men. Laurence et al. (2023) highlight several factors that might explain the migrant wage gap, including difficulties with the recognition of qualifications from other countries, English-language skills and discrimination on the basis of nationality or ethnicity (see also McGinnity, Quinn et al., 2021). Given the remarkable changes in the labour-market outcomes of migrants in the period since then, it would be interesting to see whether these patterns are maintained in the post-pandemic period.

2.3 SUMMARY

The period 2020–2022 was a particularly turbulent one in the Irish labour market. The public-health restrictions imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, discussed in section 2.1, meant that during prolonged periods large segments of the workforce were either working from home or on temporary layoff, and some even lost their jobs. LFS data show that migrants were harder hit by the pandemic, with larger falls in employment and a bigger rise in unemployment between Q1 2020 (pre-pandemic) and Q1 2021 (mid-pandemic). Yet employment rates for migrants have risen remarkably since, so, by Q1 2022, at 77 per cent, the migrant employment rate exceeded both migrant employment rates in Q1 2020 (71 per

cent) and the Irish-born employment rate in Q1 2022 (72 per cent). African-born migrants in particular saw their employment rate rise from 56 per cent in 2020 to 74 per cent in 2022. Investigating reasons for this would require further analysis, ideally of multiple LFS waves pooled including 2023 data, but, if it persists, it is evidence of considerable progress by this group that has been characterised by low employment rates and high unemployment since the first time the group could be separately distinguished in LFS data in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2013).

The employment and activity rates of migrant women are about 10 per cent lower than those of migrant men, but, in 2022, these too were high among migrant women. In 2022, migrant women had an employment rate of 72 per cent, compared to 68 per cent among Irish-born women, and their activity rate, at 76 per cent, was also higher than the activity rate of Irish women (71 per cent). That said, in 2022, migrant women's unemployment rate, at 6 per cent, was slightly higher than that of Irish women (4 per cent), and migrant women earn substantially less. Laurence et al. (2023) found that non-Irish women earn 30 per cent less on average than Irish men.

CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX

Table A2.1 presents a logistic regression model of the odds of unemployment for different migrant groups. Model 2 indicates that all migrant groups face greater likelihood of unemployment when compared to that of Irish-born individuals, even when controls have been added to the model. In particular, individuals born in Africa, Other Europe and the UK are more likely to experience unemployment when compared to individuals born in Ireland (2.6, 2.4 and 1.4 times more likely, respectively). Higher likelihoods of unemployment are also observed among those born in EU-West, EU-East, NAAO and Asia. As expected, the odds of unemployment are greater in Q1 of 2021 when compared to Q1 of 2019. There is no significant difference between unemployment in Q1 2022 when compared to Q1 2019.

TABLE A2.1 UNEMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR MIGRANTS LFS, Q1 2020–2022

		Model 1		Model 2	
Place of birth	Ireland (RC)	1	(.)	1	(.)
	UK	1.197	(0.060)	1.435***	(0.000)
	EU-West	1.214	(0.291)	1.541*	(0.021)
	EU-East	1.345**	(0.009)	1.274*	(0.032)
	Other Europe	2.111**	(0.003)	2.252**	(0.002)
	NAAO	1.316	(0.259)	1.811*	(0.016)
	Africa	2.392***	(0.000)	2.559***	(0.000)
	Asia	1.172	(0.316)	1.505*	(0.012)
	Rest of the World	1.258	(0.286)	1.482	(0.082)
Survey year	Q1 2020 (RC)	1	(.)	1	(.)
	Q1 2021	1.521***	(0.000)	1.634***	(0.000)
	Q1 2022	1.028	(0.655)	1.062	(0.340)
Sex	Female (RC)			1	(.)
	Male			1.064	(0.254)
Age	Age			0.977***	(0.000)
Family status	Couples no children (RC)			1	(.)
	Couples with children			1.022	(0.802)
	Lone-parent family			2.145***	(0.000)
	Single			1.539***	(0.000)
Educational attainment	Does not hold tertiary degree (RC)			1	(.)
	Holds tertiary degree			0.451***	(0.000)
Observations		39,018		39,018	

Source Quarter 1 of LFS 2020, 2021, 2022.

Note *p*-values shown in parentheses. ** indicates $p < 0.01$. *** indicates $p < 0.001$. 'RC' denotes the reference category, against which the other categories are compared. Findings are presented using odds ratios; odds greater than 1 mean that a group is more likely to experience unemployment when compared against the reference category, and odds less than 1 indicate a lower likelihood of unemployment when compared to the reference group. Importantly, we note the small sample size for some unemployed migrant groups within this model when reporting on the group differences observed.

CHAPTER 3

Education and integration

James Laurence and Stefanie Sprong

Education plays a crucial role in the integration process of migrants and their descendants. Greater educational attainment is generally associated with higher earnings and higher-class occupations for all workers (OECD, 2021). For migrants, education can be particularly important as it may help them to enter the labour market, earn money and access other resources and contacts that may aid their participation in society in other life domains. Across OECD countries, those with higher educational attainment have better physical health, improved socio-emotional well-being and participate more actively in their societies (OECD, 2021).

The majority of the migrant population arrives in Ireland as adults (CSO, 2017). This means that they have typically completed most or all of their education in their country of origin rather than in Ireland, though some decide to continue or start their education after migration. Looking at the educational attainment of migrants thus mostly provides insights into the level of education that migrants in Ireland arrive with rather than reflecting their participation in Irish education. Therefore, Box 3.1 focuses on young people of migrant origin who are passing through the Irish education system. Nevertheless, studying the degree of similarity between Irish-born and migrant population can generate an important understanding of the composition of migrant groups and inform policies related to training and skills. For example, if certain migrant groups tend to have lower levels of educational attainment than Irish-born, this may signal the need for more adult-education programmes.

This chapter presents an analysis of the educational outcomes of adults according to individuals' region of birth. It focuses on three of the core Zaragoza indicators for education related to educational attainment: among the working-age population and among young adults, and early school-leaving among young adults. The results presented are based on the analysis of the LFS. Conforming to previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, data from the first quarter of the previous three years (2020, 2021 and 2022) was combined to boost sample size.

BOX 3.1 ACCESS TO EDUCATION UPDATE

The Irish education system is made up of primary, secondary, further and third-level education. State-funded education is available to Irish citizens at all levels and to non-Irish nationals at primary and secondary levels, or until age 18. Third-level tuition costs vary considerably depending on the institution, course of study and,

most critically, the residency status of the student. Most undergraduate students attending publicly funded third-level courses in Ireland do not have to pay tuition fees, though they do pay registration fees.³⁴ To qualify for ‘free fees’, a student must have been living in an EEA Member State or Switzerland for at least three of the five years before starting the course.³⁵ Fees for non-EEA nationals, most of whom do not qualify for free fees, can be substantial.³⁶

Previous studies have highlighted difficulties in gaining access to schools for some migrant families because of the use of waiting lists and policies favouring children whose parents had attended the school (see Smyth et al., 2009). This situation has changed somewhat with the introduction of the Education (Admission to Schools) Act 2018, which represented a major reform of admissions policy, with its stated aim of making ‘rules around admissions to schools more structured, fair, and transparent’ (Department of Education, 2021).³⁷ Key features of the Bill include: a ban on waiting lists aimed at ensuring children who move to a new area are not disadvantaged;³⁸ an amendment to the Equal Status Act (2000) to prohibit the use of religion as a selection criterion; and an obligation on the 80 per cent of all schools which are not oversubscribed to admit all students who apply. Enacting this was Action 26 of the Migrant Integration Strategy, 2017–2021. Action 29, to monitor the number of non-English-speaking migrant children in schools, has also been addressed; since 2016/2017, the Department of Education and Skills has collected additional data on migrant children in the annual primary-school census (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019).³⁹ According to estimates from the CSO, 14,686 children who arrived from Ukraine have enrolled in schools in the academic year 2022/2023 as of 13 February 2023. Most of these students (65 per cent) attend primary schools, and a smaller group (35 per cent) are in secondary schools. On average, their school enrolment took place three weeks after they were given a PPSN.⁴⁰

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- 34 Charges for PLC courses operate under different rules than most publicly funded third-level courses. The maximum rate of the student contribution (also known as registration fees) for the academic year 2022–2023 is €3,000.
- 35 The members of the EEA (European Economic Area) are the Member States of the EU, along with Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. The student must also fulfil one of the following six criteria as regards nationality and immigration status in Ireland: (1) be a citizen of an EEA Member State or Switzerland; or (2) have an official refugee status; or (3) be a family member of a refugee and have been granted permission to live in Ireland; or (4) be a family member of an EU national with permission to stay in the State with residence Stamp 4EUFAM; or (5) have been granted humanitarian leave to stay in the country; or (6) have been granted permission to remain in the State by the Minister for Justice and Equality, following a determination by the Minister not to make a deportation order under Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999.
- 36 Students who do not qualify for EU fees can be charged non-EU fees, which are set by each third-level educational institution themselves and thus vary across educational institutions and across courses.
- 37 For details of changes, see www.education.ie/en/parents/information/schoolenrolment
- 38 There is due to be a five-year phasing-in period for this provision once the legislation is enacted.
- 39 See www.education.ie/en/Publications/Statistics/Primary-Online-Database-POD-/Primary-Online-Database-POD-.html. Action 31, monitoring the effectiveness of training for teachers in managing diversity and tackling racism, delivered via the Professional Development Service for Teachers (PTSD), was reported in the interim review of the Migrant Integration Strategy (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019) as having minor problems or delays.
- 40 For more information, see www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/FP/p-aui/arrivalsfromukraineinirelandseries9

Supports for migrants in school

A key support for migrant children in Irish schools is the provision of English-language tuition delivered mainly through specialised ‘English as an additional language’ (EAL) teachers. Since the 2012/2013 academic year, assignment of teachers for special-needs education and language support has been combined through the Special Education Teaching allocation model. Thus, it is no longer possible to monitor spending on English-language tuition in schools.

Language support is assigned based on the number of pupils requiring support: additional language-support hours have been provided in schools with a high concentration of students requiring English-language support, and this alleviation measure is continuing for the 2022/2023 school year.⁴¹ Other language supports include the distribution of language-assessment kits to primary and post-primary schools, in-service provision for language-support teachers and guidelines on EAL for all teachers.

English-language provision for adults

ESOL (English for speakers of other languages) classes are provided by the 16 education and training boards (ETBs) nationally to meet the needs of learners who may be highly educated with professional and skilled backgrounds who are attending classes to learn English.⁴² An evaluation report found that provision of ESOL programmes has developed in the absence of a national strategy on ESOL provision and that the need for training far exceeded provision (Kett, 2018). McGinnity, Privalko et al. (2020) found employment chances and job quality clearly related to English-language skills, though Arnold et al. (2019) found that many government departments, service providers and migrants themselves are unaware of the relevant services providing English-language classes in Ireland. Language provision for adults is recognised as a policy priority and the aim of a number of actions in the Migrant Integration Strategy (Actions 32, 35, 37).

3.1 EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ADULTS IN IRELAND

3.1.1 Educational attainment among the working-age population

Educational attainment refers to the highest level of education that an individual has completed. Following Eurostat, the level of educational attainment is measured

41 See www.gov.ie/en/circular/32843-staffing-arrangements-in-primary-schools-for-the-202223-school-year. See appendix C for a list of schools that receive additional support as they have high concentrations for pupils who require language support.

42 See www.etbi.ie/esol for further information.

according to the International Standard Classification of Education, which is presented in four aggregate groups:

1. lower secondary education or less, including people with no formal education
2. upper secondary education (Leaving Certificate or equivalent) only
3. post-Leaving Certificate (PLC) qualifications⁴³
4. third-level qualifications.

In Table 3.1, we present the educational attainment of the working-age population (between the ages of 15 and 64), analysed by region of birth. Overall, the level of educational attainment among Irish residents is high: 42.6 per cent have a third-level qualification, which may not be surprising considering that Ireland has the largest share of people with a third-level degree of all the countries in the EU (Eurostat, 2022).

TABLE 3.1 HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY REGION OF BIRTH (AND NATIONALITY), Q1 2020–2022 (POOLED), FOR THOSE AGED 15–64

Place of birth	No formal to lower secondary (%)	Upper secondary (%)	Post-Leaving Certificate (%)	Third-level (%)	Total
Ireland	21.3	25.2	13.3	40.1	43,668
Born abroad	10.3*	22.8*	13.1	53.8*	9,854
<i>Of which, born:</i>					
UK	16*	19.7*	14.8*	49.4*	3,319
EU-West	5.1*	14.9*	8.4*	71.6*	845
EU-East	9.9*	33.9*	17.6*	38.6	2,284
Other Europe	7.8*	25.7	13.3	53.2*	370
NAAO	10.2*	18.1*	7*	64.7*	554
Africa	7.9*	23.6	18*	50.5*	726
Asia	8.2*	14.5*	5*	72.3*	1,249
Rest of World	5.5*	16*	7.9*	70.6*	507
Nationality					
Irish	20.5	24.9	13.3	41.3	48,417
Non-Irish	8.4*	23.2*	13.2	55.2*	4,952

Source LFS Q1 2020, Q1, 2021, and Q1 2022 (pooled) weighted. Working-age respondents (15–64).

Notes 'Third-level' includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above; *denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from Irish-born at $p \leq 0.05$.

43 A PLC course is taken after a student has passed their Leaving Certificate and is generally a one- or two-year course. PLC courses are aimed primarily at students who would like to develop vocational or technological skills in order to enter an occupation or go on to higher education. This group is relatively small, meaning that estimates for some groups need to be considered with some caution.

Nevertheless, the migrant population in Ireland tends to have higher levels of education than the Irish-born population, as also shown in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020; McGinnity, Fahey et al., 2018). Of those born in Ireland, 40.1 per cent have a third-level education compared to 53.8 per cent of people born abroad, and 21.3 per cent of the Irish-born population have a lower secondary education or less compared to 10.3 per cent of the migrant population.

The higher average level of education among the migrant population may be related to positive selection of migrants compared to non-migrants in their country of origin due to the financial and personal costs associated with migration (e.g., Feliciano, 2005; Ichou, 2014). For non-EU nationals, this may also be linked to a skills-focused immigration policy (Devitt, 2016), whereby work permits are typically issued for jobs that require non-EU migrants to be highly skilled (McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020; see also Chapter 1). Of the work permits that were issued in 2021, 36 per cent were in the health and social-work sector and 28 per cent in the information and communication sector (Murphy and Sheridan, 2022) where levels of education may be higher. Western Europeans are also concentrated in skilled sectors such as information and communication (Laurence et al., 2023).⁴⁴

In line with findings from McGinnity, Privalko et al. (2020), based on 2016 Census data, there is substantial variation in the levels of educational attainment across migrant groups. The highest levels of education can be found among migrants born in Asia, EU-West and the Rest of the World, with more than 70 per cent of the people in these groups having a third-level degree. The EU-West and Rest of the World categories also have the smallest shares of people with no formal to lower secondary education, which are about four times smaller than the proportion of Irish-born in this education category. The groups of migrants from the UK, Africa and other European countries have lower shares of people with third-level qualifications at 49.4, 50.5 and 53.2 per cent respectively, though they are still significantly higher than the share for Irish-born residents. The only migrant group that has a slightly lower share of people with a third-level qualification than the group of Irish-born is the EU-East at 38.6 per cent. This is consistent with findings from previous Monitoring Reports on Integration.

Interestingly, while the share of EU-East migrants with third-level qualifications is relatively similar to that of Irish-born individuals, the EU-East has larger shares of people with upper secondary education (33.9 per cent) or a PLC (17.6 per cent) than the Irish-born group (at 25.2 and 13.3 per cent, respectively). The high rate of


44 Laurence et al. (2023) found that one in five EU-West nationals work in the information and communication sector in Ireland, compared to one in 20 of the labour force as a whole.

PLC qualifications among Eastern European migrants may be reflective of the vocational nature of the education systems in some EU-East countries (Ulicna et al., 2016) and the jobs they come to work in, which may not require a university degree. In general, Polish migrants to Ireland (and the UK) are young and highly educated relative to the Polish population living in Poland (Kaczmarczyk, 2014).

3.1.2 Educational attainment among 25–34-year-olds

Reflecting Ireland’s relatively recent immigration history, the migrant population in Ireland tends to be relatively young, as has been shown in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration. Moreover, in recent decades, the educational system in Ireland and many other countries has expanded rapidly, with younger cohorts typically being more highly educated. It is therefore possible that the relatively high levels of educational attainment among the migrant population can be attributed to their age profile. To explore whether differences in educational attainment are (partially) due to the different age profiles of the migrant groups, we compare attainment of tertiary education focusing on young people aged 25 to 34 (see Fig. 3.1).

FIGURE 3.1 SHARE OF 25–34-YEAR AGE GROUP WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION, Q1 2020–2022 (POOLED)



Source LFS Q1 2020, Q1 2021 and Q1 2022 (Pooled) weighted. Age 25–34 years.

Notes Figure shows percentages and the 95 per cent confidence intervals by group.

As expected, the share of the total population that has a third-level education is larger among this younger age group than for the entire working-age population. For Irish-born individuals, the percentage of individuals with a third-level degree increases from 40 to 56 per cent. For migrants, the percentage goes up from 54 to

67 per cent. This means that even though the gap between the Irish-born and the migrant population becomes smaller (decreasing from 14 to 11 per cent) when focusing on a younger age group, a significant difference is still found between Irish-born and the various migrant groups.

Nevertheless, the shares of 25–34-year-olds with tertiary education differ across the migrant groups, and for some groups the age-group restriction has a much larger effect than for others. For some groups, the gap between them and the Irish-born population in the share of people with tertiary education is substantially smaller compared to the figures for all ages. For the UK group, there was a 9 per cent difference when considering the entire working-age population (ages 15–64), but this gap is reduced to 2 per cent when focusing on the younger age group (aged 25–34). For the group of migrants born in Africa, the gap decreases from 10 to 5 per cent, and for the Rest of the World group it goes down from 31 per cent to 22 per cent. For the EU-West, there is also a small reduction in the gap from 32 to 27 per cent. However, in contrast, for the groups of migrants born in Asia or NAAO, there is a slight increase of 2 and 4 per cent respectively.

The shift of focus to the younger age group has a particularly notable effect for two migrant groups. The group of migrants born in ‘Other European’ countries had a 13 per cent higher share of people with tertiary education when looking at the entire working-age population, but a 2 per cent lower share after restricting the age group to 24–35-year-olds. Moreover, there is one group that has a lower share of people with third-level qualifications than Irish-born after restricting the age group to 24–35-year-olds: the percentage of people with tertiary education was similar for Irish-born and the EU-East group when considering the entire working-age population (15–64), but the share of people with a tertiary education is significantly lower for the EU-East than for Irish-born individuals when focusing on the younger age category (42 per cent versus 56 per cent).

To further investigate to what extent differences in third-level education were related to the different age profiles of the groups, a regression model was employed controlling for respondents age (see Table A3.1, p. 59). The results show that even after accounting for age and gender, the odds of having tertiary education are significantly higher relative to Irish-born for all migrant groups except for Eastern European migrants for whom no significant difference (compared to Irish-born respondents) is found after accounting for respondents’ age.

3.1.3 Place of completion of education

It is likely that the higher educational attainment among migrants in Ireland is the result of selective migration of graduates from countries of origin, though it could also be the result of migrants doing well in the Irish education system. To shed some

light on this, Table 3.2 presents what share of each group completed their education in Ireland and what percentage attained their highest level of education abroad. Respondents were classified as having been educated abroad if the years since a respondent completed their formal education was greater than their length of time in the country.⁴⁵

TABLE 3.2 COUNTRY WHERE EDUCATION WAS COMPLETED, Q1 2020–2022 (POOLED)

	Educated in Ireland (%)	Educated abroad (%)	N
Place of birth			
Ireland	94.9	5.1	2,731
Born abroad	38.3*	61.7*	8,930
<i>Of which:</i>			
UK	59.4*	40.6*	3,032
EU-West	28.1*	71.9*	787
EU-East	25.5*	74.5*	2,056
Other European	25.3*	74.7*	326
NAAO	56.8*	43.2*	486
Africa	49.4*	50.6*	653
Asia	28.9*	71.1*	1,122
Rest of World	23*	77*	468
Nationality			
Irish	91.5	8.5	7,019
Non-Irish	24.9*	75.1*	4,489

Source LFS Q1 2020, Q1, 2021, and Q1 2022 (pooled) weighted. Working-age population (18–64).

Notes *denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from Irish-born at $p \leq 0.05$.

As expected, migrant residents (61.7 per cent) are significantly more likely to be educated outside Ireland compared to Irish-born residents (5.1 per cent). Migrants from the Rest of the World (23 per cent), Other European countries (25.3 per cent) and Eastern Europe (25.5 per cent) are the least likely to have attained their highest level of education in Ireland. The share of people who were educated in Ireland is also relatively low for migrants from Western Europe (28.1 per cent) and Asia (28.9 per cent). Conversely, migrants born in Africa (49.4 per cent), NAAO (56.8 per cent) and the UK (59.4 per cent) are the most likely to have attained their education in Ireland.

To investigate if educational attainment differs depending on where the highest level of education was completed, Table 3.3 shows the proportion of people with a

45 Educated in Ireland or abroad was calculated using the best available variables; however, it only represents the highest level of educational attainment achieved by respondents. For example, if someone arrived in Ireland five years ago and completed their third-level education a year ago, they would be defined as educated in Ireland despite receiving most of their education abroad.

tertiary degree by place of completion for all migrant groups. The proportion of residents with tertiary education was slightly higher for those who were educated abroad (55.6 per cent) compared to those who were educated in Ireland (50.6 per cent). This effect was particularly pronounced for the groups of migrants in the ‘Other Europe’ category (38.8 per cent versus 61.2 per cent) or migrants born in Asia (58.4 per cent versus 77.6 per cent), suggesting individuals from these groups are more likely to be highly educated if they have already completed their education before migration. Similar patterns could also be observed for those born in NAAO (59.9 per cent versus 73.7 per cent), Africa (47.2 per cent versus 56.0 per cent) and the Rest of the World (64.2 per cent versus 72.0 per cent). This may be linked to selective migration policies, which favour more educated applicants from non-EU countries (see Chapter 1 and Box 2.1 on work permits for non-EU nationals).

TABLE 3.3 PROPORTION OF MIGRANTS EDUCATED IN IRELAND OR ABROAD WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION, Q1 2020–2022 (POOLED)

Place of birth	Educated in Ireland		Educated abroad	
	% Tertiary education	Count	% Tertiary education	Count
Born abroad	50.6	4,402	55.6	5,988
Of which:				
UK	50.0	2,231	46.4	1,788
EU-West	70.5	278	71.9	608
EU-East	37.3	604	39.4	1,561
Other Europe	[38.8]	94	61.2	253
NAAO	59.9	349	73.7	258
Africa	47.2	342	56.0	350
Asia	58.4	380	77.6	808
Rest of World	64.2	124	72.0	362
Nationality				
Non-Irish	49.9	1,211	56.5	3,819

Source LFS Q1 2020, Q1, 2021, and Q1 2022 (pooled).

Notes Square brackets indicate that the denominator is smaller than 100 and estimates should be interpreted with caution.

Nevertheless, for some migrant groups, the share of people with a tertiary degree is very similar in the group that was educated in Ireland and the group that was educated abroad. This was the case for migrants born in Western Europe (70.5 per cent versus 71.9 per cent) and Eastern Europe (37.3 per cent versus 39.4 per cent). Finally, for the group born in the UK, the proportion of people with a tertiary degree is lower among those educated abroad (46.4 per cent) than among those educated in Ireland (50.0 per cent). This may indicate that there is a less strong selection effect for these groups, possibly because they do not need a residence permit.

3.2 EARLY SCHOOL-LEAVING AMONG YOUNG ADULT MIGRANTS

In this section, we focus on young people who leave education and training prematurely. Early school-leaving is a policy concern because it is associated with a range of adverse outcomes, such as unemployment, poverty and social exclusion, and worse health (Smyth et al., 2019; Smyth and McCoy, 2009). While there has been a notable decline in school dropout rates in recent decades, with the retention rate to the Leaving Certificate currently at 91.5 per cent (Department of Education, 2021), it remains a potential source of inequality, especially as certain groups, including the foreign-born population, have been reported to be particularly at risk of early school-leaving (Vanroy, 2017).⁴⁶

We follow the definition used by Eurostat which identifies young people aged 18–24 as early school-leavers if they completed at most a lower secondary education,⁴⁷ and were not in further education or training.⁴⁸ Because the analysis of age groups is restricted by the groups within the LFS, we focus on the proportion of early school-leavers aged 20–24 (rather than 18–24).

In Table 3.4, we present the rates of early school-leaving among young people in Ireland, analysed by place-of-birth group. The overall level of early school-leaving is low at 3.5 per cent, and there is no significant difference in the proportion of early school-leavers between Irish-born young people (3.3 per cent) and the foreign-born population in general (4.6 per cent). Looking at the specific migrant groups, the share of early school-leavers is higher for migrants born in the UK (6.8 per cent), Western Europe (7.4 per cent) and Eastern Europe (8.7 per cent), although only the difference between those born in Eastern Europe and Irish-born is significant. For young people born outside of the EU, on the other hand, the rate of early school-leaving is significantly lower at 0.5 per cent. This may be related to migration policy, whereby it is difficult for low-skilled migrants to come to Ireland from outside the EU as adults, and those who came as children are likely to have highly skilled parents (see also Table 3.1).

46 The retention rates to the Leaving Certificate and the number of Leaving Certificate points appear to be similar for young people with a migration background passing through the Irish education system (see Box 3.1).

47 In Ireland, this concerns students who leave education during or directly after the Junior Cycle.

48 The legal definition of early school-leaving in Ireland refers to non-participation in school before reaching the age of 16 years or before completing three years post-primary education, whichever is later.

TABLE 3.4 SHARE OF MIGRANT GROUPS AGED 20–24 DEFINED AS EARLY SCHOOL-LEAVERS, Q1 2020–2022 (POOLED)

Place of birth	Early school-leavers (%)	Number of people aged 20–24
Ireland	3.3	4,056
Born abroad	4.6	638
Of which:		
UK	6.8	155
EU-West	[7.4]	53
EU-East	8.7*	141
Non-EU	0.5*	289
Nationality		
Irish	3.3	4,389
Non-Irish	5.6	302

Source LFS Q1 2020, Q1, 2021, and Q1 2022 (pooled). Eurostat indicator of early school-leaving.

Note Square brackets indicate that the denominator is smaller than 100 and estimates should be interpreted with caution.

3.3 MIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRISH SCHOOLS

While most of those who migrate to Ireland complete their education abroad (see Table 3.2), an increasing proportion of students of migrant origin is passing through the Irish school system. In the previous Monitoring Report on Integration (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020), it was estimated that nearly one in five 15-year-old students had a migration background (i.e. they migrated themselves or were born to migrant parents). As adult migrants have typically completed all or most of their education outside of Ireland, looking at the academic outcomes of young people with a migration background may be a better reflection of how the Irish education system is integrating the migrants and their descendants.

In the previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, the educational achievement of students of migrant origin was examined using Reading, Mathematics and Science scores from PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment). McGinnity, Enright et al. (2020) use 2018 PISA data to show that reading scores are significantly lower for migrant students who speak a language other than English in the home compared to Irish-origin students. There is no difference between migrants from an English-speaking background and Irish-origin students. There are also no differences between Irish-origin and either of the migrant-origin groups in Mathematics and Science. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the PISA 2021 assessment was postponed to 2022, meaning that the most recent available data are still from PISA 2018.

As up-to-date PISA data are not available, we used data from the GUI study.⁴⁹ This study provides a unique data source to assess how students with a migration background (who are passing through the Irish education system) are faring compared to their peers without a migration background. Here, we briefly consider their retention rates to the Leaving Certificate and the number of points received in these examinations. The GUI '98 cohort started in 2007/2008 with 8,500 children aged nine years when immigration to Ireland peaked (see Fig. 1.2). As the sample was nationally representative, it also contained a representative sample of children with a migration background (about 25 per cent of our analytical sample). The GUI '98 cohort represents one of the first cohorts with a substantial share of students with a migration background who were completing all or most of their education in Ireland and who now, as young adults, are starting to enter all spheres of society. It is important to note, however, that the two dominant migrant groups at the time were the UK and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland), meaning that many of the students of migrant origin in this cohort study are of British or Polish descent.⁵⁰

In line with the high retention rates to the Leaving Certificate, 95 per cent of the GUI '98 cohort sat the Leaving Certificate examinations. Differences in the retention rates of students with (94.5 per cent) and without (95.1 per cent) a migration background were minimal. There were also no significant differences in the number of points by migration background among those who sat the Leaving Certificate (see Table A3.2, p. 59), indicating students of migrant origin who went through the Irish primary and secondary education system perform on par with their peers of Irish origin.

Looking at individual subjects, a slightly more complex story emerges. Students with a migration background, on average, scored 2 points more in English and 5 points more in Mathematics than their peers without a migration background. This might reflect their parents' higher level of education (see Table 3.1) as these gaps narrow after accounting for their mother's highest level of education (see Table A3.3, p. 60). When mother's education is held constant, the difference in English scores is no longer significant, but those from a migrant background continue to do better in Maths than those without a migration background.

Together, these findings suggest that children with a migration background are faring well in Ireland. They also corroborate recent research which has found that children of migrant origin enter primary school with lower levels of English-

49 GUI is the national longitudinal study of children and young people. The study started in 2006 and follows the progress of almost 20,000 children across two groups: Cohort '98 (also known as the child cohort) born in 1998 and Cohort '08 (the infant cohort) born in 2008. The GUI study regularly collects data on the children and young people's physical health, socio-emotional well-being and education.

50 The anonymised microfile data used here does not contain detailed information on parents' place of birth.

language skills but similar levels of non-verbal skills (Sprong and Skopek, 2022) and that language gaps seem to narrow over time (Darmody et al., 2022). The comparable rates of students who sat the Leaving Certificate exam are in line with research that tentatively concluded that there were no large differences in educational and occupational expectations by migration background (Sprong and Devitt, 2022), nor indeed in the transitions to higher education (McGinnity et al., 2023). Migrant-origin students from both English-speaking and non-English-speaking backgrounds and Irish-origin young people in this cohort have high expectations of progression to higher education, and these are largely realised, with 68 per cent of students going on to higher education (McGinnity et al., 2023).

3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examined differences in educational attainment and early school-leaving between Irish-born and foreign-born residents. The Irish population remains among the most highly educated in the EU, and retention rates to the end of secondary school are high. Even so, the level of education among the migrant population tends to be higher than among Irish-born, and the rate of early school-leaving is similar.

There is notable variation across the migrant groups in terms of educational attainment. Migrants born in Western Europe, Asia and the Rest of the World have the highest shares of people with tertiary education, which are nearly twice as high as the share of Irish-born residents with a tertiary degree. The group of migrants born in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, has the lowest proportion of tertiary educated individuals, especially after taking into account their younger age profile. Eastern European migrants also had the highest rate of early school-leaving, while migrants born outside of the EU had substantially lower rates of early school-leaving than Irish-born young people.

The higher educational attainment likely partly reflects the younger age profile of the foreign-born population. Focusing on younger respondents (aged 25–34), we find that the gap in tertiary education between Irish-born and foreign-born residents narrows, although migrants still have significantly higher attainment. It may also be related to the selection of migrants, with migrants often having higher levels of education compared to non-migrants in their country of origin (e.g., Feliciano, 2005; Ichou, 2014). Additionally, the high levels of educational attainment among migrants born outside of the EU may be explained by immigration policies, with work permits typically issued for high-skilled jobs that require non-EU migrants to be highly skilled (McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020). This may also explain why the proportion of people with tertiary education is substantially higher among those educated abroad than those educated in Ireland for non-EU migrants.

Overall, the findings presented in this chapter confirm the information presented in previous Monitoring Reports showing differences between countries regarding educational attainment among the adult population. While the LFS data show that young migrants born in Poland have higher rates of early school-leaving, evidence from the GUI study ('98 cohort) shows very similar Leaving Certificate points overall for migrant-origin and Irish-origin students. Other recent research using this cohort finds that both students of migrant and Irish origin have high educational expectation and that high proportions attend higher education at age 20.

CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX

TABLE A3.1 LOGISTIC REGRESSION (ODDS RATIO) OF HAVING THIRD-LEVEL EDUCATION FOR THOSE AGED 15–64, LFS Q1 2020–2022

	Model 1	Model 2
Place of birth (ref. Irish)	1	1
UK	1.45***	1.32***
EU-West	3.77***	3.89***
EU-East	0.94	0.98
Other Europe	1.71***	1.81***
NAAO	2.71***	2.77***
Africa	1.53***	1.56***
Asia	3.91***	4.27***
Rest of the World	3.57***	3.95***
Age		1.02***
Gender (ref. female)		1
Male		0.74***
Survey year (ref. 2020)	1	1
2021	1.16***	1.16***
2022	1.19***	1.19***
Observations	53,522	53,522

Source Own calculations from pooled LFS Q1 2020–2022.

Note *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

TABLE A3.2 NUMBER OF LEAVING CERTIFICATE POINTS BY MIGRATION BACKGROUND, GUI '98

Leaving Certificate points	No migration background	Migration background
200 or less	6%	4%
201–300	15%	15%
301–400	29%	27%
401–500	28%	31%
More than 500	15%	17%
Not answered	7%	5%
Observations	3,685	1,300

Source Own calculations from GUI '98 cohort W1–W4. Weighted data.

Note Predicted probabilities shown. Analyses controlled for whether the number of Leaving Certificate points were awarded under the old or the new system.

TABLE A3.3 LEAVING CERTIFICATE POINTS IN MANDATORY SUBJECTS BY MIGRATION BACKGROUND, GUI '98

	English		Maths	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
No migration background (ref)		Accounting for maternal education		Accounting for maternal education
Migration background	2.2**	1.2	5.2***	3.2**
Constant	65.5	63.6	56.7	52.6
Observations	4,545	4,545	4,567	4,567

Source Own calculations from GUI '98 cohort W1-W4. Weighted data.

Note Predicted probabilities shown. All analyses controlled for whether the number of Leaving Certificate points were awarded under the old or the new system Model 2 additionally controls for the mother's level of education. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$.

CHAPTER 4

Social inclusion and integration

Stefanie Sprong

After a period of severe economic decline between 2008 and 2012, the Irish economy made a remarkable recovery, with strong economic growth rates and falling unemployment in the years leading up to 2020. This was associated with declining levels of poverty and an increased standard of living (Roantree et al., 2021), as also reported in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration (McGinnity, Quinn et al., 2017; McGinnity, Fahey et al., 2018; McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). However, the COVID-19 pandemic had a deep impact on the Irish economy, with the introduced public-health restrictions leading to a contraction in economic activity (McQuinn et al., 2021) (see also Chapter 2 for a discussion of labour-market restrictions). In the light of the effects of this global crisis, we examine the impact in terms of poverty and social exclusion and investigate if differences by place of birth have changed over the recent period.

Tackling poverty and social exclusion plays an important role in the well-being of individuals and society more generally. The Irish government has long been committed to reducing poverty and social exclusion. In the National Anti-poverty Strategy that was adopted in 1997, poverty was defined as:

People are living in poverty if their income and resources (material, cultural and social) are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living which is regarded as acceptable by Irish society generally. As a result of inadequate income and resources, people may be excluded and marginalised from participating in activities which are considered the norm for other people in society. (Government of Ireland, 1997, p. 3)

This definition is close to the influential definition of Townsend (1979), which also emphasises that poverty consists of a lack of resources and an inability to participate in society to a normal standard. However, to reflect the broad, multifaceted nature of poverty and social exclusion, the Irish government has added a definition of social inclusion in recent years:

Social inclusion is achieved when people have access to sufficient income, resources and services to enable them to play an active part in their communities and participate in activities that are considered the norm for people in society generally. (Department of Social Protection, 2020, p. 11)

In their approach, the Irish government recognises that certain groups within society are at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion and may require additional support. Migrants are one of the groups that are often found to be more

vulnerable (Kraszewska et al., 2021). Indeed, while important for all, having a sufficient income and other resources to participate fully in society may be particularly important for migrants as it is directly related to their integration into the host country. Social-welfare entitlements are presented in Box 4.1.

BOX 4.1 SOCIAL WELFARE

The social-welfare system in Ireland is administered by the Department of Social Protection. It is divided into the following main types of payments:

- social-insurance payments (e.g., jobseeker’s benefit, maternity benefit);
- social assistance or means-tested payments (e.g., jobseeker’s allowance);
- universal payments (e.g., child benefit).

To qualify for social-insurance payments, an individual must have made the necessary number of social-insurance (PRSI – pay-related social insurance) payments for the relevant scheme and satisfy certain conditions. Social-assistance payments are made to those who do not have enough PRSI contributions to qualify for the equivalent social-insurance-based payments and satisfy a means test. Universal payments, such as child benefit, do not require a means test or insurance contributions.

While, in principle, many migrants are entitled to various social-welfare payments, in practice, national administrative rules lead to differing levels of access. This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of a habitual residence condition to social-assistance payments and to child benefit, which means that applicants must show they are both resident in and have a proven close link to Ireland. A number of agreements between Ireland and the UK ensure that from 1 January 2021 all existing social-security arrangements for Irish and UK citizens are maintained following Brexit.⁵¹

Because of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on unemployment levels and incomes, the government introduced the PUP and the TWSS (see also Chapter 2). These payments in general also applied to students, part-time workers and non-EU workers who had lost employment due to the pandemic, as long as the worker had paid a minimum amount of PRSI contributions and was on the employer’s payroll (see Enright et al., 2020, and EMN Ireland, 2020, for further details).⁵²

51 See www.gov.ie/en/publication/fc9c5e-operational-guidelines-for-deciding-officers-on-the-determination-of/?referrer=www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Habitual-Residence-Condition--Guidelines-for-Deciding-Offic.aspx

52 As well as being permitted to apply for the PUP if their jobs were lost during COVID-19, international students who continued to work through the pandemic were allowed to work up to 40 hours per week while their educational institute was closed due to COVID-19 (EMN, 2020).

This chapter presents poverty and social-exclusion statistics analysed according to individuals' place of birth. It focuses on the core Zaragoza indicators for social inclusion relating to the household income, material deprivation, self-reported health status and housing. The results presented are based on the analysis of the SILC. The SILC is the primary data source to measure and monitor poverty and social exclusion in Ireland with indicators such as income poverty and material deprivation (Department of Social Protection, 2007; Cronin et al., 2018) and has been conducted every year by the CSO since June 2003, with participating households being interviewed throughout the year on a weekly basis. The analysis in this chapter is based on a pooled sample for the years 2020 and 2021, which are the most recent years available.⁵³ In 2020, the SILC sample included 4,243 households and 10,683 individuals, and in 2021 it was 4,846 households and 12,291 individuals.

4.1 INCOME AND POVERTY

4.1.1 Household income

The first of the core Zaragoza indicators related to social inclusion is the median net household income. In this chapter, we report the median annual disposable household income and the median equivalised disposable household income recorded in the SILC surveys of 2020 and 2021.⁵⁴ Because there was a break to the SILC time series in 2020, and, as this report relies on place of birth rather than nationality, the numbers in this chapter will not be directly comparable to previous Monitoring Reports on Integration.

The total annual disposable household income is the sum of all sources of income (employment, private pensions, rental income, interests, savings, social transfers) of all individuals living in the household, less their total tax and social-insurance contributions. Most of the income information in the SILC is drawn from two data sources, the Department of Social Protection social-welfare data and the Revenue Commissioner employee income data, which makes the SILC income data extremely reliable. To allow for meaningful comparisons between households, we report the equivalised household income, which considers the differences in household composition in terms of age and size. The annual disposable household

53 As in the previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, we combine the data from two years. By pooling two years of data, we increase the total number of migrants in our sample so that we can report reliable statistics and follow the CSO statistical disclosure guidelines. According to the CSO guidelines, estimates for the number of persons where there are fewer than 30 persons in a cell are too small to be considered reliable and have the potential for statistical disclosure. Where there are 30–49 persons in a cell, estimates are considered to have a wide margin of error and should be interpreted with caution.

54 While much of the information collected in the SILC surveys relates to the household current circumstances during the year of the interview, the income reference period is the previous calendar year. For example, during the 2020 survey, the income reference period is 2019.

income is adjusted based on the Irish equivalence scale. This scale gives a weight of 1 to the first adult (aged 14+), a weight of 0.66 to each additional adult and a weight of 0.33 to each child (aged less than 14). The equivalence scale for each household is the sum of these weights; and the equivalised disposable income is then the total disposable household income divided by the equivalence scale and attributed to each individual in the household.

In Table 4.1, we report the median annual disposable household income and median annual equivalised disposable household income across the various groups.⁵⁵ The overall median disposable household income increased from €50,762 in 2017/2018 to €56,981 in 2019/2020. However, the gap between the Irish-born and foreign-born population remained relatively stable: the median disposable household income for Irish-born (€57,959) was higher than for foreign-born residents in Ireland at €51,627, meaning that the median disposable household income of the foreign-born population was about 89 per cent of the value of the median income for Irish-born.

TABLE 4.1 YEARLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALISED INCOME, 2019 AND 2020 (POOLED)

	Disposable household income (median) €	Equivalised (needs adjusted) Income (Median) €	No. of individuals in each group (unweighted)
Born Ireland	57,959	25,107	20,060
Born abroad	51,627*	22,802*	2,912
<i>Of which, born:</i>			
UK	48,814*	22,826*	1,037
EU-West	58,296*	28,293*	248
EU-East	50,925*	21,971*	700
Non-EU	52,512*	22,366*	927
All	56,981*	24,743*	22,972
Nationality			
Irish	57,727	24,976	21,451
Non-Irish	51,227*	22,614*	1,523

Source Own calculations from pooled SILC 2020 and 2021 (income reflecting 2019 and 2020), weighted.

Notes Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. * is to signal that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at $p < 0.05$.

55 The median income is the midpoint of the income distribution once incomes have been sorted from lowest to highest.

When ordered from low to high, the pattern of the disposable household income distribution across the various groups is the same as in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration. The median annual disposable household income is the lowest for the UK-born population at €48,814, followed by the EU-East group at €50,925 and the non-EU group at €52,512. The EU-West group has the highest median household income at €58,296, which is slightly higher than the median annual disposable household income of Irish-born.

Using the equivalence scale changes this pattern slightly, reflecting the different demographic composition of the groups. Irish-born residents still have a higher median equivalised income (€25,107) than foreign-born (€22,802). The EU-East group has the lowest median equivalised income at €21,971, followed closely by the non-EU and UK groups at €22,366 and €22,826, respectively. The EU-West group also has the highest median equivalised income at €28,293.

4.1.2 Poverty rates

While a wide range of indicators can be used to measure poverty and social exclusion, in this chapter we focus on three official poverty indicators that are commonly used to monitor poverty and social exclusion in Ireland (Department of Social Protection, 2007, 2021). The first indicator is the at risk of poverty (AROP) measure, which identifies individuals living in a household where the income is below the poverty line. This poverty line is calculated using an income threshold related to the mean or median income. The official poverty line used in Ireland and the EU is 60 per cent of the median income.

The second indicator is a measure of material deprivation, which measures a household's inability to afford a set of basic goods and services that are considered as common across the overall population (Maître et al., 2006; Maître and Privalko, 2021). This measure is designed to capture the absolute standard of living, in contrast to the AROP indicator, which is a relative measure and might fail to capture any change in the standard of living of the population, particularly in periods of economic boom or bust. The basic deprivation measure includes 11 basic items (shoes, clothes, heating, etc.) that are regarded as essential to fully participate in society with a minimum standard of living. A household is considered materially deprived if its members cannot afford to have at least two of these 11 items.⁵⁶

56 Two pairs of strong shoes; a warm waterproof overcoat; to buy new (not second-hand) clothes; to, respectively, eat a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day; to have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week; to have had to go without heating during the past year through lack of money; to keep the home adequately warm; to buy presents for family or friends at least once a year; to replace any worn-out furniture; to have family or friends over for a drink or meal once a month; and to have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the past fortnight for entertainment.

The last indicator is the consistent poverty measure, which is the official national poverty measure in Ireland and corresponds to the overlap of the two previous measures. A household is considered consistently poor if it is both at risk of poverty and experiencing enforced deprivation.

In Table 4.2, we report the percentage of people who are experiencing poverty according to each of the three poverty indicators across the groups. Overall, the shares of people who are AROP, experienced deprivation or are in consistent poverty are lower than in the 2020 Monitoring Report on Integration. The percentage of the total population that is in consistent poverty, for example, decreased from 6.2 per cent to 4.3 per cent between 2017/2018 and 2020/2021.

Generally, Irish-born people have a much lower AROP rate than migrants, at 11.6 and 16.8 per cent respectively. However, there is substantial variation across the foreign-born groups. At 11.6 per cent, the AROP rate of the EU-West group is very similar to that of the Irish-born group, followed by the EU-East group at 12.8 per cent. The AROP rates for the UK and non-EU groups are much higher at 17.5 and 21.3 per cent respectively.

The group of Irish-born people also have a lower deprivation rate than the migrant group, at 13.5 per cent and 17 per cent respectively, but the deprivation rates vary across the foreign-born groups. The EU-West has the lowest deprivation rate, and, at 13.2 per cent, the deprivation rate of the UK group is very similar to that of the Irish-born individuals. However, the rates are substantially higher for the EU-East and non-EU at 20.3 per cent and 20.0 per cent respectively.

The consistent poverty rate is slightly lower for Irish-born than for migrants, at 4.1 per cent and 5.3 per cent respectively. The consistent poverty rates for the UK group do not differ significantly from those of the Irish-born group. The rate of EU-West group is low, as might be expected. For EU-East migrants, the consistent poverty rate is also low, even though material deprivation and AROP rates are high. This indicates that many EU-East migrants who count as deprived are not at risk of income poverty, and, conversely, that many of those at risk of poverty are not deprived. However, the consistent poverty rate is substantially higher for the non-EU group at 8.3 per cent, over twice that of the Irish-born group. Previous Monitoring Reports have also highlighted the higher consistent poverty rate for the non-EU group (previously defined as non-EU nationals). While the non-EU group cannot be further disaggregated in these data, results from Chapter 2 on labour-market participation, combined with Laurence et al. (2023) on wages, suggest that there is likely to be considerable variation within the non-EU group in terms of deprivation and poverty.

TABLE 4.2 'AT RISK OF POVERTY', DEPRIVATION AND CONSISTENT POVERTY RATES, 2020 AND 2021 (POOLED)

Place of birth	AROP (under the 60% median poverty line) (%)	Deprivation (enforced lack of two or more items) (%)	Consistent poverty (at risk + deprived) (%)	No. of individuals (unweighted)
Born Ireland	11.6	13.5	4.1	20,060
Born abroad	16.8*	17.0*	5.3*	2,912
<i>Of which, born:</i>				
UK	17.5*	13.2	4.9	1,037
EU-West	[11.6]	[3–9]*	[1–6]	248
EU-East	12.8	20.3*	[1–6]	700
Non-EU	21.3*	20.0*	8.3*	927
Nationality				
Irish	12.0	13.7	3.5	21451
Non-Irish	16.4*	17.4*	4.4	1523

Source Own calculations from pooled SILC 2020 and 2021, weighted.

Notes * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < 0.05$. Square brackets indicate that the value (range) has to be interpreted with caution due to the small count in the cell.

4.2 HEALTH STATUS

Living conditions experienced by people can have a profound impact on their living standards, and health is a major determinant of individual well-being and quality of life. Therefore, health status is often considered in studies and reports related to poverty and social exclusion (Di Meglio et al., 2018; Department of Social Protection, 2020), particularly because there is a strong association between social exclusion and health inequality (Marmot, 2015; Watson et al., 2016). Since migrants might be more exposed to poverty and social exclusion and possibly face inequities in access to and utilisation of health services, there is a concern that this could have an impact on their health and, consequently, on their ability to participate in society.

In this section, we compare the general health status of several migrant groups to that of the Irish-born population. We focus on a measure of self-perceived health, which is one of the core Zaragoza indicators. This indicator is based on a question from the SILC in which all respondents aged 16 and over were asked to rate their health in general on a 5-point scale, ranging from 'very good' to 'very bad'. However, it is good to underline that this is a subjective indicator that assesses people's perceptions of their health, and which may have limitations.

In line with other research and the previous Monitoring Reports, we report the percentage of people who indicated that their health status was good or very good

and the mean age of the respondents in Table 4.3. Despite the global COVID-19 pandemic, 82.5 per cent of the overall population aged 16 and over assessed their health as good or very good, which is very similar to the 82.8 per cent reported in the 2020 Monitoring Report on Integration. Moreover, as in previous years, a somewhat smaller share of the Irish-born group reported their health as good or very good (81.9 per cent) compared to the foreign-born group (84.9 per cent). This is sometimes referred to as the ‘healthy immigrant effect’ and is often related to the positive selection of migrants in terms of factors such as age and education level when compared to people who did not migrate from their country of origin (Ichou and Wallace, 2019; Nolan, 2012).

TABLE 4.3 SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH STATUS, 2020 AND 2021 (POOLED)

Place of birth	Very good or good health (%)	Mean age (rounded)	No. of individuals (16 and over)
Ireland	81.9	47	15,464
Born abroad	84.9*	42*	2,694
<i>Of which, born:</i>			
UK	75.8*	50*	990
EU-West	90.4*	42*	226
EU-East	88.4*	37*	645
Non-EU	88.1*	39*	833
All	82.5	46	18,158
Nationality			
Irish	81.8	47	16,834
Non-Irish	87.6*	39*	1,326

Source Own calculations from pooled SILC 2020 and 2021, percentages weighted; N unweighted.

Notes * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < 0.05$

There is, however, considerable variation in the level of self-assessed health across the different migrant groups. The EU-West group appears to be the healthiest, with 90.4 per cent reporting their health as good or very good. They are followed by the EU-East and non-EU groups at 88.4 and 88.1 per cent, respectively. As also found in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, the group with the lowest share of people reporting their health as good or very good is the UK at 75.8 per cent, which may be related to their higher mean age compared to other groups (see Table 4.3).

4.3 HOUSING TENURE AND AFFORDABILITY

Having access to adequate and affordable housing is often considered a basic need (Russell et al., 2021), as well as an important component of integration (Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas, 2016). Adequate housing allows migrants to work, to be

in education and to participate in society more broadly. Moreover, in many societies, homeownership is considered as a marker of social and economic success. However, due to a myriad of factors, migrants may face inequalities in housing tenure and affordability. Migrants may, for example, be younger, have different housing preferences because they do not intend to stay in Ireland long-term or have a lower income from work, limiting their ability to buy a home. In addition, they may be limited by the characteristics of the property market, the banking sector and credit regulations of the host country, as well as facing discrimination in the rental housing market (Gusciute et al., 2022). Set against a backdrop of the current Irish housing market, which is characterised by limited availability and affordability, the challenges faced by some migrant groups may be especially large (McGinnity et al., 2022; Russell et al., 2021).

In this section, we present the statistics for the indicator of housing tenure and two measures of housing affordability, analysed by region of birth. Tenure status refers to the nature of the accommodation in which the household resides, as reported by the person in the household answering to the questions about their household (generally the head of the household) during the survey interview.⁵⁷ Since the Irish housing system is broadly comprised of three sectors, responses were classified into the following three categories: owner-occupied; rented in the private sector (with or without subsidies from government, e.g., the Housing Assistance Payment); and rented from a local authority (social housing).

Affordability challenges have risen considerably in Ireland over the past decade as monthly rents have risen much faster than average wages (Russell et al., 2021).⁵⁸ The two housing affordability indicators are based on the total housing costs and the household income. The first measure of housing affordability is an indicator of high housing costs, which identifies households that spend more than 30 per cent of their income on housing and is a commonly used measure in the literature (Corrigan et al., 2019) although these kinds of measures may not fully capture people's experiences (see also Sprong and Maître, forthcoming). The second measure of housing affordability is the AROP rate after housing costs used by the CSO, which identifies those whose equivalised income after rent and mortgage interest is below the poverty line (less than 60 per cent of the median before rent and mortgage interest).⁵⁹ These are both commonly used measures of affordability but capture different aspects of affordability. For households with high overall incomes, a high proportion of income on housing costs may not necessarily

57 The results reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are at the household level rather than at the individual level, unlike all the previous results.

58 The ratio of average monthly rent to the average monthly wage rose from 0.22 in 2012 to 0.31 in 2020 (Russell et al., 2021, Table 4.1).

59 See www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/hubs/p-wbhub/well-beinginformationhub/housingandbuiltenvironment/atriskofpovertyrateafterrentandmortgageinterest

translate into being AROP. Conversely, some families who are AROP after housing costs may not face housing costs that exceed 30 per cent of their income.

In Table 4.4, we report the percentage of households living in the three tenure types across the various groups. Overall, most households live in a home that is owner-occupied (70.3 per cent), followed by those who rent in the private market (19 per cent) or from a local authority (10.7 per cent). These patterns are similar to the overall tenure figures reported in the previous Monitoring Report on Integration (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020), though the numbers represent a decrease in homeownership of 2.7 per cent and an increase in privately rented accommodation of 2.6 per cent compared to 2017/2018.

TABLE 4.4 HOUSING TENURE, 2020 AND 2021 (POOLED)

Place of birth	Homeowners (%)	Private rented	Local authority rented	No. of households (unweighted)
Ireland	76.6	12.2	11.2	7,623
Born abroad	42.8*	48.7*	8.6*	1,322
<i>Of which, born:</i>				
UK	68.3*	20.0*	11.7	568
EU-West	[45–50]*	49.9*	[<=5]*	85
EU-East	[22–27]*	68.1*	[5–10]*	302
Non-EU	30.8*	61.7*	[7.5]*	367
Nationality				
Irish	74.6	14.1	11.3	8352
Non-Irish	31.5*	63.5*	5.0*	594

Source Own calculations from pooled SILC 2020 and 2021, percentages weighted; N unweighted. Households are classified based on the place of birth of the household reference person. A small number of households living rent-free have been excluded from the analysis.

Notes * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < 0.05$. Square brackets indicate that the value (range) has to be interpreted with caution due to the small count in the cell.

There are substantial differences in tenure status by place of birth. While the majority of Irish-born people continue to own their home, at 76.6 per cent, this share is much lower among foreign-born residents, at 42.8 per cent. The migrant group with the largest share of homeownership is from the UK, at 68.3 per cent, followed by the EU-West. In contrast, homeownership is much less common among migrants from the EU-East and non-EU groups; fewer than one in three households from these groups owns their home.

As mentioned before, renting in the private market is the most common tenure type among migrants, at 48.7 per cent compared to 12.2 per cent for Irish-born

residents. Renting in the private sector is also more common among non-Irish nationals (63.5 per cent) than among Irish nationals (14.1 per cent): this is similar to 64.7 per cent for non-Irish nationals in 2017/2018 (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020).⁶⁰ Households headed by an EU-East migrant are the most likely to live in privately rented accommodation at 68.1 per cent, followed by the non-EU at 61.7 per cent and EU-West at 49.9 per cent. The share of households renting in the private sector is smaller for the UK group, at 20 per cent, though still significantly higher than for Irish-born people.

Even though foreign-born households are less likely to own their home, they are generally also less likely to rent from a local authority (8.6 per cent) than are Irish-born households (11.2 per cent). This is particularly true for the EU-West, but also for the EU-East and non-EU groups.⁶¹ The share is larger among households from the UK group, at 11.7 per cent, though not significantly different from Irish-born.

The findings presented in Table 4.3 show a similar pattern to the findings from McGinnity et al. (2022) who analyse housing tenure of individuals using 2016 Census microdata and who are able to distinguish between more specific groups of migrants. They also find that EU-East migrants as well as some non-EU groups have particularly high rates of private renting (see McGinnity et al., 2022, fig. 4.2). Even after controlling for age, household composition, employment status and ethnicity, McGinnity et al. (2022) find that Polish migrants, for example, are 20 times more likely to live in private rented accommodation than Irish-born people.

While recent migrants are most likely to rent, even among migrants who came to Ireland in the period 2000–2009, 46.5 per cent rent privately (McGinnity et al., 2022). Accommodation quality in the private rented sector varies, and it is likely to be the tenure of choice for some, but recent challenges with supply and housing cost mean that, overall, the sector is much more expensive and offers much less security of tenure than owner occupation. Rented accommodation is also more likely to be overcrowded than owner-occupied accommodation, and McGinnity et al. (2022) find migrants are much more likely to live in overcrowded accommodation, particularly non-EU migrant groups.

60 The difference between non-Irish nationals and migrants is likely due to the fact that the UK-born, many of whom are Irish nationals, make up a much greater share of migrants than of non-Irish nationals, and they are much less likely to rent privately (see Table 4.3 and McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020).

61 This is likely to be a combination of factors. For example, some migrants will not have a long-term right to reside and thus will not be entitled to local-authority housing (see <https://www.gov.ie/en/circular/42023-circular-housing-412012-access-to-social-housing-supports-for-non-irish-nationals>). Long waiting lists for access to social housing, given shortage of supply, may be an issue for recently arrived migrants. Some migrants may not satisfy the means test; others may not be aware of their entitlements. See McGinnity et al., 2022, section 1.3.2, for further discussion.

In Table 4.5, we report the percentage of households that face high housing costs and that are AROP after rent and mortgage interest. Overall, more than one in ten households face high housing costs, and more than one in five are AROP after deducting rent and mortgage interest. These rates are higher for migrants than for Irish-born: for migrants, the share of households with high housing costs is 29.3 per cent, and the AROP rate after housing costs is 30.8 per cent compared to 8.5 (high housing costs) and 19.2 per cent (AROP after housing costs) for Irish-born. This suggests that for a significant proportion of the Irish-born group, their poverty risk is not directly related to very high housing costs.

TABLE 4.5 HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, 2020 AND 2021 (POOLED)

Place of birth	High housing costs (>30%)	At-risk-of-poverty rate after housing costs	No. of households (unweighted)
Ireland	8.5	19.2	7,749
Born abroad	29.3*	30.8*	1,339
<i>Of which, born:</i>			
UK	12.0*	26.0*	582
EU-West	[35–40]*	[20–25]	86
EU-East	35.7*	30.0*	303
Non-EU	41.3*	39.1*	368
Nationality			
Irish	9.6	20.3	8491
Non-Irish	38.1*	30.7*	598

Source Own calculations from pooled SILC, 2020 and 2021, weighted percentages. Households are classified based on the place of birth of the household reference person.

Notes * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < 0.05$. Square brackets indicate that the value (range) has to be interpreted with caution due to the small count in the cell.

There is considerable variation in the shares of households facing housing affordability challenges across the migrant groups. In the UK group, 12 per cent of households spent more than 30 per cent of their income on housing costs, while these percentages are notably larger for the EU-West (between 35 and 40 per cent), EU-East (36 per cent) and non-EU (41 per cent). In terms of the share of households that are AROP after rent and mortgage interest, the EU-West group has the lowest percentage of the migrant groups at between 20 and 25 per cent, likely linked to their higher disposable income (Table 4.1) and lower poverty rates (Table 4.2), followed by the UK group at 26 per cent. For the EU-East and non-EU groups, the rates are higher at 30 per cent and 39.1 per cent respectively.

The greater vulnerability of migrant households in relation to housing affordability likely partly reflects their greater tendency to be in accommodation that is rented

in the private market, where costs are likely the highest (Corrigan et al., 2019; O’Toole et al., 2020). Indeed, results from a statistical regression model presented in Table A4.1 (see p. 76) show that once we take account of tenure status, the predicted probability of facing high housing costs and being AROP becomes smaller for all migrant groups, and, in some cases, the difference to the Irish-born group is no longer even significant.

4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examined differences in poverty and social exclusion between Irish-born and foreign-born residents against a backdrop of the COVID-19 crisis. It presented poverty and social-exclusion statistics analysed according to individuals’ region of birth, focusing on the core Zaragoza indicators for social inclusion relating to household income, material deprivation, self-reported health status and housing.

The change of using place of birth instead of nationality makes it difficult to draw direct comparisons between the results presented in this chapter and those in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration. However, patterns were generally very similar to previous reports. There was a continuing trend of increasing incomes and decreasing poverty rates, but, as before, the Irish majority population tended to have a higher income and to do better on the poverty indicators than the foreign-born population. Furthermore, the overall rates of good health and homeownership were relatively stable over time, and migrants continued to report better health than Irish-born people but were much less likely to own their home. Besides, migrant households were more likely to face issues relating to housing affordability than Irish-born households.

The high rates of private renting and associated affordability issues mean many migrants are particularly exposed to the current housing crisis and shortage of rental accommodation in Ireland. This underscores the importance of including housing in the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 as a matter of urgency, though, of course, addressing major challenges more broadly in the Irish housing market will benefit migrants too as they are disproportionately found in the private rented sector, in overcrowded accommodation and in homeless shelters (see also McGinnity et al., 2022).

Together, the statistics presented in this chapter show some of the challenges some migrant groups face in relation to income, material deprivation, health and housing. The EU-East group do not have a high AROP rate before housing costs (Table 4.2), but after housing costs they do (Table 4.5), which might help explain their relatively high deprivation rate (Table 4.2). Statistical modelling indicates that a key part of the poverty risk after housing costs for this group is their concentration

in the private rented sector. The non-EU group may be at even greater risk of poverty and social exclusion. This group had the highest consistent poverty rate from all the groups and was most likely to face high housing costs as a proportion of income.

However, it is important to acknowledge that migrants from outside of the EU are a heterogeneous group, comprising both migrants from the developing nations of South and East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa and from the developed economies of NAAO. It is therefore likely that there is considerable variation within this group in terms of their experiences of poverty and social exclusion. It was not possible to examine these differences due to the limited numbers in the SILC data, which render cell sizes too small to be considered reliable and have the potential for statistical disclosure; Census microdata does not have detailed information on household income. This persistent problem of lack of detailed information on poverty and social exclusion within the non-EU group is something we return to in the conclusion.

CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX

Table A4.1 presents the results from logistic regression models predicting the odds of facing high housing costs and being at risk of poverty after rent and mortgage interests. The results of such models are usually provided in terms by log-odds scale or in odds ratios. As the interpretation of estimates can be complicated, we present the predicted probabilities, which can be interpreted in the probability scale. For each outcome, we first present the predicted probabilities without accounting for any factors, which are similar to the results presented in Table 4.5. We then present the predicted probabilities of having high housing costs and being AROP after rent and mortgage interest, accounting for tenure status.

Overall, the results suggest that once we take account of tenure status, the predicted probability of facing high housing costs and being AROP after rent and mortgage interest becomes smaller for all migrant groups, and, in some cases, they no longer differ significantly from the Irish-born people. For example, before taking into account tenure status, about 36 per cent of EU-East households faced high housing costs which made them significantly more likely to spend more than 30 per cent of their income on housing than Irish-born. After accounting for tenure status, this percentage went down to 13 per cent, which implies that their concentration in the private rented sector is a key factor explaining housing affordability challenges among EU-East migrants.

TABLE A4.1 LOGISTIC REGRESSION (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES) OF HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, 2020 AND 2021 (POOLED)

	High housing costs	High housing costs – accounting for tenure status	AROP after Rent and Mortgage Interest	AROP after rent and mortgage interest – accounting for tenure status
IE	0.09	0.12	0.19	0.21
UK	0.12*	0.12	0.26**	0.25*
EU-West	0.38***	0.20*	0.22	0.18
EU-East	0.36***	0.13	0.30***	0.19
Non-EU	0.41***	0.17***	0.39***	0.27**
Observations	8,902	8,902	8,945	8,945

Source Own calculations from pooled SILC 2020 and 2021

Note *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (compared to Irish-born). The number of observations is somewhat smaller than in the table in the main text because only those households that did not have missing values on the housing affordability and tenure status indicators were included.

CHAPTER 5

Active citizenship

Keire Murphy and Emma Quinn

The Zaragoza Declaration included three indicators designed to measure the active-citizenship aspect of integration.⁶² The first is an indicator of naturalisation, measured as the ratio of those who acquired citizenship to all resident immigrants. Naturalisation is an important act of integration, granting migrants the same rights and responsibilities as native-born residents. In addition, research has found that immigrants who have naturalised are often better off than immigrants who have not naturalised, in particular for non-EU migrants (Tjaden and Becker, 2013). The second indicator is the share of immigrants holding permanent or LTR permits, which often grant additional rights and guarantee a level of security and certainty for migrants. The third indicator is the share of immigrants among elected representatives. This indicator is an important proxy for multiple things: how invested migrants feel in the political system and future of the country, how well the political system accommodates and welcomes migrants, and may also indicate discrimination or acceptance of migrants among the voting population. This chapter presents these indicators as well as an overview of recent policy changes, debates and research on the issue.

The term ‘active citizenship’ is used here as a broad concept embracing formal and non-formal, political, cultural, interpersonal and caring activities (Taskforce on Active Citizenship, 2007).

5.1 NATURALISATION

In order to be eligible to apply for citizenship through naturalisation, an applicant must ‘be of good character’, generally have had a total reckonable residence in the State amounting to five years out of the previous nine and must intend to reside in Ireland (see Box 5.1).

BOX 5.1 ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP**Irish nationality and citizenship**

Citizenship describes the particular legal bond between an individual and the State, acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means according to national legislation (EMN Ireland, 2020). In the Irish Constitution, the individual member of the State is referred to as a ‘citizen’, but the status is referred to as ‘nationality and citizenship’.⁶³ Citizenship by descent may be granted to a person whose parent was, or would have been (if deceased), an Irish citizen at the time of the person’s birth, irrespective of their place of birth. The granting of such citizenship is automatic at birth.⁶⁴ Persons born in Ireland may be granted citizenship where they are born on the island to at least one parent who has Irish or British citizenship.⁶⁵ Persons born to non-Irish citizens may also be entitled to Irish citizenship where at least one of their parents has been legally resident in Ireland for three out of the previous four years prior to the birth (see Groarke and Dunbar, 2020).⁶⁶ Irish citizens may hold the citizenship of another country without giving up their Irish citizenship.

Naturalisation

An application for a certificate of nationality is considered under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, as amended. Non-Irish nationals living in Ireland may apply to the Minister for Justice to become an Irish citizen by naturalisation if they are over 18 years, or a minor who was born in the State after 1 January 2005. In general, the applicant must ‘be of good character’ and have had a period of one year’s continuous reckonable residence in the State immediately before the date of application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable residence in the State amounting to four years.⁶⁷ Applicants are usually required to have been ‘self-supporting’, i.e. not dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to application. Periods spent in Ireland as an asylum applicant, a student or undocumented are not considered when calculating reckonable residence.⁶⁸ Aside from judicial review, there is no mechanism for challenging the

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- 63 The EUDO Citizenship Observatory notes that the two terms describe different elements of the relationship between the individual and the Irish State. Nationality relates to the external (international) dimension, whereas citizenship relates to the internal (domestic) dimension. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, ‘Translations and a brief discussion of the use of the terms “citizenship” and “nationality” in legal documents and political debates’. <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>.
- 64 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended), s. 7(1).
- 65 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended), s. 6(6).
- 66 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended), s. 6A.
- 67 The applicant must intend in good faith to continue to reside in the State after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State.
- 68 There is now an obligation on the State to provide reasons for a refusal of an application for naturalisation (although this issue continues to be a source of some debate). In *AP v. Minister for Justice and Equality*, the Court stated the primary objective should be to seek the maximum disclosure possible (*AP v. Minister for Justice and Equality* [2019] IESC 47 [5.12]).

refusal of an application. Currently, Irish citizenship acquired through naturalisation may be withdrawn no matter how long a person has been an Irish citizen (though not if it would make them stateless).

Application fees

The standard application fee payable by all applicants is €175. A further €950 is payable by successful adult applicants for naturalisation. The naturalisation fee is €200 in the case of minors and widows or widowers of Irish citizens. Persons granted refugee status and those recognised as stateless persons are exempt from payment of the naturalisation fee.


Access to long-term residence

Ireland does not have a statutory LTR status. The current administrative scheme allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for a continuous period of five years or more on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses) to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residency scheme is available to those who are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five years' work, have been made redundant.⁶⁹

Figure 5.1 shows that, after a rapid incline from 2010 and a peak in 2012, applications for naturalisation in Ireland have plateaued in recent years, with 11,970 valid applications received in 2021, an 11 per cent increase on 2020 but similar to the 2017–2019 period. This largely follows immigration trends five years prior to the relevant years, as would be expected.

69

A small number of non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who are of 'good character' are permitted to remain in Ireland 'without condition as to time'. They receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit (Becker, 2010).

FIGURE 5.1 NATURALISATION CERTIFICATE APPLICATION, REJECTIONS AND CERTIFICATES ISSUED, 2010–2021

Source Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice, October 2022. Some data has been revised and therefore totals may differ from those presented previous monitoring reports.

The number of total certificates issued also increased in 2021, after the low points of 2019 and 2020, which were affected by court decisions that paused applications and COVID-19 shutdown measures (see McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). In 2001, 9,783 certificates were issued, a 79 per cent increase on the 2020 figure. In total, 22.9 per cent of all certificates issued were on the grounds of marriage to an Irish national, similar to the previous two years.⁷⁰

Refusals of citizenship applications began to be issued more frequently in 2021, following a pause in processing applications in 2019 related to the judgment in *Jones v. Minister for Justice and Equality* (see McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020) and a suspension of refusals during the pandemic (see Box 1.1), with only six refusals

70 The 1956 Act governs the modes of citizenship acquisition in Ireland. The three main modes of citizenship acquisition are acquisition of citizenship at birth by descent, acquisition by birth on the island of Ireland and naturalisation (Groarke and Dunbar, 2020). The data discussed here relates only to naturalisation. Therefore, for example, UK nationals entitled to Irish citizenship at birth by descent (who might apply for Irish passports on foot of this) are not included in these figures.

issued in 2020.⁷¹ In contrast, in 2021, 695 refusals were issued, around half the 2018 figure.

Processing times for naturalisation applications increased significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic, in spite of measures put in place to enable continued processing and increasing digitalisation (see section 5.1.3), with an average processing time of 30 months and a median processing time of 24 months in 2021, compared with 14 and 12 months respectively in 2020.⁷² The year 2020 had, in turn, represented an increase in processing time from previous years (see previous Monitoring Report in this series, McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020).

5.1.1 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens

Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 show the prevalence of EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals among naturalised citizens.⁷³ Overall, the trend observed is a significant increase in naturalisation figures for non-EEA nationals and a more stable pattern for EEA nationals, leading to a decline in the proportion of EEA nationals among those naturalised (see Table 5.1).

TABLE 5.1 PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY FORMER NATIONALITY GROUP (EEA AND NON-EEA), 2012–2021

	2012	2014	2016	2018	2019	2020	2021
EEA	1,478	2,970	3,338	3,922	2,822	1,832	2,413
Non-EEA	23,594	18,105	6,685	4,292	2,960	3,639	7,370
Total	25,072	21,075	10,023	8,214	5,782	5,471	9,783
% EEA	5.9	14.1	33.3	47.7	48.8	33.5	24.7

Source Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice, October 2022. Some data has been revised and therefore totals may differ from those presented previous monitoring reports on integration. From 2021, UK counts as non-EEA. Selected earlier years.

In 2021, there was a significant spike in the naturalisation of non-EEA nationals, representing the highest figure since 2015, with 7,370 certificates issued to non-EEA nationals, a 103 per cent increase on 2020. Figures for EEA nationals have conversely declined since the peak in 2018, although 2021 represented a slight recovery from the 2020 low. As a result, Table 5.1 shows that the percentage of EEA nationals naturalising among the total naturalisations fell from a peak of 49 per cent in 2019 to 25 per cent in 2021. These changes are likely to reflect the

71 *Jones v. Minister for Justice and Equality* [2019] IEHC 519.

72 Department of Justice, September 2022.

73 We examine EEA and non-EEA nationals separately as these groups are entitled to different rights in Ireland before naturalisation, which means that there is often significantly more benefit for non-EEA citizens from naturalisation.

recategorisation of British nationals as non-EEA following the UK's withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020 (see section 5.1.3). As shown in Table 5.2, UK nationals were the top nationality acquiring citizenship in Ireland in 2020 and 2021. The data discussed here relates only to naturalisation. Therefore, for example, UK nationals entitled to Irish citizenship at birth by descent (who might apply for Irish passports on foot of this) are not included in these figures.

Table 5.2 shows the top ten nationalities of naturalised citizens between 2016 and 2021. It shows the continued rise of UK nationals since 2017, the first time the UK entered the top ten since at least 2010 (the period for which data is available). Certificates issued to UK nationals represented 12 per cent of all naturalisations in 2021 and 17 per cent in 2020. Prior to the referendum to leave the EU, UK nationals represented just 0.4 per cent of new citizens in Ireland.⁷⁴ Other top nationalities remained similar to previous years, with Poland (8.4 per cent of certificates), India (7.6 per cent), Nigeria (7.6 per cent) and Romania (7.4 per cent) making up the rest of the top five nationalities, as they have since 2017.

74 2015 figure; see McGinnity, Enright et al. (2020).

TABLE 5.2 TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALISATION BY FORMER NATIONALITY, 2016–2021 (TOP TEN)

2016		2017		2018		2019		2020		2021	
Poland	1,324	Poland	1,355	Poland	1,462	Poland	925	UK	943	UK	1,190
India	1,027	Romania	762	Romania	819	UK	664	Poland	758	Poland	819
Nigeria	773	India	665	UK	685	Romania	552	Romania	538	India	743
Romania	756	UK	525	India	629	India	514	India	464	Nigeria	741
Philippines	728	Nigeria	506	Nigeria	478	Nigeria	302	Nigeria	225	Romania	721
Pakistan	417	Latvia	392	Pakistan	363	Latvia	221	Brazil	176	Pakistan	610
Latvia	380	Philippines	362	Philippines	317	Philippines	189	Philippines	156	Brazil	334
China	304	Pakistan	339	Latvia	308	Brazil	186	Latvia	146	China	292
Brazil	300	Brazil	264	China	231	China	158	Pakistan	135	Latvia	240
USA	232	China	221	Brazil	217	USA	154	USA	132	Philippines	216
Other	3,782	Other	2,796	Other	2,705	Other	1,917	Other	1,798	Other	3,877
Total	10,023	Total	8,187	Total	8,214	Total	5,782	Total	5,471	Total	9,783

Source Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice, October 2022.

Note China includes Hong Kong.

5.1.2 Citizenship indicators

The naturalisation rate is measured as the ratio of those who acquired citizenship to the number of resident immigrants in a given year. It captures information on the opportunities to naturalise (policies) as well as on a range of other contextual factors such as migrants' motivation to naturalise, duration of residence and settlement in the country (Huddleston et al., 2013). This section presents separate annual naturalisation rates for non-EEA and for EEA nationals. In order to produce the most up-to-date and precise indicator possible, we use administrative data on residence permissions to calculate a rate for non-EEA nationals. A similar rate is provided for EEA nationals; however, because residence permission data is not available for this group, we report an indicator compiled by Eurostat.⁷⁵ This data is less up-to-date but has the advantage of allowing us to place Ireland in an EU context.

5.1.2.1 Citizenship indicator for non-EEA nationals

The annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA (excluding UK) nationals is shown in Table 5.3. The indicator refers only to those aged 16 and over, as non-EEA nationals under 16 are not required to register with immigration services in Ireland. After a steady decline in the naturalisation rate since 2012, there was a small increase in the naturalisation rate of non-EEA nationals in 2020 and a larger increase in 2021. While in 2021 this reflected increased naturalisations, in 2020 it mainly resulted from lower numbers of those holding immigration permissions in the year (i.e. a change in the denominator, likely related to COVID-19 travel restrictions; see Box 1.1). In 2021, the number of people holding residence permissions rebounded to slightly higher than the 2019 figure. However, the number of naturalisations of non-EEA citizens simultaneously increased by 134 per cent from 2020, leading to a naturalisation rate of 3.4 per cent in 2021.

75 EEA/non-EEA and EU/non-EU categories are used at different points throughout this chapter, based on data availability. It should therefore be noted that non-EU categories also include EEA countries which have similar rights to EU citizens. Where possible therefore, EEA/non-EEA is used.

TABLE 5.3 CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER, 2011–2021 – ANNUAL NATURALISATION RATE

	2012	2014	2016	2018	2019	2020	2021
Non-EEA aged ≥16 who acquired citizenship in reference year	19,658	13,415	5,380	3,586	2,461	2,441	5,708
Non-EEA aged ≥16 holding immigration permissions	120,281	105,569	110,927	142,286	168,297	155,317	169,687
Share of total number of non-EEA aged ≥16 holding permissions in ref. year who acquired citizenship in ref. year (%)	16.3%	12.7%	4.9%	2.5%	1.5%	1.6%	3.4%

Source Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice, October 2022. Selected earlier years. UK nationals are excluded from this table as they are not required to hold immigration permissions and would therefore skew the indicator (relevant to 2020 and 2021 only).

Note Excludes UK nationals. UK nationals are excluded from this calculation because they are not required to hold immigration permissions; therefore, calculating a resident 'stock' figure consistent with one for other non-EEA nationals is not possible.

The very low rate of naturalisations in 2019 resulted from a freeze in processing during 2019, as mentioned above (see also discussion in McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). However, this also coincided with a time of strong annual growth in the total number of non-EEA nationals holding immigration permissions, with a 52 per cent increase from 2016 to 2019, meaning that many of those holding immigration permissions would not yet have accrued the necessary reckonable residence to qualify for naturalisation.

A total of 116,686 non-EEA (excluding UK) nationals, aged 16 and over, naturalised between 2005 and 2021, indicating that a substantial proportion of the population of non-EEA origin has now acquired Irish citizenship.⁷⁶ As in previous Monitoring Reports on Integration, we estimate the proportion of the population of non-EEA origin that has naturalised using data from the Department of Justice. We report the proportion of the resident adult population of non-EEA origin (defined as the currently registered non-EEA adult population, plus those previously naturalised and resident in Ireland) who have acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation. In order to estimate the resident population, the indicator is adjusted to take account of a 10 per cent outflow, i.e. emigration and deaths among naturalised Irish citizens.⁷⁷

In 2021, we estimate that, excluding UK nationals, up to 38.2 per cent of the resident adult population of non-EEA origin had acquired Irish citizenship through

76 Includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009.

77 See McGinnity, Enright, et al. (2020) for further discussion on the method.

naturalisation since 2005.⁷⁸ This compares to an estimated 13 per cent at the end of December 2009 in the 2010 Monitoring Report on Integration (McGinnity et al., 2011) and 37 per cent in 2019 (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020).⁷⁹ While this indicator is not without problems (e.g., it assumes that most of those naturalised stayed in Ireland, see McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020, chapter 5), it does document a remarkable rise in the proportion of non-EEA residents in Ireland who have acquired Irish citizenship, consistent with the marked increase in naturalisation acquisition in the period 2010–2015. To the extent that acquiring citizenship facilitates integration for this group, this is a very positive development in Ireland.

5.1.2.2 Citizenship indicator for EU nationals

Table 5.4 shows the Eurostat estimate of the percentage of EU nationals who acquired citizenship in the reference year. As shown in the table, the rate increased steadily from 2011 to 2018 but has dropped significantly once again since then, to 0.52 per cent in 2020. The decrease may relate to recategorisation of UK nationals following their withdrawal from the EU, as well as the pause on processing applications in 2019 and COVID-19-related processing challenges in 2020.

TABLE 5.4 CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR EU NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER, 2011–2020

	2012	2014	2016	2018	2019	2020
EU residents who acquired citizenship as a share of EU residents (%)	0.33	0.72	0.80	0.90	0.63	0.52

Source: EUROSTAT (*migr_acqs*), extracted October 2022. Selected earlier years.

5.1.3 Policy issues related to naturalisation

The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) (Citizens Rights) Regulations 2020 came into force at the end of 2020, following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. As reported in previous reports in this series, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has led to a significant increase in naturalisation among UK citizens, and this has continued through 2020 and 2021, with the UK now the largest nationality of naturalised citizens, having increased steadily since the Brexit referendum in 2016 (see section 5.1.1).

The Irish government introduced a new scorecard approach for citizenship applications from January 2022. The change was made following a review by the

78 The non-EEA/UK adult population ‘ever naturalised’ (116,686) is reduced by 10 per cent to take account of outflows by 2021 to estimate ‘naturalised remaining’ (105,017). This is expressed as a proportion of the ‘population of non-EEA/UK origin’ (274,704). The latter is defined as the currently registered non-EEA/UK population aged 16 and over (169,687), plus those ‘naturalised remaining’ (105,017).

79 UK nationals are excluded from this calculation because they are not required to hold immigration permissions; therefore, calculating a resident ‘stock’ figure consistent with one for other non-EEA nationals is not possible.

Department of Justice, which found that significant resources were diverted from general processing by incorrectly submitted applications, which led to an overall longer processing time.⁸⁰ The new approach gives predetermined points to different proofs of residency and identity, with applicants required to reach a specific number of points for each year residency is claimed and for establishing identity.⁸¹ The new approach was broadly welcomed for providing clarification for applicants (AIDA: Asylum Information Database, 2022, p. 123).

Draft legislation to change naturalisation requirements for children born in the State and to clarify the meaning of ‘continuous residence’ for the purpose of naturalisation was published in 2021. The General Scheme of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2021 (and the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2022) outlines a proposal to shorten the minimum period of residence for naturalisation from five years to three years for children born in the State.⁸² It also proposes to amend the ‘continuous residency’ requirement to allow for a total absence of up to 70 days from the State in the year preceding an application for citizenship, with a further 30 days available where necessitated by exceptional circumstances.⁸³ A Single Person Committee of Inquiry was established in 2021 to review requests for disclosure of the information relied upon in refusals of naturalisation on the grounds of national-security concerns.⁸⁴

Some changes were also made to the application process for naturalisation, including the introduction of online vetting, online tax clearance and online payments⁸⁵ and a new approach whereby applicants do not have to supply their original passport with their application but can instead provide certified copies.⁸⁶

In *Damache v. Minister for Justice*, the Supreme Court found that sections 19(2) and 19(3) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, which relate to the procedure for revocation of naturalisation, were unconstitutional with regard to the right to fair procedures due to the absence of an impartial and independent decision-maker.⁸⁷ Before any further revocations take place, therefore, it will be

80 Department of Justice, 1 March 2022, ‘Response to parliamentary question 11765/22’.

81 Department of Justice, 31 December 2021, ‘Scorecard approach being introduced for citizenship applications from January 2022’; Department of Justice, 20 May 2022, ‘Proofs of residence’.

82 This Bill also clarifies the good-character requirement for minors under the age of 14.

83 EMN Ireland, 9 June 2021, ‘Shorter residence requirement for naturalisation and longer period for voluntary return among changes planned in new Bill’.

84 Applicants can request a disclosure within three months of the decision, and the Single Person Committee can advise the Minister for Justice as to whether and to what extent it is possible to make disclosure of the security information to the applicant. Department of Justice (22 July 2021) ‘Single Person Committee of Inquiry set up to review refusals of Irish citizenship where national security concerns arise’, www.irishimmigration.ie/single-person-committee-of-inquiry-set-up-to-review-refusals-of-irish-citizenship-where-national-security-concerns-arise/

85 Department of Justice, 2 February 2022, ‘Response to parliamentary question 5229/22’.

86 Department of Justice, 15 November 2021, ‘Minister McEntee makes customer focused immigration changes’.

87 *Damache v. Minister for Justice* [2021] IESC 6.

necessary to introduce a new process that meets the requirements laid down by the court, according to the judgment. According to that judgment, the Oireachtas needs to determine the basis of any proposed scheme, although this has yet to be acted upon.

5.2 LONG-TERM RESIDENCE

While a statutory LTR status has been planned by Irish policymakers since 2008, this has still not been put on a statutory footing.⁸⁸ This has significant implications for integration, particularly for non-EEA nationals who may not qualify or who may not wish to apply for naturalisation.

LTR is a permanent residence status for migrants who have been resident in the host country for a period of time (often five years), which offers the same basic socio-economic rights as citizens of the host country. Such a status is provided for in the majority of EU Member States, under Directives 2003/109/EC and 2011/51/EU.⁸⁹ Ireland has not opted in to either directive, and resident non-EEA nationals have much more limited access to permanent residence than elsewhere in the EU (see Box 5.1).

After a steady decline in applications for LTR between 2012 and 2015, there has been an increase in applications, up to 318 in 2021, the highest number since 2012 (see Table 5.5). However, numbers remain low, and this has not led to an increase proportional to the share of non-EEA nationals with residence permissions. LTR permit-holders accounted for just 0.7 per cent of the total number of non-EEA nationals holding residence permits. In 2001, 250 LTR permits were issued, according to Eurostat, the highest number in the past five years.⁹⁰

88 Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008.

89 Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011 amends Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection.

90 Eurostat, 'Long-term residence permits issued during the year migr_resltr), extracted 2 November 2022.

TABLE 5.5 APPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM RESIDENCE, SELECTED YEARS, 2012–2021

	2012	2014	2016	2018	2019	2020	2021
New applications for LTR	703	173	100	144	160	191	318
Non-EEA nationals holding LTR	5,771	2,309	1,473	1,272	1,125	1,051	1,219
Number of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' permissions (aged 16 and over)	120,281	105,569	110,927	142,286	168,297	155,317	169,687
Share of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' permissions (aged 16 and over)	4.8%	2.2%	1.3%	0.9%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%

Note 2013, 2015 and 2017 excluded.

As discussed in previous years, this low rate is likely related to both the Irish LTR scheme and naturalisation. While Ireland's LTR scheme has been criticised as having 'some of the most restrictive and discretionary policies in the EU' (MIPEX [Migrant Integration Policy Index]; see Solano and Huddleston, 2020), and Ireland ranked 39th out of 56 countries reviewed by MIPEX, the study findings relating to naturalisation were much more positive, and Ireland ranked ninth. Naturalisation may therefore be preferable for many, in particular as both require five years of residence.

5.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

No local or national elections have taken place since the last report in this series (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020), so the analysis of electoral compositions conducted in that research is still relevant. The last elections that took place were in 2019 (local elections and European Parliament election) and 2020 (general election). In the local elections in 2019, where all 'usual' residents can vote and run for office, 56 migrant candidates ran – 3 per cent of all candidates. Seven non-Irish councillors were elected, or 0.7 per cent of all councillors (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020). It should be noted that this statistic does not include naturalised Irish citizens.

The low number of ethnic minorities in positions of power was flagged by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Anti-racism Committee (created to write the new NAPAR) in its interim report.⁹¹

The lack of disaggregated data on potential indicators of political participation such as voter registration remains a challenge for monitoring political integration in the Irish context. However, some qualitative and quantitative research has been conducted recently that can give an insight into active citizenship among Ireland's migrant communities, which we present in this section.

5.3.1 County-level integration

The Immigrant Council of Ireland conducted research on local authorities' progress relating to migrant integration across a variety of indicators. They found that many local authorities had not made significant progress on actions under the National Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021. Local authorities had made most progress on establishing a migrant integration forum, with 17 local authorities indicating that they had done this. The research also found a lack of data collected by local authorities on users of their services. Of the 25 local authorities who responded to the survey, 23 indicated that they had engaged in actively encouraging migrants to register to vote. However, all but two of the local authorities surveyed did not have information on the percentage of the local migrant population that is registered to vote.

5.3.2 Political engagement

Very few detailed studies have been conducted on the engagement of different migrant groups in Irish politics. Polish migrants are interesting as they are a very large, established migrant group; many came in the period immediately following the accession of Poland to the EU in the period 2006/2007 (see Fig. 1.2).⁹² Recent research on Polish engagement in Irish elections and politics, involving interviews with Polish candidates for previous elections and a survey of Polish residents in Ireland (n = 503), examined declining engagement among the Polish community in Irish elections (Pszczółkowska and Lesińska, 2022). They focus on three explanations: (1) level of organisation of the migrant community; (2) opportunity structures in Ireland; and (3) country-of-origin politics. The research found that the level of organisation of the migrant community can be a key factor in political mobilisation and that there was a strong sense of community among Polish migrants in the early years of migration (e.g., for the 2009 elections). However, this

91 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2019) 'Concluding observations on the combined fifth to ninth reports of Ireland', CERF/C/IRL/CO/5–9; Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (2020).

92 The majority of Polish migrants in Ireland – 60 per cent – have been living here for 11–20 years (see Table A1.4).

diminished over time as people integrated and no longer needed the support of these organisations.

The research also analysed multiple elements relating to the opportunity structures in Ireland that influenced candidates to run. They found that the political opportunity structure was very favourable for candidates in 2009 but gradually became less favourable over time. This was in part due to the parties' disappointment in Polish voter turnout but mainly due to the Local Government Reform Act that abolished town and borough councils, which were the easiest step for new entrants to the political scene. Pszczołkowska and Lesińska (2022) noted, however, that the opportunity structure had become somewhat more favourable for Polish candidates in the 2019 elections, with the adoption of the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 and consequent political inclusion goals.

The third type of factor presented in the paper related to the country of origin. Conditions and policies in the country of origin continue to affect migrant communities, particularly for intra-EU migrants, where it is easier to maintain a link with the country of origin and migration plans often have a sense of 'liquidity' (Favell, 2008). They found that the change in Poland's political context and diaspora policies had a significant impact on Polish people's political engagement in Ireland. The rise of the Law and Justice party, which focused on attracting Poles home and fostering a sense of nationality, was found to be an important element in political engagement. As much of the Polish community in Ireland remained more engaged in Polish politics, the strong political divisions were reflected in the Polish community in Ireland. This makes it more difficult for Polish candidates to gain support from the Polish community and makes many Poles less politically engaged (Pszczołkowska and Lesińska, 2022). This illustrates that it is not only host-country politics and political structures that influence migrants' participation in politics, but country-of-origin politics can also play a role.

5.3.3 Volunteering

Volunteering can be seen as both an indicator of integration and a means of facilitating integration. As such, the last Migrant Integration Strategy aimed to promote volunteering among less represented groups. Encouraging diversity in volunteering is also a part of the National Volunteering Strategy 2021–2025 (Department of Rural and Community Development, 2020, pp. 39–41).

The Institute for Social Science in the 21st Century and University College Cork conducted research in 2022 on migrant participation in volunteering (Scanlon and

Martin, 2022).⁹³ Of those registered with Cork Volunteer Centre, 46 per cent identified as non-Irish nationals. Challenges identified in volunteering by migrants included uncertainty about what they could contribute and whether they would be welcome, with women more likely than men to have identified these as challenges (Scanlon and Martin, 2022, p. 16). Many respondents also raised concerns about language proficiency, with concerns about not being welcome linked to language capacity rather than discrimination (Scanlon and Martin, 2022, p. 16). The majority of respondents volunteered in supporting vulnerable groups (48 per cent). Scanlon and Martin (2022, p. 22) found that only 14 per cent of respondents volunteered supporting other migrants (i.e. volunteering that would relate to bonding social capital), although many volunteer informally within migrant communities to provide support.⁹⁴ Volunteering facilitated social integration: the majority of volunteers reported that they had a greater sense of being part of the community (72 per cent); that they had gained a better understanding of Irish society (56 per cent); that they felt more connected to Ireland (52 per cent); and that they had widened their circle of friends and contacts (46 per cent). Interviewees also felt that volunteering made them more accepted and valued within the local community.

5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The processing of citizenship applications increased in 2021, with the highest number of certificates issued in the past five years. Having become an increasingly large percentage of naturalisations since 2016, when the UK voted to leave the EU, UK citizens continue to be prominent in naturalisation statistics in Ireland. Furthermore, despite removing UK citizens from the figures, an increasing proportion of non-EEA nationals are naturalising in Ireland (to 3.4 per cent), while the proportion of EU nationals naturalising has decreased (to 0.52 per cent). We estimate that up to 38.2 per cent of the resident adult population of non-EEA origin had acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation by the end of 2021.

Significant increases in processing delays for citizenship applications (to 30 months on average) impede access to naturalisation, potentially negatively impacting integration in the long term.⁹⁵ To tackle this, multiple reforms to the citizenship process have been adopted, including a scorecard approach for documentation and increased digitalisation of the process. In addition, the temporary measures of online citizenship ceremonies and signatures of affidavits of loyalty were brought

93 The study was based on 244 online surveys with migrants who had registered with the Cork Volunteer Centre and eight interviews.

94 Bonding social capital is generated during interactions between people within the same social group. Bridging social capital is generated during interactions between people from different social groups.

95 These delays could be particularly problematic for those who opted to apply for citizenship as opposed to long-term residence.

in to enable naturalisations to continue during the COVID-19 restrictions on in-person events.⁹⁶

The monitoring of political participation continues to be affected by the lack of available data. However, multiple research outputs have been conducted in recent years that have provided insight into active citizenship and political participation in Ireland. These show an often challenging opportunity structure in Ireland, but also provide insight into how the characteristics of migrant communities and countries of origin can impact upon political participation (Pszczółkowska and Lesińska, 2022), indicating that solutions may not be straightforward.

96 Department of Justice (2021) 'Citizenship applicants to sign affidavit of loyalty under temporary COVID-19 measures announced by Minister McEntee'. <https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/9427b-citizenship-applicants-to-sign-affidavit-of-loyalty-under-temporary-covid-19-measures-announced-by-minister-mcentee/>

Challenges for policy and data collection

Frances McGinnity and Stefanie Sprong

This report presents an overview of the integration outcomes of migrants living in Ireland using the best and most recently available data. By comparing the degree of closeness or similarity between the foreign-born and Irish-born population on a range of Zaragoza integration indicators, the report aims to contribute to the understanding of how migrant groups in Ireland are faring. As noted in Chapter 1, any monitoring exercise is only as good as the indicators and data on which it is based. This chapter considers some implications for future data needs, as well as highlighting policy issues that have persisted or emerged. The context has changed considerably since the previous Monitoring Report on Integration (McGinnity, Enright et al., 2020), which analysed data mainly from 2019. Since then, both the COVID-19 pandemic and Brexit have had a considerable impact on migration flows and integration outcomes. The current report is also set against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with unprecedented flows of refugees with temporary protection in Ireland.

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Ireland continues to have one of the highest percentages of foreign-born residents (18 per cent) among EU Member States. However, in contrast to previous years, the share of migrants from outside the EU is now larger than the share of migrants from other EU countries, which likely reflects the effect of Brexit, as the sizeable number of UK migrants to Ireland now count as non-EU.⁹⁷ Net migration stayed positive in the years 2020–2022, yet there was a notable dip in migration in 2020 and 2021, which was followed by a marked increase in inward migration in 2022. This likely largely reflects the impact of the COVID-19 related restrictions and border closures, with 2022 figures representing a ‘catch-up’ effect (see also Cunniffe et al., 2022), unless of course these higher numbers persist beyond 2022.

The significant social and political events that have taken place since the Monitoring Report on Integration 2020 also bear consequences for the integration outcomes in the domains of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. Chapter 2 shows that migrants tended to be harder hit by the labour-market impact of the pandemic than Irish-born people, with larger falls in employment and a bigger rise in unemployment in the early years of the COVID-19

97 The data (presented in Fig. 1.1) is from 2021 and thus predates the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This means that this change cannot be explained by the arrival of Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection.

pandemic. Nevertheless, since then, employment rates among the foreign-born population have risen remarkably. Particularly notable is the increase in employment rates among the African-born population, which requires further investigation, and which, if it persists beyond 2022, shows considerable progress by this group. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the level of education among the foreign-born population continues to be higher than among Irish-born, which partly reflects the younger age profile of migrants. Chapter 4 highlights the challenges faced by some migrant groups in terms of poverty and social inclusion: compared to the Irish-born population, the migrant population tended to have a lower income and higher poverty rates, were more likely to rent in the private market and faced greater issues relating to housing affordability, yet they tended to be healthier. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on active citizenship and shows a significant increase in the processing of citizenship applications and a continued prominence of UK citizens in naturalisation statistics following the Brexit vote.

6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, represents a significant statement of policy intent and brought new energy and focus into efforts to integrate migrants in Ireland, though, as noted in the interim review, some actions were more successful than others (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019). As a consultation process begins for renewing and improving the strategy, it is an opportune time to reflect on the policy implications of research evidence. The section below discusses some issues arising from outcomes presented in this report, though, where relevant, it also draws on other studies in the programme of research on integration.

In terms of employment, migrants in Ireland generally seem to be faring well. While the findings in Chapter 2 corroborate earlier findings that suggested migrants were particularly hard hit by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the labour market (Enright et al., 2020), analysis of data on the first quarter of 2022 suggests that migrant employment rates recovered, and that, by 2022, the employment rate for migrants was higher than prior to the pandemic and higher than the employment rate of Irish-born people. However, Chapter 2 finds higher unemployment rates in 2022 among some non-EU groups. It is thus important that the jobseeker engagement and labour-market activation policies described in Actions 39, 40 and 41 of the Migrant Integration Strategy are appropriate to the needs of migrants and are effectively implemented. Moreover, it is important to consider the quality and wages of the jobs migrants are in, with a recent report showing significantly lower wages and working conditions for some non-Irish national groups, in some cases substantial and persisting over time (Laurence et al., 2023). Given high qualification levels among migrants overall, one potential driver is that foreign qualifications are not receiving equal recognition by employers in Ireland. Thus, greater efforts may

be needed to improve qualification recognition among employers, along with raising awareness of the NARIC system.

The labour-market situation of two migrant groups is particularly notable. First, results from Chapter 2 suggest that, despite a continuing higher unemployment rate, in 2022 the employment and participation rates of African-born workers no longer differ from Irish-born workers. In fact, the African employment rate in 2022 (74 per cent) is considerably higher than in Q1 2020 (56 per cent). This represents a significant change from previous findings based on data prior to 2020; both LFS data (in earlier Monitoring Reports) and research based on other data sources (Cronin et al., 2018, using administrative data on jobseekers; O’Connell, 2019, using Census 2016 data). Further analysis is required to investigate the reasons for this, but if the pattern persists past 2023, it is evidence of considerable progress by this group which has been characterised by low employment rates since the first time it could be separately distinguished (McGinnity et al., 2013).

Nevertheless, previous research on the Irish labour market has also documented ethnic discrimination in recruitment, particularly towards the Black ethnic group (McGinnity, Grotti et al., 2018). While racism and discrimination had not been prominent on the policy agenda for years in Ireland, with little focus on them in the Migrant Integration Strategy, the current development of a NAPAR represents a significant opportunity, as long as it is effectively implemented and monitored (McGinnity, Quinn et al., 2021).

Second, incorporation into the labour market can be particularly difficult for those who are likely to have come to Ireland seeking international protection (McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020).⁹⁸ The recent shortening of the waiting period before international-protection applicants may access the labour market, as well as work permits being valid for longer, may improve their labour-market integration prospects (see Box 1.2). However, targeted supports may be needed for all those granted protection – either through the protection system or as recipients of temporary protection (Ukrainians). For Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection, a group that largely consists of women with children, support may particularly be needed in the areas of mental-health support and counselling, language-learning, skill recognition and childcare. It may also be that lessons from the rapid introduction of supports for Ukraine arrivals in some areas (such as housing) can be incorporated into the implementation of any reform of the international-protection system.

98 Whether this is due to the duration in the protection system excluded from the labour market, the trauma and disruption experienced prior to and during migration, or the stigma attached to being an asylum seeker or from an ethnic minority is not investigated in this research.

It may be most effective in policy terms to have the needs of refugees addressed as part of the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy, rather than in a separate refugee strategy – the crucial issue being that targeted supports are provided.⁹⁹ In the context of an unprecedented increase in refugees and protection applicants in Ireland in 2022, providing additional support places considerable demands on resources, yet it is likely to yield benefits for the integration of these migrants, and Ireland, for years to come.

Housing and homelessness are not identified as issues in the Migrant Integration Strategy, yet findings from Chapter 4 suggest that, compared to the Irish-born, migrants are more likely to be in private rented accommodation and to experience affordability problems associated with housing. Renting may be a tenure of choice for some, but it is a potential problem in the current housing market, where private renting is often linked to high and fluctuating rents and insecurity of housing tenure. Chapter 4 shows how EU-East migrants are very exposed to the private rental sector and associated high housing costs: their risk of poverty is not particularly high before housing costs but is very high after housing costs. Moreover, renting is not only an issue for recently arrived migrants: McGinnity et al. (2022), using Census 2016 microdata, found that, even among migrants who came to Ireland in the period 2000–2009, 46.5 per cent were living in private rented accommodation, compared to 13 per cent of Irish-born. The same report also found that migrants were more likely to be in overcrowded accommodation and living in homeless shelters (McGinnity et al., 2022).

Finding suitable and affordable accommodation is particularly challenging for those moving out of Direct Provision centres who have been granted international-protection status. As of 16 February 2023, 5,040 people with international-protection status were still living in IPAS (International Protection Accommodation Services) accommodation, representing 26 per cent of the total (19,741).¹⁰⁰ An additional issue is the capacity to respond to changes in the numbers of refugees and international-protection applicants, which implies greater flexibility in housing stock may be required (Cunniffe et al., 2022). Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of including housing in the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 as a matter of urgency, though, of course, addressing major challenges more broadly in the Irish housing market will benefit migrants too (see also McGinnity et al., 2022).

99 The UK has a separate refugee strategy, and in Northern Ireland a refugee strategy is currently under development (McGinnity et al., 2023). For details of the Refugee Integration Strategy in Northern Ireland, see www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/consultations/draft-refugee-integration-strategy

100 See www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/committee_of_public_accounts/2023-02-16/3/

Chapter 4 also documents higher poverty rates for migrants in Ireland, particularly among non-EU migrants. Non-EU migrants are twice as likely to experience consistent poverty (income poverty and material deprivation) than Irish-born in 2020–2021, a period that predates the current cost-of-living crisis. Unfortunately, the SILC data used for the analysis of poverty and deprivation in Ireland contain very small numbers in the African group, and other non-EU groups, that do not permit them to be identified separately. Despite relatively high employment rates, groups with low incomes and experiencing deprivation may be most vulnerable to the current cost-of-living crisis and energy price inflation in Ireland. This underlines the importance of targeted supports for those on very low incomes to help face the cost-of-living crisis.¹⁰¹

Learning the host-country language is the key skill for facilitating economic, social and cultural integration (OECD, 2020). English-language skills and labour-market outcomes are not included in this report as they are not available in the LFS. However, recent research suggests that migrants with better self-reported English-language skills are more likely to be employed and have a better job. (McGinnity, Privalko et al., 2020). This is not surprising and is also recognised as being a policy priority in the Migrant Integration Strategy, though with mixed evidence on implementation (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019). However, given a lack of any coordinated approach to English-language provision for adult learners in Ireland (Kett, 2018), an effective approach to language learning for adults is a key priority for the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy. A shift to online (elearning) for adult learning, particularly of language skills, may make implementation easier; this is already happening in some other OECD countries (OECD, 2020).

As so many non-Irish adults in Ireland were educated abroad, the performance of young people may give a better indication of how well the Irish education system is integrating migrants. The analysis of GUI data in Chapter 3 shows that students of migrant origin who had been in the Irish education system since (at least) age nine perform on par with their Irish peers. There was no significant difference in the proportion of migrant origin and Irish-origin groups who sat the Leaving Certificate examination (around 95 per cent of both groups), and there was no significant difference in achievement (average points) between the two groups. These findings are consistent with recent research which has found that children of migrant origin enter primary school with lower levels of English-language skills but similar levels of non-verbal skills (Sprong and Skopek, 2022) and that language gaps seem to narrow over time, though, at age nine, children from non-English-speaking backgrounds still perform worse in English reading (Darmody et al., 2022). While

101 See ESRI (2022) 'One-off Budget measures will insulate most households from inflation this winter', www.esri.ie/news/one-off-budget-measures-will-insulate-most-households-from-inflation-this-winter

most adult migrants have high educational qualifications, the group of migrants born in Eastern Europe has the lowest proportion of tertiary educated individuals, especially after taking into account their younger age profile. Eastern European migrants also had the highest rate of early school-leaving among young adults. These findings suggest that maintaining language support for migrant students is very important, as many of the EU-East group come from non-English-speaking backgrounds. To plan effectively, policymakers need to know what proportion of students at primary and secondary level require English-language tuition, what the budget requirement is and how effective English language tuition is (see Actions 29 and 33 in the Migrant Integration Strategy). The Department of Education moved quickly to support children arriving from Ukraine to access education. Regional education and language teams have been established, hosted by the 16 ETBs to support the educational needs of children arriving from Ukraine, in particular by finding them a school place (see Education and Training Boards Ireland, 2022).

Citizenship acquired through naturalisation may be viewed as the highest level of membership available to migrants in their host state. McGinnity, Privalko et al. (2020) show that non-EEA migrants who have become Irish citizens have better labour-market outcomes than non-EEA migrants who have not, though they cannot say for certain whether citizenship leads to improved integration outcomes or whether those who are more integrated tend to apply for citizenship. Estimates in Chapter 5 indicate that up to 38.2 per cent of the resident adult population of non-EEA origin had acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation by the end of 2021. However, recent significant increases in processing delays for citizenship applications (up to 30 months on average) impede access to naturalisation, potentially negatively impacting integration in the long term. To help tackle this, multiple reforms to the citizenship process have been adopted, including a scorecard approach for documentation and increased digitalisation of the process.

6.3 ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION

Integration has important implications for the well-being of migrants and their descendants as well as for the host society. Measuring the integration of migrants into Irish society across several key areas is important. Monitoring Reports on Integration may help to identify areas where migrants may need additional support and can assist in keeping integration on the policy agenda, which is particularly relevant considering the mainstreaming approach to integration policies in Ireland. In addition, both the OECD and the EU continue to emphasise the importance of monitoring integration (Huddleston et al., 2013; OECD, 2018).

Yet the usefulness of such monitoring will only be as good as the data and evidence on which they are based and an understanding of the strengths and limitations of the data. The current indicators allow for consistent monitoring over time, but they

are limited in scope and neglect important areas of integration, such as job quality, overeducation and English-language proficiency (Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021; Laurence et al., 2023), as well as a sense of belonging, experiences of discrimination, integration into social networks, intentions to stay and identity. Besides, the Monitoring Reports on Integration are largely based on repeated national social surveys, which are a meaningful and cost-effective way of comparing migrants with the host population across the same indicators over time. However, these surveys were not designed to survey migrants, so it is important to consider how well the migrant population is represented.

Existing cross-sectional surveys will continue to play a pivotal role in monitoring integration in Ireland. It is, therefore, crucial that efforts be continued to encourage the participation of foreign-born residents in these surveys. This is particularly important for harder-to-reach groups, such as migrants with limited English-language skills and those living in rented accommodation. The usefulness of existing surveys for monitoring integration could be further improved by the inclusion of additional questions, such as self-perceived English-language ability and political participation, and the addition of migrant or ethnic-minority boost samples, which is common practice in some other European countries. Larger migrant samples allow for finer-grained distinctions of migrant groups, which is important given that more general categories likely hide considerable diversity. A good example of this is the grouping of all non-EU migrants for the analysis of social inclusion in Chapter 4.

It is important to highlight some of the changes that have already been implemented in the large surveys used in this report. One development is that new LFS and SILC questionnaires, the major sources of information on income, living conditions and employment in Ireland (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) now include a question about the place of birth of the respondents' parents. This means that it now becomes possible to study the integration outcomes of both first- and second-generation migrants. This is particularly relevant in Ireland, given the growing number of migrant-origin children (Darmody et al., 2022) and also because this can generate better insights into equality of opportunities and inclusion of migrants, with some commentators arguing that the integration of the children of migrants is the 'litmus test' for integration (OECD, 2018).

More and better data on the ethnic background of Irish residents is needed, reflecting the renewed focus on racism and discrimination in public and policy debates, illustrated by the current development of a NAPAR. There is increasing evidence of discrimination against some minority-ethnic groups, particularly the Black ethnic group, in various areas of life (McGinnity, Grotti et al., 2017; McGinnity, Grotti et al., 2018). Documenting the extent of discrimination and disadvantage over time should form an integral part of any anti-racism strategy, allowing both for

motivating the implementation of new measures to combat racism and for monitoring their effectiveness. This makes collecting good data on ethnicity increasingly urgent (Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021). This information on ethnicity needs to be collected separately from nationality or place of birth because people in ethnic minorities are often Irish nationals (McGinnity, Grotti et al., 2018), or may be born in Ireland (second-generation). Field experiments on discrimination in housing among migrants and refugees (following Gusciute et al., 2022) or the labour market (McGinnity and Lunn, 2011) could add considerably to our knowledge of discrimination.

There remains a need for surveys and qualitative work focused on migrants and their situation. Some indicators, such as dual identities or remittances, are specific to the migrant population and will never be collected on national surveys. This type of migrant-specific information is best captured in dedicated surveys, yet Ireland still lacks a large representative survey of the migrant and refugee population as is common in many other European countries (e.g., the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany). Given challenges associated with the sudden, unprecedented arrival of a large number of Ukrainians, as well as historically high numbers of international-protection applicants coming to Ireland, there is an urgent need for data following people in Ireland who seek protection from political persecution and violent conflicts, as these are not identified in regular social surveys. In the absence of specific migrant or refugee-focused surveys, it would be very useful to make linked and anonymised administrative data available to researchers. The CSO, for example, has used information from the Department of Social Protection administrative data to report on the arrivals from Ukraine in Ireland.¹⁰² While the inability to track the outcomes of refugees has been an issue raised since monitoring migrant integration in Ireland began (McGinnity et al., 2011), the fact that Ireland is currently experiencing the largest inflow of refugees in its history means that this is now more urgent than ever. Lessons from data collection on Ukrainian refugees might usefully be adapted to follow other protection cases, notwithstanding data-protection concerns.

As well as the immediate policy challenges of integrating these migrants in terms of accommodation, schooling and employment, social integration and the response of the population in Ireland are also important considerations. In recent months, protests across Ireland have occurred, ostensibly against the housing of refugees in local communities, but which have also been marked by wider sentiments that immigration to Ireland is too high.¹⁰³ There are fears that anxiety about immigration

102 CSO, 'Arrivals from Ukraine in Ireland, Series 7'. For further details, see www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/FP/p-ai/arrivalsfromukraineinirelandseries7

103 Danny De Vaal (2022) 'Second protest takes place in East Wall after "male-only" asylum seekers housed in old ESB building', *Irish Mirror*, 21 November, <https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/irish-news/second-protest-takes-place-east-28550267>; Rory Carroll (2023) "'There is no room": Anti-immigration protesters march in Dublin', *The*

is being politicised. Understanding the drivers of current attitudes to immigrants in Ireland, and whether anti-immigrant sentiment overall has changed in the recent period, might be informative for understanding concerns and potentially addressing them (McGinnity et al., 2023). Additionally, such an understanding may help to strike a balance between meeting the needs of immigrants and maintaining social cohesion in Ireland.

The Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 aims to ensure all migrants can actively participate in Irish communities, workplaces and politics. In light of this strategy, this report and related research show some areas that appear to demonstrate positive progress but other areas where issues still remain, or where difficulties have arisen since the strategy was initially implemented. This underscores the importance of a timely follow-up strategy, as well as the importance of prioritising these issues. With a mainstreamed approach to integration in Ireland, implementing any Migrant Integration Strategy is not just the responsibility of the department responsible for integration and equality but of all relevant government departments and agencies who interact with migrants, including local authorities. Stapleton et al. (2022) note that as the Migrant Integration Strategy, the National Strategy for Women and Girls and the National Traveller and Roma Inclusion Strategy all ended in 2021, the development of successor strategies may present an opportunity for increased focus on the specific integration needs of migrant women.

Early data from 2022 seem to suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic and associated job losses did not seem to have had a lasting effect on migrant employment rates overall, though this report did not investigate wages and working conditions of migrants, which are lower for some groups. However, the housing crisis in Ireland is being disproportionately felt by migrants, and, given the exposure of some groups to poverty, the cost-of-living crisis may be very difficult for some migrant households. Integrating a large group of Ukrainian refugees and protection applicants, an especially vulnerable group of migrants to Irish society, represents a particular challenge and highlights the importance of implementation of planned reform of the system of international protection. The policy gaps and areas of concern highlighted here underscore the importance of renewing the Migrant Integration Strategy to keep up the momentum built by the previous one and to enhance it so it can be even more effective at meeting the needs of the changing migrant population in Ireland.

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APPENDIX 1

Common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union

1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society and to making such contributions visible.
4. Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way, is a critical foundation for better integration.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, to evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.

APPENDIX 2

Definition of indicators

Indicator	Definition	Data source
1. Employment		
Employment rate	Proportion of population of working age (15–64) who are employed	LFS
Unemployment rate	Proportion of labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15–64) who are unemployed	LFS
Activity rate	Proportion of adults of working age (15–64) who are in the labour force (employed and unemployed)	LFS
Self-employment rate	Proportion of employed population who are self-employed (that is working in their own business, professional practice or farm for the purpose of making a profit)	LFS
2. Education		
Highest educational attainment	Share of population aged 15–64 with third-level, PLC, upper secondary or no formal/lower secondary education	LFS
Share of 25–34-year-olds with third-level educational attainment*	Share of 25–34-year-olds with third-level education	LFS
Share of early-leavers from education and training*	Share of population aged 20–24 with no more than lower secondary education and not currently in education	LFS
Mean achievement scores for 15-year-olds in reading and Mathematics and Science*	Mean achievement scores in English reading, Mathematics and Science at age 15 by English-language ability and generational status	Updated PISA data not available
3. Social inclusion		
Median net income	Median net (household and equivalised) income of the immigrant population and the Irish population	SILC
AROP rate	Share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national median	SILC
Consistent poverty rates	Proportion of population both (1) AROP and (2) living in households that lack two or more basic items such as food, clothing or heat	SILC
Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good	Share of population aged 16+ perceiving their health status as good or very good	SILC
Ratio of property-owners to non-property-owners among immigrants and the total population	Percentage of property-owners, private renters and local-authority renters among immigrant and Irish household respondents	SILC

4. Active citizenship		
Share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship (best estimate)	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population who have acquired citizenship (best estimate)	Department of Justice
Share of immigrants holding permanent or LTR permits	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population granted LTR (best estimate)	Department of Justice
Share of immigrants among elected representatives	Share of immigrants among elected national representatives	Immigrant Council of Ireland

Notes Employment and unemployment are defined in this table and elsewhere in this report using the standard ILO definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey interview for one hour or more, or who were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview but were available to start work in the next two weeks and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the Live Register of unemployment and from the individual's own self-assignment of their principal economic status. * indicates where definitions of the indicators differ slightly from those proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with third-level educational attainment instead of the share of 30- to 34-year-olds with third-level educational achievement; share of early leavers from education and training aged 20–24 instead of 18–24. Updated PISA data was not available due to COVID-19 delays.

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