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ESRI ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Monitoring Report on Integration 2024

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GLOSSARY

AROP	At risk of poverty
BoTP	Beneficiary of temporary protection
CSO	Central Statistics Office
CTA	Common Travel Area
DCEDIY	Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth
DEA	Daily Expenses Allowance
DETE	Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
EAL	English as an additional language
EEA	European Economic Area, which comprises the EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
EMN	European Migration Network
EPIC	Employment for People from Immigrant Communities
ESOL	English for speakers of other languages
ETB	Education and Training Board
EU	European Union
EU27	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
EU-East	The EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
EU-West	EU15 Member States excluding Ireland and the UK: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
Forced migrant	A person subject to a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters).
HIQA	Health Information and Quality Authority
HSE	Health Service Executive

ICTU	Irish Congress of Trade Unions
ILO	International Labour Organization
IHREC	Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission
IPAS	International Protection Accommodation Services
LAIT	Local Authority Integration Teams
LMAP	Labour market access permission
LTR	Long-term residence
LFS	Labour Force Survey
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
NAAO	North America, Australia and Oceania
NARIC	National Academic Recognitions Information Centre
NAPAR	National Action Plan Against Racism
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Oireachtas	Irish parliament, consisting of both the upper house (the Seanad) and the lower house (the Dáil)
'Other Europe'	European countries outside of the EU (see Appendix 2)
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD)
PPSN	Personal public service number
PRSI	Pay-related social insurance
QQI	Quality and Qualifications Ireland
REALT	Regional Education and Language Teams
SILC	Survey on Income and Living Conditions
SUSI	Student Universal Support Ireland
Taoiseach	Irish prime minister
TD	Teachta Dála (Member of the Dáil/Member of Parliament)
TPD	Temporary Protection Directive
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Migrant integration allows migrants to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political life of the country they migrate to; it is also important for social cohesion and inclusive growth. By examining how migrants fare relative to the majority population in key life domains, this report seeks to illustrate the challenges, successes and opportunities for migrant integration in Ireland today. Monitoring integration can provide crucial information for policy and public conversations around migration, and the profile of migrants in Ireland.

Ireland's migration context has changed considerably in recent years: there have been relatively high numbers of arrivals from Ukraine to Ireland, and a marked increase in the number of people seeking international protection since the last monitoring report on integration (McGinnity et al., 2023b). A rise in the cost of living and an acute shortage of housing continue to be significant challenges for all living in Ireland, including many migrants.

This report is the ninth in a series of monitoring reports on integration that began in 2011. It considers how migrants – generally defined as those born outside the State – fare relative to the Irish-born population across four key life domains: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. The report also provides updates on migration and integration policy. Integration indicators are based on high-quality, nationally representative survey data for the latest available time points, supplemented with administrative statistics on forced migrants, where possible. Key headline figures are presented in Table A: individual chapters disaggregate migrant groups by region of origin.

KEY FINDINGS

Chapter 1 presents recent trends in migration and provides a profile of the migrant population in Ireland. The rise in immigration since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic continued into 2024, nearly reaching its 2007 peak. The 2007 peak was dominated by migration from within the European Union (EU): recent patterns indicate a shift towards non-EU migration, for work, study and international protection. In 2023, 22% of the population were born outside the State: just over half of this subgroup was born in the United Kingdom (UK – including Northern Ireland) or the EU, while the remainder was born across a diverse range of non-EU countries. This is an increase from 20% born outside the State in 2021.[1]

1 See Eurostat - 'Population on 1 January by age group, sex and country of birth', https://doi.org/10.2908/MIGR_POP3CTB.

TABLE A KEY INTEGRATION INDICATORS AT A GLANCE

Domain	Irish-born	Foreign-born
Employment, working age population (Q1, 2024)		
Employment rate	72.7	76.8*
Unemployment rate	3.5	5.8*
Activity rate	75.3	81.5*
Education (2021–2023, pooled)		
Share of 25–34 age group with third-level education	58.0	70.0*
Share of early leavers from education (20–24 age group)	3.3	3.7
Social inclusion (2022 and 2023, pooled)		
Median annual net income (adjusted for household composition)	€27,602	€24,827*
At-risk-of-poverty rate	11.0	14.5*
Deprivation rate (enforced lack of 2+ essential items)	15.7	23.1*
Share of population (aged 16+) perceiving their health as good or very good	79.5	82.9*
Proportion of households that are homeowners	77.1	37.2*
Proportion of households spending more than 30% of their income on housing	9.2	36.5*
Active citizenship (end 2023)		
Annual citizenship acquisition rate (non-EEA nationals)		4.0
Proportion of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship since 2005 to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at end 2023 (best estimate)		29.7
Share of non-EEA adults with live residence permissions holding long-term residence (LTR)		0.6

Sources: Labour Force Survey (LFS) Q1 2024 for employment indicators; LFS 2021, 2022 and 2023 (pooled) for education indicators; Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) 2022 and 2023 (pooled) for social inclusion indicators. Citizenship and LTR indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Citizenship Service, Eurostat. See Appendix 1 for further details of sources. Survey data used for employment, education and social inclusion indicators do not include arrivals from Ukraine or international protection applicants living in communal accommodation (see Appendix 2).

Notes: * signals that the migrant group value is significantly different from the Irish group value, at $p < .05$ level. We use the International Labour Organization (ILO) definitions of employment, unemployment and activity rates. The employment rate is the proportion of the working age population (15–64) who are in paid work. The unemployment rate is the proportion of the labour force (in work or seeking work) who are not employed but who have sought work in the last month. The activity rate is the proportion of the working age population active in the labour market (employed or unemployed) (see Chapter 2). The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the proportion with less than 60% of median equivalised income (see Chapter 4). The ratio of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship since 2005 to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at the end of 2021 is adjusted for naturalised persons leaving the State. UK nationals are excluded from these estimates of the non-EEA population, as are arrivals from Ukraine and international protection applicants (see Chapter 5 for detailed discussion).

Chapter 2 shows how employment and activity rates remained steady and high across Q1 of 2022, 2023 and 2024, with migrants having higher rates than Irish-born residents (Table A). Labour market indicators for migrants differed substantially based on their place of birth: those born in the EU (east or west), had higher employment and activity rates than the Irish-born group, and had low unemployment rates relative to other migrant groups. Outcomes improved for some groups – in particular, unemployment among migrants of African origin has decreased to 6%, having been persistently high across the 2009–2019 period. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) does not include migrants living in communal

accommodation, but estimates from administrative data suggest that labour market participation is much lower among arrivals from Ukraine and international protection applicants (see Chapter 2).

Chapter 3 compares academic achievement between Irish and migrant-origin children, and educational attainment levels between Irish- and foreign-born adults. As before, foreign-born residents have higher educational attainment than the Irish-born residents overall, although there is substantial variation by region of birth. In the 25–34 year age group, 70% of foreign-born residents had third-level education compared to 58% of Irish-born residents in the 2021–2023 period (Table A). The proportion of young adults (aged 20–24) who had left school before finishing upper secondary education was low, and similar among migrants overall and Irish-born people (Table A). Data from the most recent Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test in 2022 show that, among 15 year olds, students from a migrant background had lower scores on English reading and somewhat lower scores in mathematics tests than non-migrant students in Ireland. Second-generation students perform better than first-generation students, particularly in reading (Donohue et al., 2023).

Chapter 4 investigates the social inclusion of migrants, focusing on income and poverty, health and housing in the period 2022–2023. Adjusted for household composition, the average income for migrants, at €24,827, is lower than the Irish average of €27,602 (see Table A). Table A also shows that migrants have a higher at-risk-of-poverty rate, at 14.5% compared to 11% for Irish-born residents. This is primarily driven by a very high at-risk-of-poverty rate for those born outside the EU – one in five are income poor (20.4%). Material deprivation, the enforced lack of two or more of eleven essential items, is also higher for migrants, at 23%, compared to just under 16% for Irish-born residents. These estimates do not include migrants living in communal accommodation, who, if they are not employed, are likely to be income poor given the low payment rates they receive. In contrast, migrants overall were more likely than the Irish-born group to report being in good health (see Table A); this was largely driven by their younger average age (aside from UK migrants). Migrants were much less likely to be homeowners and much more likely to be living in the private rental sector compared to the Irish-born population (Table A). Migrants are also less likely to live in local authority or social housing than the Irish-born group. Linked to their concentration in the private rental sector, migrants are much more likely to experience high housing costs: 36% of migrants spend more than 30% of their income on housing costs, compared to 9% of Irish-born residents (Table A).

Chapter 5 considers active citizenship. The annual citizenship acquisition rate, defined as the ratio of the number who have acquired Irish citizenship to the number of resident immigrants in a given year, has remained at around 4% for non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals since 2021. The estimated share of

migrants of non-EEA origin who have acquired Irish citizenship since 2005 is around 30% (see Table A). The proportion of non-EEA nationals holding permanent or long-term resident permits is much lower and has decreased in recent years, from 1.2% in 2017 to 0.6% in 2023. Political participation of immigrants has increased, with the number of immigrants both running and winning a seat doubling in the 2024 local elections, albeit from a very low base. The proportion of councillors with a migrant background remains low overall, at 2.2%.

POLICY ISSUES

Despite higher employment rates, higher educational attainment and better health, migrants overall have lower incomes, are more likely to be at risk of poverty (AROP), are particularly exposed to costly private rental accommodation and are underrepresented politically. These findings highlight the importance of renewing the now-expired Migrant Integration Strategy (2017–2021), in conjunction with relevant active strategies such as the National Action Plan Against Racism (NAPAR), and the White Paper to End Direct Provision.

Even with high employment rates and high qualifications among migrants, migrant incomes are lower, on average; this is in part driven by lower wages (see Laurence et al., 2023). Greater efforts may be needed to improve recognition of foreign qualifications, which would help address the lower wage returns to education for migrants. In the context of cost-of-living challenges, poverty and deprivation rates are higher among some migrant groups, especially for those born outside the EU. Supports targeted at those on the very lowest incomes are therefore very important for migrant integration.

Findings relating to housing indicate that migrants are more exposed to current challenges in the private rental sector than Irish-born residents, and that housing affordability has become a particular challenge for many migrant groups. Addressing problems in the housing market overall – a shortage of social and rental accommodation, affordability in the private rental sector – would help migrants, though they face additional challenges in the housing market. Housing issues are particularly acute for those moving out of Direct Provision centres, an issue that is all the more pressing given existing challenges in accommodating new arrivals. As Stapleton and Murphy (2024) argue, a multi-agency approach is required.

ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION

Integration monitoring is only as accurate as the evidence on which it is based. Most of the analysis in this report is based on high-quality, national-level repeated representative surveys, such as the LFS and the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC). While these surveys allow for comparisons between migrant and non-migrant groups, they are not designed to survey migrants, and many groups are small. The addition of migrant or ethnic-minority boost samples would allow

for finer-grained distinctions of migrant groups. Migrant-specific indicators, such as sense of belonging, intentions to stay and identity are best captured in dedicated surveys, yet Ireland still lacks a large representative survey of migrants. In the interim, special modules to existing surveys could also be used to field migrant-specific questions on an ongoing basis.

Household surveys do not survey those living in communal establishments. This is a particularly salient issue, given the recent increases in those seeking international protection and arrivals from Ukraine currently living in communal accommodation in Ireland. This report supplements survey data with an analysis of administrative data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) on these groups. However, as integration outcomes may be quite different for these groups, addressing this issue is now a priority.

Integration is a two-way process, meaning the attitudes and behaviours of non-migrants also matter. Research investigating the drivers of these attitudes is important for understanding migrant integration and the role that community-level factors, such as disadvantage, may play (Laurence et al., 2024a, 2024b). The migrant population comprises highly diverse groups and these characteristics can interact with the characteristics of the communities in which migrants settle. The importance of local-level governance in integration has been recently acknowledged, though the data in this report do not capture potential spatial differences in outcomes, which may be of interest for future research.

A recurring theme of monitoring reports is that ethnicity, and its role in understanding migrant integration, is rarely measured in Ireland, neither in surveys nor in administrative data. More and better data on the ethnic background of Irish residents is needed, as highlighted by the NAPAR. The forthcoming Equality Data Strategy, when published, has the potential to increase momentum in this regard.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction, policy and context

Frances McGinnity and Evan Carron-Kee[2]

Increasing immigration to Ireland in recent decades has brought with it greater diversity. This presents opportunities to Irish society, but also challenges. Integrating migrants is important for migrants' outcomes and well-being; successful migrant integration enables immigrants to fully contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political life of the country they migrate to (the 'host country') (OECD, 2023). The success of migrant integration also has consequences for the host society by affecting social cohesion, intergroup relations and inclusive growth (Alba and Foner, 2015). In this report, integration is broadly understood as the process by which migrants become a part of their host society, by participating in its economic, social, cultural and political life.

Monitoring integration helps us to assess how migrants are faring, and also to potentially indicate problems that need addressing. This 2024 monitoring report on integration follows a series of eight monitoring reports on integration published between 2011 and 2022. These monitoring reports on integration have consistently measured the integration of immigrants into Irish society across four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. The report also provides updates on migration and integration policy. By keeping an ongoing record of differences in outcomes between immigrants and the Irish-born population in these domains, these reports provide both policymakers and the general public with important information to assess integration outcomes and respond to policy challenges. In the current context of heightened salience of immigration in Ireland, it is perhaps even more important than ever to provide this information.

This monitoring report on integration is funded by the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY) and the Department of Justice, as part of a new programme of research on migration, integration and equality. This report is broad in scope and provides an overview of the topic. Previous reports in the research programme complement the monitoring reports by focusing in more depth on topics of policy or research interest, for example housing and family among migrants (McGinnity et al., 2022), wages and working conditions

2 With thanks to Ciara Dalton and Keire Murphy for their work on boxes in this chapter.

(Laurence et al., 2023) and attitudes to immigrants and immigration (Laurence et al., 2024a; Laurence et al., 2024b).[3]

Integration is affected by both migration flows – the number and characteristics of migrants – but also by the context in the host country. The nature of migration has changed in recent years, influenced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and associated migration flows, and also by the increase in the numbers seeking international protection. The last monitoring report was set in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, meaning this report allows us to see how trends have developed since then. Current domestic challenges include a rapid increase in the cost of living, which followed a rapid rise in inflation after the COVID-19 pandemic and which was partly driven by the spike in energy prices as a result of the invasion of Ukraine. There is also an acute shortage of housing in Ireland, coupled with affordability challenges. How has migrant integration been affected by these challenges?

This chapter provides an introduction and context for the assessment of integration in this report. Section 1.1 presents a brief overview of how we define, measure and monitor integration. Section 1.2 considers the current policy context in Ireland and the European Union (EU). Section 1.3 presents an overview of the current main trends in migration in Ireland, which will help inform our understanding of both the composition of the migrant population and how it is changing over time. Section 1.4 provides some information about the composition of migrants in terms of region of origin, duration of residence, age, gender and citizenship, based on Labour Force Survey (LFS) data.

1.1 MEASURING MIGRANTS AND MONITORING INTEGRATION

1.1.2 Measuring the migrant population

Migrants are defined as all those who were born outside the Republic of Ireland. This is consistent with international definitions (OECD, 2023), but it is a broad definition, including those born in the United Kingdom (UK), including Northern Ireland, and those born abroad to Irish parents. Migrants are then further divided into place-of-birth groups. It is much easier for migrants from the EU and UK to live and work in Ireland compared to those from outside the EU or UK. There is a longer tradition in Ireland of immigration from the UK than from other places, and the profile of immigrants from the UK is very different to that of other migrant groups (see Table 1.2); for these reasons, they have always been distinguished from other migrant groups in the monitoring reports. Since the exit of the UK from the EU, this

3 For other reports in the programme see https://www.esri.ie/current-research/integration-and-equality-research-programme.

has become even more important. Through the Common Travel Area, migrants who are UK citizens have rights equivalent to migrants from within the EU.[4] Within the EU, EU-West migrants and EU-East migrants are also distinguished: EU-East migrants are from countries that joined the EU since 2004.[5]

Where possible, non-EU migrants are divided into the following groups: 'Africa'; 'North America, Australia and Oceania'; 'Asia', which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; 'Other Europe' and 'Rest of the World', which comprises Central America and the Caribbean, South America, Near and Middle East, and other countries, based on distinctions in the LFS (see Appendix 2 for detailed countries).[6] Ideally, migrant groupings would remain consistent throughout the report; however, where data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) are used (Chapter 4), small sample sizes mean these latter groups need to be aggregated into a 'non-EU' category. Data used in Chapter 5 are drawn from administrative data from the Department of Justice, which distinguishes the European Economic Area (EEA) from non-EEA nationals.[7]

Defining migrants as those born abroad is consistent with the 2022 monitoring report on integration. Previous reports in the series used an alternative definition, distinguishing Irish nationals from non-Irish nationals. Nationality is usually based on citizenship, which can change over time. In the past 20 years, many migrants have acquired Irish citizenship,[8] and thus no longer count as non-Irish nationals (see McGinnity et al., 2023). However, in 2021, the LFS changed from recording the nationality of non-Irish nationals to recording their citizenship. For this reason, this report refers to 'citizenship' where previous editions referred to 'nationality'. Non-Irish nationals and those born abroad overlap, particularly for some regions of origin, but are not the same (see Table 1.6 for the overlap). For comparison with earlier reports in the series, a broad indicator of outcomes by citizenship is included in each of the indicator tables. This is comparable to the Irish/non-Irish nationality categories in previous reports. In addition, some tables are derived from other sources; for example, regarding the school census reported in Chapter 3 and

4 Note the UK is not distinguished in Eurostat statistics on immigration flows, where those from the UK fall under 'non-EU' category (see Figure 1.1 and accompanying discussion).

5 EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises EU Member States that joined the EU from 2004 onwards – Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania in 2007; and Croatia in 2013.

6 Distinguishing migrants further is only possible using Census data (see McGinnity et al., 2020b). For further details of migrant and non-Irish group sizes in 2022, see https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cpp5/census2022profile5-diversitymigrationethnicityirishtravellersreligion/keyfindings/.

7 The EEA comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

8 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the acquisition of Irish citizenship by naturalisation trends.

information on volunteering activity reported in Chapter 5, data on country of birth is not available, so nationality is used.

Finally, because migration is a dynamic process, the size and composition of the migrant population living in Ireland changes over time. New migrants are added to the migrant population through immigration, and others leave the country (emigration). This is why migration flows are so important for understanding changes in the characteristics of immigrants living in Ireland; this is discussed in Section 1.3.

1.2 MONITORING INTEGRATION

What it means to be 'integrated' is challenging to define, and often contested. At the most basic level, migrants need to 'find a place for themselves' – a home, a job, income, schools, access to healthcare in their host country – and to fit into the social and cultural fabric of their destination (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016). These authors argue that integration is best understood as a process of becoming, not a state of 'being integrated'. They note that integration is a 'two-way street' – a process of mutual accommodation by both migrants and the host country and its residents. The principle that integration is a two-way process also underpins the definition of integration in the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021–2027) (European Commission, 2020).

The main aim of this monitoring report on integration is to provide a balanced and rigorous assessment of the situation of immigrants in Ireland, using the most up-to-date and reliable data available. The framework for this monitoring report on integration is based on the set of integration indicators known as the 'Zaragoza indicators', which arose from the EU's Common Basic Principles of Integration. Table 1.1 presents the indicators used in this monitoring report on integration, which draw on those proposed at Zaragoza (see also Appendix 1).[9] This section considers the rationale behind the indicators and some of their strengths and limitations.

Table 1.1 shows how indicators are largely focused on integration outcomes. One principle in this report is that for each indicator, outcomes for migrants are compared with those for the Irish-born population, as a benchmark for assessing how the non-Irish population is faring. This is not to imply that migrants 'should' appear the same, but instead to identify the dimensions in which they face disadvantage and where additional measures may be required to tackle inequality.

9 Adopted in April 2010 by EU ministers responsible for integration, and approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2010.

The two exceptions to this principle of comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning citizenship and long-term residence (see Table 1.1), which describe the context and opportunities for integration rather than measure outcomes compared to the Irish-born population.[10]

TABLE 1.1 OUTLINE OF CORE INDICATORS, BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO ZARAGOZA INDICATORS

Category	Indicators
1. Employment	Employment rate Unemployment rate Activity rate
2. Education	Highest educational attainment Share of 25 to 34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment Share of early leavers from education and training Mean English reading and mathematics scores for 15 year olds (PISA)
3. Social inclusion	Median net income (household income and equivalised income) At-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rate Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good Share of property owners
4. Active citizenship	Ratio of non-EEA immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population (best estimate) Share of non-EEA immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best estimate) Share of immigrants among elected local representatives

Note In some instances, the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 1). Non-EEA migrants are the focus for citizenship acquisition indicator (see Chapter 5 for discussion).

A key objective of this report is to provide indicators for a representative sample of the migrant population compared to the Irish-born population – the 'bigger picture'. This is a cost-effective strategy that provides an up-to-date assessment of the situation of migrants' outcomes compared to that of the Irish-born population on an ongoing basis. The reliance on repeated, large-scale survey exercises does limit the range of indicators considered. The indicators principally measure important 'structural' dimensions of integration – aspects such as labour market outcomes, educational attainment, income and poverty, and housing situation. While research has shown that English language skills have a salient impact on a range of outcomes for migrants (e.g. Privalko et al., 2023), language skills are not regularly measured on social surveys. Indicators of socio-cultural integration, such as sense of belonging in Ireland, identity or the experience of racism and

10 This monitoring report on integration differs then from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Solano and Huddleston, 2020), as the MIPEX indicators are designed to assess, compare and improve integration policy indicators across EU countries and selected other Western countries, ranking integration policies on different dimensions. For more information, see http://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex.

discrimination, are also important to people's experiences (Diehl et al., 2016), but these are not measured on an ongoing basis and are therefore not included as 'core' indicators. Voting behaviour is an important indicator of political integration, but again is not regularly measured in surveys in Ireland.[11] The focus on nationally representative survey and administrative data means that the monitoring report on integration lacks a sense of the lived experience of integration: this is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies (for example Share and Bobek, 2024).

Another guiding principle is that indicators should be simple to understand, accessible and transparent. For indicators to be meaningful for both policymakers and the general public, they need to be based on familiar concepts. They also need to use robust, internationally-validated measures like unemployment and income poverty (see Table A1 in the appendix). The focus on accessible indicators means statistical modelling is kept to a minimum in this monitoring report on integration, except for cases in which background characteristics, such as age and education, are likely to play a substantial role in understanding outcomes (see Chapters 2–4). It is important to acknowledge that the migrant population may differ from the Irish population in several key characteristics, such as age and gender. To help better understand these differences, Section 1.3 of this chapter presents a profile of the different groups based on place of birth.

A core principle of repeated monitoring is that indicators remain consistent, so that changes may be identified over time. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, from a policy perspective, the direction of change is important because it can identify trends – is the situation getting better or worse? Secondly, this emphasis can overcome some concern about measurement. Monitoring change over time can detect meaningful trends, even when an indicator might not accurately capture the absolute levels of an outcome.[12]

Keeping indicators consistent over time means that certain indicators are repeated over time, such as employment rates, poverty and deprivation and early school-leaving, to allow for monitoring. This means that other indicators, for example overeducation/educational mismatch, are not included as core indicators (see also Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021). To partly address this, some chapters incorporate additional information where particularly relevant. In Chapter 3, educational qualifications are distinguished by place where education is acquired; Chapter 4 reports indicators of housing affordability; and Chapter 5 reports new information

11 For further research on migrants and political participation in Ireland, see Lima (2020) and Pszczółkowska and Lesińska (2022).

12 An indicator might, for example, underestimate the proportion of a migrant group who are experiencing deprivation, but if it does so consistently over time and across groups, it will still detect changes in that share of the group.

from Census 2022 on volunteering. In addition, separate detailed analytic reports have been produced as part of this research programme, to complement the indicators in the monitoring reports on integration series. These topics include migrants' acquisition of Irish citizenship (Groarke and Dunbar, 2020); the impact of COVID-19 on non-Irish nationals (Enright et al., 2020); housing and family (McGinnity et al., 2022); wages and working conditions (Laurence et al., 2023); and trends in international protection applications (Cunniffe et al., 2022). More recent studies focus on attitudes of the host population (Laurence et al., 2024a) and how these attitudes vary across communities (Laurence et al., 2024b).

Approaches to monitoring integration differ across European countries (EMN, 2024b).[13] Some lessons from these approaches could potentially inform future monitoring exercises. One possibility is to collect migrant-specific surveys to capture indicators specific to the group (such as sense of belonging). Another is to involve migrants themselves in selecting indicators through a consultation process (Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021; McGinnity et al., 2021; EMN, 2024b). Another is to make even greater use of administrative data (Fahey et al., 2019). The challenge is how to incorporate changes while retaining some consistency and limiting scope. We return to this point in the conclusion.

1.3 RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN IRELAND AND THE EU

Ireland, like the majority of EU Member States, pursues a policy of mainstreaming service provision in the area of integration, with targeted initiatives to meet specific needs. Ireland's first Migrant Integration Strategy (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017) ran from January 2017 to December 2021, having been extended for one year during the COVID-19 pandemic. It focused on ensuring the equitable provision of public services within a mainstreamed system (Arnold et al., 2019). The interim report, *Migrant Integration Strategy: 2017–2020 Progress report to Government*, was published in June 2019. A key finding was the importance of the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to successful integration, and the benefits this brings to all aspects of Irish life (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019). In noting the report, the Government agreed to develop new actions particularly to address areas where outcomes for migrants need to be improved. These areas include combatting racism, employment, English language acquisition and the promotion of integration at the local level.

Work on the development of a new national integration strategy is underway. A public consultation, which aimed to gather information on challenges and needs

13 See https://emn.ie/publications/monitoring-integration/#:~:text=This%20joint%20EMN%2DOECD%20Inform,of%20challenges%20and%20good%20practices.

related to supporting migrant integration, ran from October to November 2023. A second phase of consultation, which ran from July to November 2024, aimed to gather insights from migrant communities underrepresented in the public consultation. The updated strategy is now expected to be published in 2025. While the new national strategy is delayed, some progress has been seen in the provision of targeted supports since the last monitoring report on integration. Local Authority Integration Teams (LAITs) continue to be rolled out to each of Ireland's local authorities. LAITs are four-person integration teams, and are funded by the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY) to provide integration support to international protection applicants, resettled refugees and beneficiaries of temporary protection (BoTPs). LAITs are not intended to replace services or facilities, but will support access to existing services (Murphy and Stapleton, 2024). In addition, a recent regularisation scheme targeting long-term undocumented migrants provided more than 5,000 applicants with a pathway to integration (See Polakowski and Quinn, 2022; Stapleton et al., 2024).

Monitoring integration can be particularly important when approaches to integration are 'mainstreamed' within government departments, as opposed to there being a dedicated 'department of integration' (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017; 2019). Mainstreaming can be an effective policy approach to the integration of migrants, particularly in the longer term, but is not without risks: monitoring is important to assess whether the needs of immigrants are being met (Scholten et al., 2016). Mainstreaming approaches have been criticised for ignoring the specific needs of immigrants, such as host-country language provision and other settlement services (Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021; Scholten et al., 2016).

As Platt (2024) notes, in relation to the UK, '[q]uestions of racial inequality and of the short and long-term impacts of immigration are conceptually distinct but heavily overlapping in practice', (ibid., p. 1). This is also true in Ireland, given that most of Ireland's racial and ethnic minorities are first- or second-generation immigrants. As there was little focus on racism in the first Migrant Integration Strategy (McGinnity et al, 2023), the publication of the National Action Plan Against Racism (NAPAR) (2023–2027) (DCEDIY, 2023) is a significant development (see Box 1.1).

BOX 1.1 THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN AGAINST RACISM (2023–2027)

The National Action Plan Against Racism (2023–2027) (DCEDIY, 2023) was published in March 2023. An independent Anti-Racism Committee led the plan's development, with public consultation forming an important part of the process. Its five main objectives are: 1. Strengthening protections from racist crimes and incidents and making it easier for people experiencing racism to access effective remedies; 2. Addressing inequalities of outcome including in employment, education, health and housing; 3. Supporting the representation and participation of minority ethnic people in all aspects of life in Ireland, in particular where they are currently under-represented; 4. Measuring the impacts of racism as well as causes of racism and remedies; and 5. Developing a collective understanding of the impacts of racism and its prevalence.

The plan sets out priority actions, assigned to implementing bodies with timelines, and recommendations, which suggest ways of achieving the actions and objectives. A NAPAR Coordination Committee, comprised of representatives of government departments and local authorities and which is chaired by DCEDIY, co-ordinates activity and monitors progress. As set out within the plan, a Special Rapporteur on Racial Equality and Racism and an Advisory Committee on Racial Equality and Racism have been appointed.[14] The Ireland Against Racism Fund supports the plan and has provided €1 million in funding for projects that have a specific focus on anti-racism.

The NAPAR places emphasis on implementation and monitoring, stressing the importance of access to good quality data that can provide insights to the experience of minority ethnic groups.[15] Specific actions, assigned to DCEDIY, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform and the CSO, among others, relate to monitoring racial equality and the development of a standard ethnic classification to be used across administrative systems and surveys. This will link in with the forthcoming Equality Data Strategy.

During 2023 and 2024, tensions and protests were seen in some communities where new reception centres for international protection applicants were being opened. In some cases, these led to arson attacks. A new Community Engagement Team was set up to engage with communities in advance of the opening of reception centres. The team engages directly with elected representatives, local authorities, local development companies, and other stakeholders where appropriate.[16] The purpose of the team is to provide information to local communities to help integrate new international protection applicants. In addition, the Department of the Taoiseach is developing a communications strategy to support communications with communities.[17] Community response forums,

14 In July 2024, Dr Ebun Joseph was appointed as the NAPAR Special Rapporteur and is tasked with monitoring progress towards the objectives of the plan. She is supported by an independent Advisory Committee on Racism and Racial Equality, which includes representatives from ICTU and the HSE, as well as from academia, law and civil society organisations.

15 The first implementation report can be found at https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/14d79-national-action-plan-against-racism/#implementation-report.

16 DCEDIY (2023). 'Response to parliamentary question 46971/23', 25 October.

17 See https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/aeea0-migration-the-facts/.

originally set up by local authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic, have been adapted to include both arrivals from Ukraine and international protection applicants and beneficiaries. Formal expansion of the model was begun in early 2024 and they were renamed to community integration forums. In 2023, the Community Recognition Fund was established in recognition of the efforts made by communities to integrate migrants (see Potter et al., 2025, for further discussion).[18]

While in the past, European Commission integration policy related to non-EU citizens (or third-country nationals) only, the new EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021–2027) expands the scope to also include the integration of EU citizens of migrant background. This brings integration policy at the EU level closer to both integration policy in Ireland (Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2020), and the scope of the monitoring reports on integration series. Another very important recent policy development at EU level is the EU Migration and Asylum Pact (Box 1.2).

BOX 1.2 THE EU MIGRATION AND ASYLUM PACT

The EU Migration and Asylum Pact is a new framework aimed at managing migration and asylum in Europe. Proposed by the European Commission in September 2020, following consultation with various stakeholders, it aims to address challenges and deficiencies observed in the EU's approach to migration and asylum, which became particularly evident during an increase in asylum migration to Europe in 2015–2016. It is designed to create a more unified approach to managing migration flows across the EU, while ensuring respect for human rights. It is a set of regulation and policies based around four main pillars.

Pillar 1: Securing external borders

This pillar outlines strategies for securing the EU's external borders, including pre-entry screening, establishing an asylum and migration database, efficient border procedures for asylums seekers, and crisis protocols. Notably, it introduced registration, security and health checks and fingerprinting for the Eurodac database (expanding its use from asylum procedures) for third-country nationals with no valid permission to enter EU Member State territory. For international protection applicants, a border procedure will introduce mandatory processes for certain categories of applicants.[19] Those who are processed under the border procedure will not be authorised to enter the State and will be accommodated at designated locations.[20]

18 Department of Rural and Community Development (2023). 'Community Recognition Fund 2023: Scheme outline'.
19 For example, those applicants who are unlikely to be in need of international protection, or who mislead the authorities or present a security risk.
20 These 'designated locations' are still to be determined.

BOX 1.2 (CONTD.) THE EU MIGRATION AND ASYLUM PACT

Their applications, appeals and removal decisions must be processed within three months. Unaccompanied minors and people with special reception or procedural needs may be exempt from this, with some exceptions. Safeguards will also be required for families with minors. In times of crisis and force majeure situations, limited derogations from asylum procedures would be temporarily available to Member States, such as the option to extend processing times or immediately provide a protection status equivalent to subsidiary protection.

Pillar 2: Fast and efficient procedures

This pillar aims to: streamline asylum procedures with legally binding timeframes and clear standards, ensuring the rights of asylum seekers; establish EU-wide standards for refugee status qualification; and make asylum, return and border procedures quicker and more effective. Under this pillar, mandatory accelerated procedures are proposed for certain categories of international protection applicants, such as those coming from countries with a recognition rate of 20% or less, or those who present themselves without documentation, with false documentation and those who have crossed the border illegally. In addition, an inadmissibility procedure is proposed for people who have already been granted asylum elsewhere.

Pillar 3: Effective systems of solidarity and responsibility

This pillar introduces a permanent solidarity framework to ensure EU countries receive support and share asylum-related responsibilities among Member States. It also clarifies rules on responsibility for asylum applications and aims to prevent secondary movements of asylum seekers. The solidarity mechanism, which is characterised as mandatory but flexible, gives Member States options relating to their contribution, which can take the form of financial contributions, relocations of asylum seekers from countries facing particular pressures, and alternative solidarity measures (such as deployment of personnel or measures focusing on capacity building).

Pillar 4: Embedding migration in international partnerships

This pillar focuses on preventing the irregular arrival of people through border management capacity building in partner countries, combatting migrant smuggling through partnerships with United Nations (UN) agencies, enhancing cooperation on return and readmission, and promoting legal pathways for migration through an EU Talent Pool and Talent Partnerships. Talent Partnerships have already been launched with Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Tunisia. They will allow people from the countries concerned to work, study and train in the EU, and thus develop new skills that can later benefit their country of origin.

BOX 1.2 (CONTD.) THE EU MIGRATION AND ASYLUM PACT

Latest developments and implementation

In June 2024, both houses of the Oireachtas voted to opt in to the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which was confirmed by the European Commission in July.21 The pact provides Ireland with the opportunity to design and build the future of migration and asylum in the State. Ireland is currently finalising its national implementation plan for submission to the European Commission. The national implementation plan provides an outline of the required steps to: introduce new policy and legislation; end-to-end processes; rethink reception; and improve technology to meet the requirements set out in the Pact. Following a two-year implementation period, the Pact will be in effect in Member States by 12 June 2026.

1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN IRELAND

This section provides an overview of the main trends in migration in Ireland, with a focus on developments since the 2022 monitoring report on integration.

Figure 1.1 compares foreign-born residents as a proportion of the population and the EU/non-EU composition of the foreign-born group for all EU countries in 2023. Ireland had the third highest proportion of foreign-born residents in the EU, at 22%, representing both a relative and absolute increase since 2021. At that time, Ireland was eighth highest in the EU, with 20% of residents born abroad (Eurostat, 2025). Similar to the previous monitoring report on integration (McGinnity et al., 2023), we also see that that most foreign-born residents in Ireland are from outside the EU. Since 2021, the non-EU group includes those born in the UK, including Northern Ireland. However, the rights of those born in the UK to reside and work in Ireland are very similar to those enjoyed by EU nationals, and many may have Irish citizenship. When combined, UK- and EU-born residents make up a majority of the foreign-born population, at 55% (see Table 1.2).

21 European Commission (2024). 'Ireland will participate in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum', 31 July, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/ireland-will-participate-eu-pact-migration-and-asylum-2024-07-31_en.

FIGURE 1.1 FOREIGN-BORN RESIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION, 2023



Source: Eurostat (migr_pop3ctb).
Notes: Percentage of foreign-born residents by place of birth on 1 January 2023. The following data for Luxembourg are excluded: 33% born in other EU Member States, 17% born in non-EU Member States. Stateless residents not included. Following the UK's departure from the EU, people born in the UK are counted as born outside of the EU in these statistics. For further details on figures for Ireland, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/EN/demo_pop_esms_ie.htm.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the striking changes that occurred in immigration to and emigration from Ireland over the last two decades. International and European events have had strong impacts on migration to and from Ireland. The expansion of the EU in 2004 led to an increase in immigration, with net migration reaching its peak in 2007, at +104,800 people. However, the global financial crisis led to a sharp decline and eventually to net emigration (-27,500) by 2010 across all groups, before returning to net immigration in 2015. Immigration declined in 2020 and 2021, likely due to COVID-19 public health restrictions on travel, although it surpassed its 2019 level in 2022. In fact, by April 2024, immigration had almost returned to its level in 2007, reaching 149,200 in 2024. This represents an increase of 54% on the pre-pandemic level in 2019. However, emigration, which had stagnated at around 50,000 per year between 2017 and 2022, has increased, reaching 69,900 in 2024 (an increase of 32% on its 2019 level, and of 51% on its 2007 level). This means that net migration is still well below its peak in 2007, at +79,300.

FIGURE 1.2 IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION, 2000–2024



Source: CSO (2024). 'Population and migration estimates'. PEA15.

Notes: The reference period for population estimates is the end of April of each year, so, for example, 2024 estimates reflect the situation in Ireland as of 30 April 2024. The CSO creates these population and migration estimates using the LFS and the Census, when available. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators, such as the number of personal public service numbers (PPSNs) allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/renewed and the number of asylum applications.

Figure 1.3 presents immigration flows since 2012 broken down by nationality. The sharp rise in non-EU immigration noted in the 2022 monitoring report on integration continued in 2023. By end April 2024, around 86,800 non-EU/UK citizens immigrated to Ireland, representing a 134% increase from 2019, and a 48% increase from 2022. A significant proportion of non-EU arrivals in 2023 and 2024 were from Ukraine (see Box 1.3). The flow of non-UK, non-EU citizens, including those from Ukraine, has increased significantly in a short period of time, leading to a continued rise in both the overall migrant population, and in the non-EU and non-UK migrant population in particular. A major difference between the 2007 peak and immigration flows in 2024 is that in 2007 most immigrants were from other EU countries, whereas in 2024, non-EU and non-UK migration made up the greater share (see Potter et al., 2025, Figure 2.2 for earlier figures).

Migration from all other nationalities has also increased since 2022. Compared to its level at the time of the last monitoring report on integration, migration from EU-East has increased by 51%, from 8,600 to 13,000, and migration from the UK has increased from 3,800 to 5,400, almost reaching its pre-pandemic level.

Immigration from EU-West and from Irish citizens living abroad has also increased since 2022.

FIGURE 1.3 IMMIGRATION BY CITIZENSHIP, 2012–2024



Source: CSO (2024). 'Population and migration estimates', PEA24.
Notes: Year to April of reference year.

BOX 1.3 THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE AND ASSOCIATED MIGRATION FLOWS TO IRELAND

With the continued Russian invasion of Ukraine, displaced persons from Ukraine remained an important driver of the increased inflow of immigrants born outside of the EU into Ireland in the period 2023–2024. Although the number of arrivals is not as significant as it was in 2022, Ireland continues to see relatively high numbers arriving from Ukraine. Based on personal public service number (PPSN) allocations, the CSO estimated that 109,566 people from Ukraine arrived in Ireland since the onset of the invasion in February 2022 up to 29 September 2024.[22] This means 34,237 arrived between the period 26 February 2023 to 29 September 2024.

Demographic profile

Over three-fifths (60.2%) of arrivals from Ukraine are women, and 20.8% are aged under 15 years. This is slightly higher than the general demographics seen across the wider non-Irish population, which comprises 51.1% women and 11% children under 15 years.

Of arrivals from Ukraine, 75% showed activity in administrative data after 30 June 2024, implying that around 82,000 are still in Ireland.

22 CSO (2024). *Arrivals from Ukraine in Ireland*, Series 14, October.

BOX 1.3 (CONTD.) THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE AND ASSOCIATED MIGRATION FLOWS TO IRELAND

The Temporary Protection Directive

To provide immediate protection in EU countries for people displaced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU Temporary Protection Directive was activated for the first time on 4 March 2022.[23] The Directive provides for immediate protection with a standard set of rights for beneficiaries of temporary protection (BoTPs), including: a resident permit for the duration of the protection; access to employment; social welfare; medical care; education for people under 18 years; and suitable accommodation or, if necessary, the means to obtain housing (see Stapleton and Dalton, 2024 for further details). Beneficiaries can also move through the EU with similar rights as those enjoyed by EU citizens.[24] Thus, the rights of most BoTPs are different to those of international protection applicants (see Box 1.4), and for the most part, they are not counted in the regular asylum statistics as they are covered by this directive. Initially, temporary protection was granted for one year; this has been extended multiple times, most recently in June 2024, when it was extended to 4 March 2026.[25]

Changes to income and accommodation supports for arrivals from Ukraine

On 12 December 2023, the Department of the Taoiseach announced changes to state-provided accommodation and financial assistance for newly arriving BoTPs.[26] According to the Government, the changes are the result of a review of Ireland's approach to supporting beneficiaries and are intended to bring the State more in line with other Member States. The analysis found that Ireland's offering was set at a higher level than most other Member States.[27]

On 13 March 2024, new legislation commenced to bring into effect a revised approach to supporting new arrivals from Ukraine.[28] Under the revised approach, newly arrived beneficiaries who seek state accommodation will be provided with accommodation in Designated Accommodation Centres (DACs) for a maximum of 90 days, after which residents must source their own accommodation. During this 90-day period, they will also receive reduced income support in the form of a weekly allowance.[29] Once beneficiaries leave a DAC, they can apply for standard social protection assistance, subject to meeting the standard eligibility conditions. These changes initially did not apply to those already in state accommodation.[30]

23 Council of the European Union (2001). 'Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof', https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32001L0055. Council of the European Union (2022). 'Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from

Of course, the number and composition of resident migrants will also be influenced by who leaves the country. Figure 1.4 presents emigration flows broken down by citizenship. The decrease and plateau in emigration, which had been observed in the 2022 monitoring report on integration, has ended, with emigration rising steadily from 2021 to 2024. Emigration of Irish and non-EU citizens has increased substantially between 2022 and 2024, with 36% more Irish citizens emigrating (from 25,600 to 34,700) and 26% more non-EU citizens emigrating (from 17,100 to 21,500). More EU-West citizens emigrated in 2024 as well – 6,100 from 4,700 in 2022. Emigration of EU-East citizens has remained virtually unchanged since 2022, whereas around 27% fewer UK citizens emigrated (from 4,100 to 3,000).

Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection', https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.071.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A071%3ATOC.

24 Temporary protection covers not only displaced Ukrainian nationals who were residing in Ukraine on or before 24 February 2022, and their family members, but also stateless people and nationals of third countries other than Ukraine who benefitted from international protection or equivalent national protection in Ukraine before 24 February 2022, and their family members.

25 Council of the European Union (2024). 'Council extends temporary protection until March 2026', press release, June, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/25/ukrainian-refugees-council-extends-temporary-protection-until-march-2026/.

26 BoTPs who arrived in Ireland between February 2022 and 13 March 2024 were entitled to the standard rate of Jobseeker's Allowance and an indefinite stay in state-provided accommodation.

27 Department of the Taoiseach (2023). 'Government approves changes to measures for those fleeing war in Ukraine', press release, 12 December, https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/b5d86-government-approves-changes-to-measures-for-those-fleeing-war-in-ukraine/#:~:text=Under%20the%20revised%20approach%2C%20newly,receive%20reduced%20social%20protection%20payments.

28 The *Social Welfare and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2024*.

29 Similar to international protection applicants, BoTPs will now be entitled to a weekly allowance of €38.80 per adult and €29.80 per child to cover daily expenses, so long as they remain resident in a Designated Accommodation Centre.

30 However, in May 2024, it was agreed that BoTPs in state-provided serviced accommodation should all receive the same level of payment regardless of when they arrived. This change came into effect from 9 September 2024, which means all BoTPs who live in an accommodation centre that provides meals and utilities no longer qualify for certain social assistance payments, and instead are entitled to the Beneficiary of Temporary Protection Weekly Payment of €38.80 per adult and €29.80 per child, subject to an income test.

FIGURE 1.4 EMIGRATION FLOWS BY CITIZENSHIP, 2012–2024



Source: CSO (2024). 'Population and migration estimates'. PEA23.
Notes: Year to April of reference year.

Most non-EEA nationals require permission to reside in Ireland, and these permissions can give insights into reasons for migration, though of course they do not include migrants of non-EEA origin who have since become Irish citizens (see Chapter 5).[31] Neither do these include those fleeing Ukraine, who were granted residence under the EU Temporary Protection Directive (see Box 1.3), or international protection applicants.[32] Figure 1.5 shows all residence permissions held by a non-EEA nationals aged over 16, for the period 2012 to 2023, broken down by residence permission type. In 2023, there were 289,432 people with residence permissions, an increase of 71% on the number in 2021 (169,687). In 2023, most permissions were held for employment reasons (29%), and other reasons (27%), with education reasons (21%), family reasons (19%), and protection reasons (3%) making up the remainder of reasons for permissions held.[33]

31 The EEA comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals aged under 16 are not required to register and therefore are not included.

32 This is calculated using CSO estimates of BoTPs aged 18 and over who are still residing in the country, based on administrative activity. We use the figure of 57,672, as per the CSO's Arrivals in Ukraine Series 12 (see https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/fp/p-aui/arrivalsfromukraineinirelandseries12/).

33 The 'other reasons' category contains a diverse group of permits that do not fit into the main categories. These include permits issued to persons admitted under the Syrian Humanitarian Admission Programme, individuals who have permission to stay in Ireland without limits on the time they can remain, permits issued to persons granted permission to remain under Section 3 of the *Immigration Act, 1999*, and permits issued under section 4 of the *Immigration Act 2004* (see Fahey et al, 2019; Groarke and Brazil, 2020).

FIGURE 1.5 RESIDENCE PERMISSIONS (NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER), 2012–2023



Source: Eurostat (migr_resvalid).
Notes: All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year. BoTPs (those fleeing Ukraine) and those seeking international protection (but who have not yet been granted status) are not included in these statistics.

Compared to 2021, there has been a substantial increase in permissions in all categories except for subsidiary protection, where there was a marginal decline.[34] The largest absolute increase was in permissions for employment reasons, which rose from 45,409 in 2022 to 85,317 in 2023, an increase of 88%. This includes multiple permit types, the two most common of which are the Critical Skills Employment Permit and the General Employment Permit (see Box 2.1 for further discussion). The next largest absolute increases by reason since 2021 were for 'other reasons' (50,335 to 79,130) and for education (34,055 to 61,553), increases of 57% and 81% respectively. Permissions for educational reasons were quite low in 2020 and 2021, likely due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, they have since increased to well beyond their 2019 level (50,846). Family permissions have also increased substantially from 2021, from 35,440 to 55,755, and are now well above their 2019 level (33,221). The number of residence permissions held for refugee status also increased substantially in this period, although in absolute terms the increase is small. In 2023, 6,858 people held residence permission for refugee status, compared to 3,508 in 2021, an increase of 95%. There was a marginal decline in the number holding residence permission for subsidiary protection status (940 to 819), though some other protection-related permissions are included in the 'other' category, as noted above (see

34 Subsidiary protection is offered to those who apply for refugee status and do not qualify, but who face a real risk of harm if returned to their country of origin.

Groarke and Brazil, 2020, for a discussion of national statuses granted for protection-related reasons in Ireland at the time).

While it is evident from these figures that international protection represents a small proportion of both overall immigration and resident immigrants, it has increased in importance both numerically and politically in recent years. Figure 1.6 shows the number of international protection applications made in Ireland since 1992, and shows the sharp increase from 2022 onwards from low levels over the previous 20 years. The year 2022 represented a 186% increase from 2019 (the last year not affected by COVID-19 travel restrictions), a level that was maintained in 2023. The number of applications reached a record high in 2024, although they have declined so far in 2025 compared with 2024. This has led to significant pressures on the reception and processing systems (see Box 1.4 below).

FIGURE 1.6 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPLICATIONS IN IRELAND, 1992 – AUGUST 2024



Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (2014). 'Monthly statistical report January 2014'; Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (2002). *Annual report 2001*; Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (2003). *Annual report 2002*; International Protection Office, 'Statistics'.

Notes: This does not include more than 100,000 arrivals from Ukraine (see Box 1.3).

BOX 1.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN IRELAND

The international protection landscape in Ireland has changed significantly since the last version of this report. The large increase in international protection applications (see Figure 1.6), which occurred at the same time as large-scale displacement following the Russian invasion of Ukraine (see Box 1.3), was accompanied by both significant increases in the salience of immigration in Ireland, as well as a different policy context and pressures on the system.

In spite of a rapid increase in International Protection Accommodation Service (IPAS) accommodation capacity (from around 7,300 in October 2021 to 32,600 in October 2024),[35] at various points throughout 2023 and during all of 2024 and 2025 so far, IPAS was unable to provide accommodation to all single male international protection applicants, many of whom have slept on the streets or in various informal arrangements. As of February 2025, around 3,500 single males who were entitled to IPAS accommodation were awaiting an offer of accommodation.[36]

There have been changes to expense allowances for international protection applicants as a result of this. One of these changes sought to allow unaccommodated applicants to claim the Daily Expenses Allowance (DEA), while the other sought to provide a temporary increase of €75 per week to this allowance for those not offered accommodation. The lack of accommodation for international protection applicants has received significant media attention and has been the subject of extensive NGO criticism (Potter et al., 2025). A High Court judgment in April 2023 found that the support provided to homeless international protection applicants prior to this increase (a supermarket voucher and direction to private charities) 'did not come remotely close to what was required by law'.[37] A case for damages for homeless applicants was referred to the Court of Justice of the EU, and the outcome was still pending at the time of writing. The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC) also took a case in its own name in relation to the State's failure to provide for the basic needs of international protection applicants. It was the first time since IHREC's establishment that it used this legal power under section 10(1) of the *Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014*. In August 2024, the High Court ruled that the State failed to provide for the basic needs of international protection applicants, breaching their right to dignity.[38]

35 See https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/90641-statistics/.

36 See https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/ec5f2-statistics-on-international-protection-applicants-not-offered-accommodation/.

37 *S.Y. v. Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth and others* [2023] IEHC 187, 11.

38 The *Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission v. Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth and the Attorney General* [2024] IEHC 493.

BOX 1.4 (CONTD.) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN IRELAND

Following changes to the vulnerability assessment procedure due to extreme pressure (from direct assessments to making questionnaires available that applicants could return; see Murphy and Sheridan, 2023), a decision was made to suspend the Vulnerability Assessment Programme in March 2024, and to seek an external contractor to manage it. The programme recommenced in November 2024 for families.[39]

The increase in flows of migrants seeking protection raised doubts about the White Paper To End Direct Provision, which proposed a new accommodation model for international protection applicants in 2021. The paper was based on a requirement for 2,000 places in Phase 1 reception centres and 3,500 applications a year, significantly below current applicants and requirements.

As a result, the white paper was reviewed, and the new Comprehensive Accommodation Strategy was published in March 2024 (DCEDIY, 2024).[40] This strategy maintains the principles of the white paper and aims to set up a system with capacity for 35,000 people through a blended model (both state-owned and commercial providers) by 2028. Under this new strategy, 14,000 state-owned beds will be delivered by 2028 – quadruple the previous commitment under the white paper.

However, some areas of the white paper continued to be progressed. This included commissioning NGOs to provide targeted supports, an agreement with the Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA) to inspect accommodation centres, the creation of a permanent integration team in every local authority, and funding for children and young peoples' services committees (see Murphy and Sheridan, 2023; Potter et al., 2025). The new International Protection Integration Fund was established in 2022, as part of the white paper's implementation.[41] The external advisory group that was established in 2021 to monitor progress on the white paper has also published two reports, with extensive recommendations and criticism.

39 See IPAS (2024). 'Support services', https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/58397-resident-welfare/#vulnerability-assessment-programme.

40 See https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/9ed23-government-agrees-new-comprehensive-accommodation-strategy-for-international-protection-applicants/.

41 See https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/3987c-minister-joe-obrien-announces-56-projects-to-be-funded-under-the-international-protection-integration-fund-2024/.

BOX 1.4 (CONTD.) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN IRELAND

Significant changes to the processing of applicants also occurred since the last report, as part of a process to improve the international protection system and reduce processing times (see McGinnity et al., 2023; see Box 1.2). The International Protection Office (IPO) adopted a new policy in November 2022 whereby all applicants applying for international protection complete a preliminary interview and the international protection questionnaire on the same day, in English.[42] To respond to increased applications from safe countries of origin, the Minister for Justice adopted new regulations in November 2022 to accelerate the international protection procedure, including for applicants from safe countries of origin (See Murphy and Sheridan, 2023).[43] In 2024, this accelerated procedure was also expanded to include applicants from the top two countries of origin in the previous three months. Significant additional resources have also been given to the IPO and a modernisation programme has been adopted to improve processing capacity (Potter et al., 2025).[44]

1.5 PROFILE OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION IN IRELAND

This section profiles the migrant population and highlights how it has changed in recent years. It is based on Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, which is the best annual source of data on migrants and their characteristics, and is also used in Chapters 2 and 3 (see Appendix 2 for a discussion of sampling and methodology).

The LFS surveys private households; the sampling frame does not include those living in communal settings such as beneficiaries of temporary protection (BoTPs) arriving from Ukraine (See Box 1.3) or international protection applicants (Box 1.4). During Q1 2024 it is estimated that around 58,000 arrivals from Ukraine were living in serviced accommodation, and that there were around 28,000 international protection applicants, so around 86,000 in total.[45] This compares to approximately one million people who were born abroad being resident in the State.[46] However, the weighting in the LFS adjusts to current population estimates, which means the overall population is correct (see Appendix 2).

42 Prior to this change, applicants had a non-statutory 15 working days to fill in the questionnaire.
43 For a list of designated safe countries of origin, see https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/52f13-safe-countries-and-international-protection/.
44 Department of Justice (2023). 'International Protection Modernisation Programme 2023-2024', www.gov.ie.
45 See https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/9ac7b-accommodation-of-beneficiaries-of-temporary-protection-botps/. For data on international protection applicants living in international protection accommodation see: https://assets.gov.ie/288802/0850e5d5-48dc-4c59-9b70-41f4e27d1b66.pdf.
46 See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cpsr/censusofpopulation2022-summaryresults/migrationanddiversity/.

Table 1.2, based on LFS data, shows how in early 2024, 21.7% of residents in Ireland were born abroad, and that the most common places of birth after Ireland were EU-East (4.9%), the UK (4.8%) and Asia (4.2%) – see Appendix 2, Table A2.1 for details on how individual countries are classified. The proportion of residents born abroad in Q1 is higher than it was in Q1 of 2022 (21.7% versus 18.7%). A similar change occurred in citizenship rates, with an increase observed in the number of those holding non-Irish citizenship (12.8% to 15.1%). The profile of the foreign-born population has also changed since Q1 of 2022; there have been substantial increases in the proportion of residents born in Asia (2.5% to 4.2%) and 'Other Europe' (0.8 to 1.7%) – European countries outside the EU/UK – and a decrease in the proportion of residents born in the UK (5% to 4.8%). While there was an absolute increase in the number of UK-born residents in Ireland, this category, as a proportion of the total population, has fallen. Notably, in 2024 those born in EU-East become the largest foreign-born group, overtaking the UK.

TABLE 1.2 COUNTRY OF BIRTH (AND CITIZENSHIP) BY YEAR, 2022–2024

	2022	2023	2024		
Place of birth	**% – Weighted**	**% – Weighted**	**% – Weighted**	**Sample – unweighted**	**Population estimate**
Ireland	81.26	79.07	78.3	25,709	4,151,100
Born abroad	18.74	20.93	21.7	4,949	1,192,705
of which:					
UK	5.03	4.98	4.75	1,516	251,816
EU-West	1.75	1.86	1.82	348	96,266
EU-East	4.75	4.75	4.86	1,007	257,907
Other Europe	0.81	1.33	1.74	333	92,367
NAAO	1.07	1.13	1.11	292	58,889
Africa	1.24	1.68	1.41	304	74,983
Asia	2.74	3.51	4.17	821	221,021
Rest of the World	1.35	1.7	1.83	328	97,279
Missing	-	-	-	235	42,177
Total	100	100	100	30,658	5,343,805
Citizenship	**% – Weighted**	**% – Weighted**	**% – Weighted**	**Sample – unweighted**	**Population estimate**
Irish	87.24	85.6	84.86	28,026	4,534,497
Non-Irish	12.76	14.4	15.14	2,867	809,308
Total	100	100	100	30,893	5,343,805

Source: Authors' calculations from LFS microdata, based on Q1 for the years 2022, 2023 and 2024.
Notes: Percentages are weighted to agree with population estimates (see Appendix 2 for details about the weights in the LFS); sample sizes are unweighted. See Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details of which countries are included in which classification. Population estimates differ between place of birth and citizenship due to missing values. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

Table 1.2 also presents estimates of the population size of each group in Q1 2024, based on the weights used in our analysis. For a breakdown of which countries are assigned to which place-of-birth groups, see Appendix 2. As noted above, the survey does not sample the population living in communal accommodation, particularly arrivals from Ukraine who fall under the 'Other Europe' category.

Table 1.3 presents the age distribution for each place of birth. The Irish-born population has a much smoother age distribution, with between 18% and 25% of the population falling within each category, except for 15–24 years, which makes up 13.8% of the Irish-born population. The foreign-born population on the other hand is heavily skewed towards the 25–44 year age group, at 49.3% of that group. Of the foreign-born group, 85.2% are of working age (15–64 years), compared to 60.8% of the Irish-born population.

TABLE 1.3 COUNTRY OF BIRTH (AND CITIZENSHIP) BY AGE, 2024

Place of birth	0–14 years	15–24 years	25–44 years	45–64 years	65 + years	Sample
Ireland	21.2	13.72	21.59	25.5	17.98	25,709
Born abroad	7.81	9.07	49.38	26.76	6.98	4,949
Of which:						
UK	5.75	5.47	22.89	43.89	22	1,516
EU-West	5.68	6.86	51.38	31.29	4.79	348
EU-East	4.45	10.35	58.99	24.91	1.29	1,007
Other Europe	16.78	11.57	50.4	18.17	3.08	333
NAAO	11.23	11.78	37.41	31.6	7.98	292
Africa	6.45	13.72	46.99	28.96	3.88	304
Asia	9.27	9.94	62.75	15.86	2.18	821
Rest of the World	11.34	7.54	68.22	11.11	1.8	328
Citizenship	**0–14 years**	**15–24 years**	**25–44 years**	**45–64 years**	**65 + years**	**Sample**
Irish national	20.28	13.28	22.23	26.81	17.39	28,026
Non-Irish	10.97	8.93	56.66	18.65	4.79	2,867

Source: Authors' calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2024.
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

The gender profile of foreign-born residents is balanced across most groups, although there are more females (52.1%) than males (47.9%) on average. This gap has increased slightly since the last monitor, when 51.5% of foreign-born residents were female. There have also been some changes within groups. In 2022, there were more males than females among those from two places of birth: 'Other Europe' and Africa. Now, there are more females than males in each of these two

groups. CSO statistics on arrivals from Ukraine also highlight the high proportion of women (see Box 1.3). The only group with more males than females is EU-West, for which the gender gap is quite small (3 percentage points).

TABLE 1.4 COUNTRY OF BIRTH (AND CITIZENSHIP) BY GENDER, 2024

Country of birth	Male	Female	Sample
Ireland	49.81	50.19	25,709
Born abroad	47.9	52.1	4,949
Of which:			
UK	48.55	51.45	1,516
EU-West	51.51	48.49	348
EU-East	47.98	52.02	1,007
Other Europe	46.62	53.38	333
NAAO	41.45	58.55	292
Africa	47.1	52.9	304
Asia	47.4	52.6	821
Rest of the World	49.33	50.67	328
Citizenship	**Male**	**Female**	**Sample**
Irish national	49.5	50.5	28,026
Non-Irish	48.88	51.12	2,867

Source: Authors' calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2024.
Notes: *Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted*. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

There are also substantial differences in the length of time those born in other countries have lived in Ireland. Of those born in the UK, 65.5% have resided in Ireland for more than 20 years, the largest proportion of any place in this category. Africa, Australia, EU-West, Oceania and North America also had large proportions in this category, ranging from 27.2% and 35.8%. Those from EU-East are much more likely to have been in Ireland for 11 to 20 years, with 62.7% falling within that time period. This roughly corresponds to the period after the accession of many eastern European countries to the EU, when migration became much easier for these groups. Those born in other places were much more likely to have arrived in Ireland relatively recently. Of those born in 'Other Europe', 54% have been in Ireland for less than five years. The figures for those born in Asia and the 'Rest of the World' are also quite high, at 45.7% and 40.4% respectively. This variation likely reflects differences in restrictions and barriers to settling long-term in Ireland for migrants from different countries, as well as the changing of migration patterns over time. Those from the EU or UK are likely to have settled in Ireland for a long period of time, whereas those from outside Europe are less likely to have done so.

TABLE 1.5 DURATION OF RESIDENCE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN IRELAND BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 2024

Place of birth	<5 years	5–10 years	11–20 years	>20 years	Sample
UK	6.8	12.2	15.7	65.5	1,483
EU-West	25.5	23.2	23.9	27.4	343
EU-East	7.4	21.8	62.7	8.1	994
Other Europe	54.0	27.3	11.5	7.2	331
NAAO	25.2	22.8	16.2	35.8	291
Africa	28.4	24.7	19.9	27.2	298
Asia	45.7	25.6	17.9	10.8	806
Rest of the World	40.4	41.8	13.2	4.6	321

Source: Authors' calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2024.
Notes: *Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.* NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

Table 1.5 further analyses the group of Irish nationals born abroad. Around one-third of foreign-born residents are Irish nationals, a figure that has remained roughly unchanged since 2022. Of those born in the UK, including Northern Ireland, 67.1% were Irish nationals. It should be noted that many of these may be Irish citizens by birth (in Northern Ireland) or descent, rather than by naturalisation (see Box 5.1). The proportion of UK-born residents who are Irish nationals has increased since 2022, when it was 60.5%. Irish citizenship was also common among those born in North America, Australia and Oceania (52.6%) and Africa (39.52%). The proportion who were Irish nationals was lowest among those born in EU-West (12.4%) and EU-East (15.3%) countries, despite longer periods of residence; this is likely because those with EU citizenship have many of the same entitlements as Irish citizens. Residents born outside the EU may also have low naturalisation rates if they have not been in the country for long – for instance, although those born in 'Rest of the World' (17.8%), 'Other Europe' (19%) and Asia (26.6%) may face strong incentives to naturalise, Table 1.5 shows that they are more likely to be recent migrants compared to those from North America, Australia and Oceania or Africa, and therefore may not be able to do so yet (see Box 5.1 and Groarke and Dunbar, 2020).

TABLE 1.6 PROPORTION OF RESIDENTS WITH IRISH CITIZENSHIP BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, 2024

Place of birth	Percentage with Irish citizenship	Sample
Ireland	99.25	25,709
Born abroad	32.54	4,949
Of which:		
UK	67.05	1,516
EU-West	12.41	348
EU-East	15.25	1,007
Other Europe	19	333
NAAO	52.6	292
Africa	39.52	304
Asia	26.62	821
Rest of the World	17.76	328
Total	**84.77**	**30,658**

Source: Authors' calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2024.
Notes: *Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.* NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

CHAPTER 2

Migrants' employment and integration

Evan Carron-Kee, Frances McGinnity and Garance Hingre

Paid work is central to economic integration and social inclusion. A decent job provides opportunities for positive social contact between migrants and non-migrants, brings financial independence, and enables migrants to engage fully in the life of the host society. To assess migrants' labour market integration, this chapter focuses on three key labour market indicators: employment, unemployment and activity rates (see Box 2.1 for an explanation of the indicators and data used). Section 2.1 discusses how these indicators have changed for Irish- and foreign-born residents over the period 1998–2024, and presents recent figures broken down by region of birth. Section 2.2 considers differences in these key indicators by age and gender, and presents findings on self-employment rates. Finally, Box 2.1 explains the rules for migrant workers of various origins and summarises recent updates in this area. This is essential context for the figures presented in this chapter, as labour market permissions afforded to migrants can vary substantially.

Overall, labour market integration has been stable for both Irish and foreign-born residents since the most recent monitoring report. Considering the labour market disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which disproportionately affected migrant workers, this is a positive development. This is consistent with recent research on the equality impact of the pandemic on the Irish labour market (Alamir et al., 2024). There are substantial differences by region of birth, however. Those born in 'Other Europe' (European countries excluding the EU and the UK, see Appendix 2 for details) have particularly high unemployment and low employment rates, for instance. On the other hand, the improvement in African employment and unemployment rates, first observed in the previous monitor, has been sustained throughout 2022–2024. While these key indicators are important, they can only provide an overview of labour market conditions for migrants. Other recent research considers working conditions and wages (see Laurence et al., 2023) or the equality impact of the pandemic on the labour market (see Alamir et al., 2024).

2.1 MIGRANT EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES

Figure 2.1 shows employment, unemployment and activity rates by place of birth. We use the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition of employment, unemployment and activity rates. The employment rate is the proportion of the working age population (15–64) who have done any paid work in the week prior to the survey. The unemployment rate is the proportion of the labour force (all those

in work or seeking work) who are not employed but have sought work in the last month. It is important to note that only those who are seeking work and are not working are considered unemployed. Those who have not worked or sought work in the last month are considered inactive and are not a part of the labour force. From one period to another, then, both the employment rate and unemployment rate may increase or decrease; for instance, if more people become employed, and more inactive people become unemployed, then both rates will increase. Finally, the activity rate indicates the extent to which a group is in the labour force – it is the proportion of the working age population who are either employed or unemployed.

These key labour market indicators are calculated using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) (see Appendix 2 for details). This chapter uses data from Quarter 1 (Q1) of 2022, 2023 and 2024. As discussed in Chapter 1, we identify migrants based on place of birth, and focus on comparisons between those born in Ireland and those born abroad. Key tables also compare residents based on citizenship, for comparison with reports published in 2020 and earlier.

Over the period 2022–2024, foreign-born residents generally had higher employment, activity and unemployment rates than Irish-born workers (see Figure 2.1).[47] This is broadly consistent with previous monitoring reports on integration (for example, McGinnity et al., 2023; McGinnity et al., 2020; McGinnity et al., 2018). The only exception across the period was unemployment in 2023, which was not statistically significantly different to the Irish-born unemployment rate. However, this was not repeated in 2024. Employment and activity rates were stable for foreign-born residents, whereas unemployment saw a substantial drop, from 5.8% in 2022 to 4.6% in 2023, rising again to 5.8% in 2024. Irish-born employment increased gradually over the period, from 71.8% to 72.6%, while unemployment fell, from 4.5% to 3.5%.

47 As the ILO definition of employment counts those who did any paid employment/were in a job in the reference week, students who are working count as employed. Of the Irish-born group who were employed (ILO definition), 5.6% indicated that ‘student’ was their principal economic status. The figure for foreign-born residents was 3.9%.

FIGURE 2.1 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS FOR IRISH-BORN AND MIGRANTS, 2022–2024



Source: Q1 of LFS 2022, 2023, 2024.
Notes: Sample restricted to the working age population (15-64). * denotes where migrants significantly differ from Irish-born.

We now contextualise these figures by considering the long-term trend in migrant labour market statistics. Figure 2.2 presents employment rates for Irish- and foreign-born residents between 1998 and 2024. Employment rates for both groups have followed the same general trajectory over this period, although the foreign-born rate has been much more volatile, with higher peaks and lower troughs. From 1998 to 2002, employment rates were nearly identical for both groups. The employment rate of foreign-born residents fell below that of Irish-born residents in 2003 and 2004, before exceeding it between 2006 and 2008. This roughly coincides with the accession of eastern European countries to the EU, which led to a rise in migration from these countries to Ireland. (Employment rates for eastern European-born residents in Ireland increased from 42.1% in 1999 to 85.5% in 2005.)

FIGURE 2.2 TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT FOR IRISH-BORN AND MIGRANTS, 1998–2024



Source: LFS Q1 for each year, working age population (aged 15-64).

The recession following the global financial crisis led to a sharp decline in both groups' employment rates in 2009, and it was not until 2016 that foreign-born employment rates began to exceed the Irish-born employment rate over a sustained period. In 2020, the employment rate for foreign-born residents fell slightly, and in 2021 both groups experienced a sharp decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although both Irish- and foreign-born residents had nearly the same employment rate in 2021, the foreign-born employment rate fell from a higher level, indicating that migrants were disproportionately affected by the pandemic (see Enright et al., 2020, for a discussion of this issue). This is in line with research on labour market outcomes for migrants across Europe, which also finds that migrants were more likely to lose their jobs during the pandemic (Fassania and Mazza, 2020). Employment rates recovered in 2022, with the foreign-born employment rate far exceeding its level in 2019. The gap between Irish and foreign-born employment rates has grown since, with the foreign-born rate now 4.1 percentage points higher than the Irish-born rate.

Employment outcomes for migrants differ substantially according to their country of origin (Bartolini et al., 2022; Privalko et al., 2023). This is partly because access to migration and to employment depends on nationality (see Box 2.1 for a thorough discussion). For instance, all EU and UK citizens have permission to live and work in Ireland, whereas migrants from outside the EU or UK typically must apply for permission to live in Ireland. Such permission generally requires a job offer that meets income criteria, or that is in a critical sector. In the EU,

unemployment rates are often higher among migrants compared to natives, especially among non-EU migrants (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; Li and Heath, 2020). Table 2.2 presents key employment indicators by the place of birth of the respondents, as well as by citizenship. Results do not differ substantially depending on whether we consider citizenship or place of birth.

TABLE 2.1 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 2022–2024

	Employment (%)			Unemployment (%)			Activity (%)		
	2022	2023	2024	2022	2023	2024	2022	2023	2024
Place of birth									
Ireland	71.8	72.5	72.7	4.5	3.9	3.5	75.2	75.4	75.3
Born abroad	76.4*	76.8*	76.8*	5.8*	4.6	5.8*	81.2*	80.5*	81.5*
Of which:									
UK	75.0*	73.8	73.9	4.6	3.9	4.4	78.6*	76.8	77.3
EU-West	84.4*	81.9*	86.1*	6.9	4.2	3.8	90.7*	85.5*	89.5*
EU-East	78.9*	80.2*	81.4*	6.1	4.3	5.4*	84.1*	83.8*	86.0*
Other Europe	75.4	69.6	62.7*	8.9*	6.9*	13.0*	82.8*	74.8	72.0
NAAO	75.1	74.4	70.8	3.9	2.9	8.3*	78.2	76.7	77.2
Africa	74.0	69.8	71.3	7.9*	5.1	6.0	80.3	73.6	75.8
Asia	72.0	76.8*	77.0*	4.3	5.8	5.2*	75.2	81.5*	81.2*
Rest of the World	74.9	82.8*	79.5*	7.8*	4.4	6.7*	81.3	86.6*	85.3*
Citizenship									
Irish	72.0	72.9	72.9	4.7	3.9	3.7	75.6	75.8	75.7
Non-Irish	77.3*	77.2*	77.8*	5.9*	5.0*	6.1*	82.1*	81.2*	82.9*

Source: LFS Q1 2022, 2023, 2024.
Notes: Sample restricted to the working age population (15–64 years). * denotes where migrants significantly differ from Irish-born. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

Those born in EU-West and EU-East have significantly higher employment rates than those born in Ireland in all years from 2022 to 2024 (see Table 2.2). Employment rates for those born in Asia and 'Rest of the World' were similar to those born in Ireland in 2022, but became significantly higher in 2023 and 2024. Rates for those born in other places, including Africa, Australia, North America, Oceania, 'Other Europe' and the UK are similar to those born in Ireland (see Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details on which countries are assigned to each group).

In terms of unemployment, foreign-born groups either have similar or higher unemployment rates than the Irish-born group. Previous research indicates that in the EU, unemployment rates are typically higher for migrants than natives, especially for migrants whose country of origin is outside the EU (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; Li and Heath, 2020). Our results are consistent with this finding, with unemployment rates highest for those born in 'Other Europe' (13%), with all other migrant groups falling between 3.8% and 8.3%. Some groups have seen substantial changes in unemployment compared to 2022, with those born in Africa declining from 7.9% to 6% (not significantly higher than the Irish-born rate) and those born in North America, Australia and Oceania rising from 3.9% to 8.3% (significantly higher than the Irish-born rate).

Activity rates were significantly higher than the Irish-born group for those born in EU-West, EU-East, Asia and 'Rest of the World'. All other groups were not significantly different from the Irish-born rate. Notably, activity rates of those born in the UK and 'Other Europe' have fallen since 2022, when they were significantly higher than the Irish-born rate.

2.1.1 African labour market indicators

Since the first monitoring report on integration, African nationals have had much lower employment rates than Irish nationals (O'Connell, 2019; McGinnity et al., 2011; McGinnity et al., 2020b). Their low employment rates were an issue of substantial policy concern (Cronin et al., 2018), and were attributed in part to prolonged periods out of the labour market while in the international protection system (O'Connell, 2019). However, in 2022 the African-born employment rate (74%) was not significantly different from the Irish-born rate (72.7%). This was much higher than the pre-COVID-19 level of 55.7% (in Q1 2020 – see McGinnity et al., 2023). The improved employment rates for African-born residents have persisted in 2023 and 2024. This has been accompanied with a fall in the African-born unemployment rate, from 8% in 2022 to 6% in 2024, and in the activity rate, from 80.2% in 75.8%.

Sprong et al. (2023), investigating this development, find that the employment rate of African nationals rose during the post-COVID period (2021 and 2022), particularly for African women. They suggest the improvement in employment rates may be related to changes to rules regarding work for those in protection system,[48] the tight labour market and availability of employment, or the increasing cost of living, meaning more household members are required to find work. They also find no significant shift in the sector of employment for African nationals, with one-quarter working in health and social care during the period 2017–2022. Further analysis is required to understand the nature and quality of these jobs, and the factors driving these changes.

2.1.2 International protection applicants and BoTPs – Labour market indicators

Since 2018, international protection applicants and beneficiaries of temporary protection (BoTPs) have had the right to access the labour market in Ireland. International protection applicants must apply to the Department of Justice for a labour market access permission if they satisfy certain conditions (see Box 2.1),

48 See Polakowski and Cunniffe (2023) for a detailed discussion on these changes.

whereas BoTPs have direct access to the labour market (see Box 1.3). This section briefly reviews evidence on their labour market integration.

As many international protection applicants and BoTPs are not included in the Labour Force Survey (LFS), here we draw on the work of Polakowski and Cunniffe (2023), as well as statistics published by the CSO. Regarding international protection applicants, over the period 2018–2022, around 26,321 applications for international protection were made in Ireland. Over a similar period (June 2018–December 2022), 12,181 first-time labour market access permissions (LMAP) were granted. Following a rise in 2022, there was a considerable increase in permissions granted for labour market access in 2023 – a total of just under 9,995 (counting first applications and renewals) (Potter et al., 2025).[49] The increase in 2022 and 2023 compared to previous years is likely due to both the increase in international protection applications in 2022 and 2023 (see Figure 1.6), and also an increase in labour market activity compared to the COVID-19 period.

To estimate an indicator for the level of labour market participation among international protection applicants, we draw on IPAS accommodation data and Potter et al. (2025). There were 21,850 international protection applications as of 31 December 2023 (Potter et al., 2025). Using data on those living in IPAS accommodation on 31 January 2024, we estimate that there were 17,334 international protection applicants aged between 18 and 65 at the end of 2023.[50] In 2023, 9,995 international protection applicants were granted permission to work. The ratio of successful LMAP applicants in 2023 to the estimated number of international protection applicants aged 18-64 is 58%. This figure should be interpreted with the context that these applicants aren't eligible to apply for an LMAP in their first five months in Ireland. While this indicates that labour market participation is low relative to other migrant groups, it should be considered that before June 2018, international protection applicants had no access to the labour market whatsoever. One important caveat to this calculation is that successful LMAP applicants may have since left the State, or gained status, meaning they are no longer international protection applicants. This means that the figure likely overestimates the rate of labour market participation among international protection applicants. It should also be noted that this figure does not tell us anything about employment, as successful LMAP applicants may not have secured a job.

49 There were 7,784 first permissions granted and 2,211 renewal of permissions (Potter et al., 2025).

50 Based on statistics from IPAS, January 2024. See https://www.gov.ie/pdf/?file=https://assets.gov.ie/284879/7f444cd8-26dc-437e-8002-832178cbec89.pdf#page=null.

The latest data on BoTP labour market integration come from the CSO's *Arrivals from Ukraine in Ireland* (Series 14).[51] In September 2024, there were 82,051 BoTPs whose personal public service number (PPSN) had administrative activity in the previous three months. Of this group, 52,490 are aged between 18 and 64. In September 2024, 22,943 BoTPs reported earnings from employment in September 2024, a figure that represents 44% of the working age population. Median weekly earnings in this group were €492, and nearly half (45%) worked in the wholesale, transport and accommodation sector. Smaller numbers worked in these sectors: construction (16%); financial, real estate and administrative (14%); and public service, education and health (12%).[52]

51 See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/fp/p-aui/arrivalsfromukraineinirelandseries14/.

52 Sectors listed are NACE sectors, which are standard classifications for types of economic activity.

BOX 2.1 ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT

All nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the UK may migrate to Ireland, without restriction, to take up employment. The Common Travel Agreement (CTA) between Ireland and the UK grants citizens of both states the right to live, work, travel and study anywhere within the CTA. Beneficiaries of temporary protection (BoTPs) are also entitled to direct access to the labour market.

For all other non-EEA nationals, immigration permissions are required to reside in Ireland, while newly arrived workers must also hold an employment permit. Permits are applied for before entering the country and are only issued to workers with a specific job offer from a specific employer. The *Employment Permits Act 2024* has recently substantially revised the employment permit system, a process that has included the introduction of the new Seasonal Employment Permit. There are now ten types of employment permit, the two most common of which are the Critical Skills Employment Permit and the General Employment Permit.

The Critical Skills Employment Permit is linked to occupations that the Irish government have recognised as essential for economic growth, or occupations facing a skills shortage, including those in the areas of information and communications technology, engineering and healthcare. It is intended to attract highly skilled workers to the Irish labour market and to encourage them to reside permanently in the State. Critical Skills Permits are issued to non-EEA workers earning a minimum of €64,000 per year; or for jobs that are linked to recognised skills shortages, the job must offer remuneration of at least €38,000 per year and relevant qualifications are required.

The General Employment Permit is available for occupations with an annual salary of €34,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations with salaries below this.

Recent years have seen significant increases in the number of employment permits issued: 39,955 permits were issued in 2022, more than double the number issued in 2021 (16,275). While the total fell to 30,981 in 2023 (Potter et al., 2025), it recovered in 2024. India was the top nationality among those issued permits in 2023, with 11,893 permits, followed at some distance by the Philippines, at 2,634. The top two sectors of work for which permits were issued were health and social work, and information and communications technology.

In the context of a very tight labour market, there has been some loosening of the employment permit system in recent years. Since March 2019, spouses/partners of Critical Skills Employment Permit holders may work without an employment permit. In May 2024 this was extended to the spouses/partners of those with a General Employment Permit. The 2024 Act and the related Employment Permit Regulations 2024 introduce a new provision allowing General Employment Permit and Critical Skills Employment Permit holders to change employer after nine months without applying for a new permit. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have welcomed the measure as supporting workers to leave exploitative conditions (Stapleton et al., 2024).

BOX 2.1 (CONTD.) ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT

Prior to 2018, international protection applicants were not permitted to work in Ireland. Following a Supreme Court ruling, Ireland opted in to the recast Reception Conditions Directive (Polakowski and Cunniffe, 2023). Following amendments, international protection applicants are currently eligible to apply for a labour market access permit if they have been waiting for six months or more for a first decision on their application. The permit is valid for 12 months.[53]

Support with accessing employment

In Ireland, migrants are included within mainstream labour market integration policies with limited targeted supports. Intreo is the single point of contact for all employment and income supports and services in Ireland, offering job advertisements, advice and upskilling courses, among other services. These supports are available to EU/UK citizens, BoTPs, non-EEA citizens with Stamp 4 residence permission, as well as international protection applicants with labour market access permission (Polakowski and Cunniffe, 2023). To support long-term unemployed BoTPs in accessing the labour market, the eligibility criterion for the Community Employment programme was reduced from 12 to 9 months unemployed in March 2023 (Stapleton and Dalton, 2024).

Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) has a range of responsibilities, including facilitating the recognition of qualifications gained outside the State. An online international qualifications database is maintained, which lists certain foreign qualifications and provides advice regarding the comparability of a qualification to one gained in Ireland. Individuals whose qualifications are not listed in the database may apply to the qualifications recognition service, part of QQI, to have their qualification recognised. Through QQI, Ireland participates in the National Academic Recognitions Information Centre (NARIC), a European network supporting the recognition of qualifications, including Ukrainian qualifications (Stapleton and Dalton, 2024).

In terms of targeted supports, the Employment for People from Immigrant Communities (EPIC) programme is a migrant employability programme funded by the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY). Since 2021 it is specifically targeted towards asylum seekers and refugees, and offers career guidance, interviewing and CV skills, as well as work experience opportunities.

2.2 KEY LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS BY AGE, GENDER AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT

Table 2.3 presents key employment indicators by age for the Irish- and foreign-born groups. Differences by place of birth are limited, especially in the younger age groups and in employment and activity rates. Both Irish- and foreign-born residents in the 15–24 age group have the lowest employment and activity rates. This is likely

53 See https://www.irishimmigration.ie/my-situation-has-changed-since-i-arrived-in-ireland/labour-market-access-permission/.

partially driven by a high proportion of this age group being in full-time education. However, this group also has the highest unemployment rate of any age group, indicating that they face substantial barriers to accessing employment. While unemployment was relatively stable across this period for most groups, it rose substantially between 2023 and 2024 for young migrants. Employment and activity rates are highest for the 25–44 age group and then somewhat lower for the 45–64 age group. The only consistent difference between Irish- and foreign-born residents is that foreign-born residents had significantly higher unemployment in the 45–64 age group across all years. In 2024, foreign-born residents in all age groups had higher unemployment than their Irish-born counterparts, although this was not the case in 2022 or 2023.

TABLE 2.2 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND AGE 2022–2024

		Employment (%)			Unemployment (%)			Activity (%)		
Age	**Country of birth**	**2022**	**2023**	**2024**	**2022**	**2023**	**2024**	**2022**	**2023**	**2024**
15–24	Irish-born	47.0	46.4	47.1	7.2	8.5	7.6	50.6	50.7	51.0
	Born abroad	48.8	49.4	46.4	7.9	9.2	14.6*	52.9	54.4	54.4
25–44	Irish-born	83.3	83.9	84.4	5.0	3.8	3.3	87.6	87.2	87.3
	Born abroad	82.1	82.6	82.5	5.4	4.0	5.4*	86.8	86.1	87.2
45–64	Irish-born	74.1	76.2	76.6	3.1	2.5	2.2	76.4	78.1	78.3
	Born abroad	76.9*	76.3	76.4	6.2*	4.7*	4.7*	82.0*	80.0	80.2

Source: Q1 of LFS 2022, 2023, 2024.
Notes: Denominators for 'employed' and 'active' is 'total working age population'; denominator for 'unemployed' is 'total active population'. * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p<.05 level.

While labour market indicators by place of birth are similar within age groups, the age profile of foreign-born residents differs substantially from that of Irish-born residents. For instance, around 49.4% of foreign-born residents were aged 25–44, compared to 21.6% of those born in Ireland (see Table 1.3). This partially explains the higher employment and activity rates among foreign-born residents overall (see Figure 2.1). For a discussion of differences between place-of-birth groups after demographic factors are controlled for, see Appendix 2.1.

TABLE 2.3 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND GENDER, 2022–2024

		Employment (%)			Unemployment (%)			Activity (%)		
		2022	2023	2024	2022	2023	2024	2022	2023	2024
Female	Irish-born	67.7	68.9	69.1	4.2	3.3	3.4	70.6	71.3	71.5
	Born abroad	71.4*	70.1*	71.6*	6.1*	4.9	6.3*	76.1*	73.8*	76.4*
Male	Irish-born	75.9	76.1	76.3	4.8	4.5	3.7	79.8	79.7	79.2
	Born abroad	81.6*	83.8	82.4*	5.6	4.4*	5.4*	86.4*	87.6*	87.0*

Source: Q1 of LFS 2022, 2023, 2024.
Notes: Sample restricted to the working age population (15-64). * denotes where migrants significantly differ from Irish-born.

Table 2.3 presents key employment indicators by gender for the Irish- and foreign-born groups. Foreign-born residents of both genders have significantly higher employment, unemployment and activity rates than their Irish-born counterparts

in 2024. For both groups, employment rates are generally higher for males than females. However, the gender gap in all indicators is larger for the foreign-born group. For instance, the Irish-born employment rate is 7.2 percentage points higher for men than for women, whereas the foreign-born employment rate is 10 percentage points higher for men than for women. Similarly, the Irish-born activity rate is 7.7 percentage points higher for men than for women, but the foreign-born activity rate is 10.6 percentage points higher for men than for women. The gender gap in unemployment is smaller in magnitude, but still higher for foreign-born residents: unemployment rates for Irish women are 0.3 percentage points lower than for Irish men, whereas unemployment rates for foreign-born women are one percentage point higher than for foreign-born men. Variation over time has been limited, with no substantial changes in these labour market indicators since 2022.

TABLE 2.4 SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATES BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH GROUP, 2022–2024

	Self-employed (%)			Self-employed, excluding agriculture (%)		
	2022	2023	2024	2022	2023	2024
Place of birth						
Ireland	12.4	12.0	12.2	10.3	10.0	10.3
Born abroad	9.2*	9.5*	8.8*	8.9*	9.2	8.4*
Of which:						
UK	13.2	14.5*	16.3*	12.5*	13.9*	15.3*
EU-West	8.6	8.5	9.4	8.0	8.1	9.0
EU-East	6.9*	9.0*	7.8*	6.9*	8.5	7.7*
Other Europe	11.9	6.5*	10.6	11.9	6.5	10.6
NAAO	13.2	17.0	16.3	12.8	17.1*	15.5*
Africa	10.7	5.2*	4.8*	10.9	5.2*	4.8*
Asia	5.4*	7.5*	3.8*	5.4*	7.5	3.8*
Rest of the World	6.8	6.8*	4.5*	7.4	6.8	4.5*
Citizenship						
Irish	12.4	12.0	12.3	10.4	10.3	10.5
Non-Irish	7.9*	8.1*	6.8*	7.7*	7.8*	6.7*

Source: Q1 of LFS 2022, 2023, 2024.
Notes: Sample restricted to the working age population (15-64). * denotes where migrants significantly differ from Irish-born. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

Finally, Table 2.4 presents self-employment rates among migrants and non-migrants. As farming accounts for a large proportion of self-employment in the Irish-born group, but is rare among foreign-born residents, the findings are presented both with and without data for the agricultural sector.

In 2024, agriculture accounted for 1.9% of self-employment for Irish-born workers compared to 0.4% for workers born abroad. Of those born in 'Other Europe', Africa, Asia, or 'Rest of the World', no respondents indicated that they were self-employed in agriculture. Of those born in the UK, 1% were self-employed in

agriculture, the largest proportion of any migrant group. The Irish-born non-agricultural self-employment rate is therefore likely more reflective of the differences in entrepreneurship between Irish- and foreign-born residents.

Excluding agriculture, in 2024 Irish-born residents (10.3%) were still significantly more likely than foreign-born residents (8.4%) to be self-employed. However, those born in the UK (15.3%) and those born in North America, Australia and Oceania (15.5%) had a higher self-employment rate than Irish-born residents. Two groups did not significantly differ from the Irish-born self-employment rate ('Other Europe' and EU-West), whereas all other groups were less likely to be self-employed. Variation over time is limited; while some groups saw increases and decreases, on average self-employment rates for Irish- and foreign-born residents have remained steady.

2.3 SUMMARY

Key labour market indicators for migrant integration have been stable over the last three years, representing a continuation of the rapid recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a particularly negative effect on migrant employment. As in previous editions of the monitoring report on integration, migrants have had higher employment, unemployment and activity rates than the Irish-born population across all three years. There was substantial heterogeneity across place of birth, with employment highest for those born in EU-East and EU-West. Employment rose over the last three years to become significantly higher than the Irish-born rate for those born in Asia, 'Rest of the World', and 'Other Europe'. Unemployment was particularly high for those born in 'Other Europe', with all other groups having either similar or higher unemployment rates than the Irish-born population. Activity rates were also generally either similar or higher for migrant groups, with those born in EU-West having particularly high labour market activity rates. The significant rise in employment rates for African-born migrants in 2022 noted in the last monitoring report was maintained through 2023 and 2024.

We found few differences in employment indicators for Irish- and foreign-born residents according to age, with employment and activity rates generally higher and unemployment lower for those in the 25–44 year age group, regardless of place of birth. Differences by gender were substantial, however. While men had generally higher employment and activity rates and lower unemployment rates for both Irish and foreign-born groups, the gap between men and women was larger in all cases for the foreign-born group.

The LFS data used in the chapter do not include forced migrants living in communal accommodation. Estimates based on administrative data in Section 1.1.2 indicate low levels of labour market integration for both BoTPs and international protection

applicants. Accounting for these groups, the migrant employment rates would be somewhat lower. Yet the trend over time is positive: key indicators have not only recovered since COVID-19, but have remained steady over the last three years, despite the rapid increase in migration to Ireland. It should be noted that migrant unemployment rose somewhat between 2023 and 2024, however. Progress has been made among specific migrant groups, such as the declining unemployment rate of those born in Africa, which in 2024 is not significantly different from the Irish rate. On the other hand, those born in 'Other Europe' have seen a sharp rise in unemployment and a fall in employment. While there remain challenges in ensuring the labour market integration of specific groups, the overall trend is positive.

CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX

TABLE A2.1 UNEMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR MIGRANTS, 2022–2024

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Odds ratio	P-value	Odds ratio	P-value
Ireland (ref.)	1		1	
UK	1.058	0.613	1.246	0.053
EU-West	1.224	0.261	1.449*	0.042
EU-East	1.323**	0.009	1.25*	0.042
Other Europe	2.594***	0	2.894***	0
NAAO	1.313	0.236	1.622*	0.038
Africa	1.679**	0.004	1.716**	0.003
Asia	1.319*	0.038	1.664***	0
Rest of the World	1.537*	0.014	1.804**	0.001
Survey year				
Q1 2022 (ref.)	1		1	
Q1 2023	0.808**	0.001	0.791***	0
Q1 2024	0.820**	0.003	0.813**	0.002
Age, sex and family status				
Female (ref.)			1	
Male			1.086	0.144
Age			0.689***	0
Couples no children (ref.)			1	
Couples w/children			1.087	0.364
Lone parent family			2.425***	0
Single			1.705***	0
Educational attainment				
Does not hold tertiary degree (ref.)			1	
Holds tertiary degree			0.524***	0
Constant	0.047***	0	0.101***	0
Observations	40,112		40,112	

Source: Q1 of LFS 2022, 2023, 2024.

Note: P-values shown in parentheses. * indicates p<0.05 ** indicates p<0.01. *** indicates p<0.001. 'RC' denotes the reference category, against which the other categories are compared. Findings are presented using odds ratios; odds greater than 1 mean that a group is more likely to experience unemployment when compared against the reference category, and odds less than 1 indicate a lower likelihood of unemployment when compared to the reference group. Model 1 is a basic model, which includes only country of birth and survey year as the only predictors of unemployment. Model 2 adds further control variables. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

Table A2.1 presents two logistic regression models, showing how the odds of unemployment are associated with country of birth and other demographic characteristics. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios.[54] Model 1 includes dummy variables for place of birth and for survey year, showing that all groups, except for those born in Australia, EU-West, North America, Oceania and the UK are more likely than Irish-born residents to be unemployed. Those born in 'Other Europe' are most likely to be unemployed, with odds of unemployment 2.6 times greater than that of Irish-born residents. Model 2 includes controls for gender, age, family status and educational attainment. This allows us to account for differences in demographic characteristics of each group. After accounting for these variables, all groups except those born in the UK are more likely than Irish people to be unemployed. In particular, those born in EU-West have odds of unemployment 1.5 times greater than those of Irish-born residents, and those born in North America, Australia and Oceania have odds 1.6 times greater. The odds of unemployment for those born in 'Other Europe' increased, with odds 2.9 times greater than those of Irish-born residents. Those born in 'Rest of the World' and Africa were also particularly likely to be unemployed, with odds 1.8 and 1.7 times greater than those for Irish-born residents, respectively.

There were no statistically significant differences in odds of unemployment based on gender, although increased age was associated with increased odds of unemployment. Single people and lone parents were more likely than couples with no children to be unemployed, whereas couples with children were no more or less likely to be unemployed. Lone parents were especially likely to be unemployed, with odds of unemployment 2.4 times greater than those of couples with no children. Those with tertiary education were substantially less likely to be unemployed, with odds of unemployment 48% lower than those without tertiary education. In both models, respondents in 2023 and 2024 were less likely to be unemployed than those born in 2022.

54 The odds ratio is the odds of an individual being unemployed when the predictor variable is equal to one divided by the odds of someone being unemployed when the predictor variable is equal to zero, holding all other variables constant. For categorical variables (e.g. place of birth), this is interpreted as the multiplicative factor change in odds of unemployment for someone in the category compared to the reference class. For continuous variables (e.g. age), the odds ratio is interpreted as the multiplicative factor change in odds of unemployment associated with a one-point increase in the predictor variable.

CHAPTER 3

Education and integration

Evan Carron-Kee, Garance Hingre and Merike Darmody

Understanding the level of educational attainment among immigrants is essential for assessing integration. Higher educational attainment is associated with access to secure employment, decent wages and social networks, all of which support full and meaningful participation in society (OECD, 2019). However, levels of educational attainment can differ substantially depending on the country of origin, meaning immigrants may face different challenges to and opportunities for integration. Access to and success in education while in the host country is also important, especially for young migrants, second-generation migrants, and those with low proficiency in the local language.

This chapter focuses on indicators that roughly correspond to the core Zaragoza indicators for education. Section 3.1 presents data on the highest educational attainment by place of birth and the share of both the working age population and 25–34 year olds with tertiary education. Section 3.2 focuses on the share of early school leavers from each place-of-birth group. Section 3.3 considers the educational attainment of 15 year olds in reading and mathematics.[55] To supplement these core indicators, Section 3.1 considers the proportion of each place-of-birth group that was educated in Ireland, and Section 3.3 presents new data on the nationality breakdown of students in Irish primary and secondary schools.

This chapter primarily draws on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), but we also present results from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), and data collected by the Department of Education. In contrast to other analyses of LFS data in this monitor, which pool data from the first quarters of 2022, 2023 and 2024, here we pool data from all available quarters in these years. This allows for an increased sample size, which is useful for making robust inferences about differences between smaller immigrant groups.[56]

55 The four Zaragoza indicators on education are: highest educational attainment (the share of population with tertiary, secondary and primary or less than primary education); the share of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading and mathematics; the share of 30–34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment; and the share of early leavers from education and training (European Commission, 2010).

56 While the rotating panel design of the LFS means that there are multiple observations per individual, the use of weights means that the data will still be representative. As there is no unique ID for each individual in the LFS, dropping duplicate observations is difficult.

3.1 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF ADULTS IN IRELAND

3.1.1 Educational attainment among the working age population

Educational attainment refers to the highest level of education completed by a person. As education systems vary across countries, we use the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) to describe an individual's educational attainment levels, using four categories:

- lower secondary education or less, including people with no formal education;
- upper secondary education (Leaving Certificate or equivalent) only;
- post-Leaving Certificate qualifications;[57,58] and
- third-level qualifications.

In Table 3.1, we present the educational attainment of the working age population (between the ages of 15 and 64), analysed by place of birth. Overall, the level of educational attainment among Irish-born residents is relatively high, with 42.2% having a third-level qualification. The foreign-born population in Ireland tends to have higher educational attainment than the Irish-born population, with 58.5% having a third-level qualification. This is in line with findings from previous monitoring reports on integration, and with cross-country research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2022), which considered Australia, Canada, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. Foreign-born individuals are also much less likely than those born in Ireland to have lower than upper secondary-level education (9% compared to 20.4% for foreign- and Irish-born respectively).

Selective migration likely contributes to the higher educational attainment of migrants. This occurs when people face different incentives or barriers to migration. For instance, citizens from outside the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) require a work permit to work in Ireland. One such permit is the Critical Skills Employment Permit, which is issued for high-skilled jobs (see Box 2.1). In 2021, it accounted for approximately 60% of all permits issued (O'Connell, 2023). Migrants arriving on this permit are likely to have higher levels of education than the general population due to the nature of the jobs for which it is granted.[59] High-skilled individuals in other countries may be more motivated to migrate here too, as the returns to their skills in a country such as Ireland may be higher than in

57 A Post Leaving Certificate (PLC) course is taken after a student has passed their Leaving Certificate, and is generally a one or two year course. PLC courses are aimed primarily at students who would like to develop vocational or technological skills in order to enter an occupation, or go on to higher education.

58 This group is relatively small, meaning that estimates for some groups need to be considered with some caution.

59 Examples of occupations included on the Critical Skills Occupations List are engineers, ICT professionals, health professionals, architects and academics (DETE, 2024).

their country of origin. Indeed, migrants tend to be more highly educated than those who remain in their country of origin (Ichou, 2024; Van Tubergen et al., 2023).

TABLE 3.1 HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY PLACE OF BIRTH (AND CITIZENSHIP), 2021–2023 (POOLED), FOR THOSE AGED 15–64

	Lower secondary or less (%)	Upper secondary (%)	Post-Leaving Certificate (%)	Third level (%)	Total
Place of birth					
Born in Ireland	20.4	24.33	13.1	42.2	126,063
Born abroad	9.0*	21.9*	10.7*	58.5*	33,171
Of which:					
UK	16.3*	20.0*	13.5*	50.3*	9,354
EU-West	7.1*	14.4 *	6.6*	71.9*	2,696
EU-East	8.5*	37.6 *	15.7*	38.3*	7,616
Other Europe	6.9*	22.1*	8.4*	62.7*	1,696
NAAO	5.9*	17.7*	5.6*	70.8*	1,807
Africa	8.3*	17.6*	16.5*	57.7*	2,345
Asia	5.8*	10.7*	4.7*	78.8*	5,282
Rest of the World	4.9*	19.0*	6.0*	70.1*	2,375
Citizenship					
Irish	19.5	24.07	13.0	43.4	140,383
Non-Irish	7.7*	21.87*	9.8*	60.6*	18,972

Source: LFS 2021, 2022 and 2023 (pooled) weighted. Working age respondents (15–64).
Notes: 'Third level' includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above; * denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from the Irish-born population (for the 'place of birth' subheading) or Irish nationals (for the 'citizenship' subheading) at p≤ 0.05. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

While differences between the Irish-born and foreign-born populations are striking, there is substantial variation in levels of educational attainment within the foreign-born population by region of birth. Those with the highest rates of tertiary education were born in Asia (78.8%), EU-West (71.9%), North America, Australia and Oceania (70.8%), and 'Rest of the World' (70.1%). The Irish-born group has the highest proportion of individuals with the lowest level of education (20.4%), with all foreign-born groups having significantly lower proportions in this category. Those born in the UK are the closest to the Irish-born population, at 16%, whereas all other groups are between 4% and 9%. Considering tertiary education, those born in EU-East (38.3%) are the only group with a lower rate of tertiary education than the Irish-born population (42.2%). Those born in the UK (50.3%) and in Africa (57.7%) are the next lowest groups, but both have tertiary education rates significantly higher than those of the Irish-born population. Other groups have substantially higher rates of tertiary education, ranging from 63% to 78%.

While those born in EU-East are slightly less likely than the Irish-born population to have a third-level qualification, the proportion of those born in EU-East with upper secondary education (37.56%) is substantially higher than that of the Irish-born population (24.33%). They also have a higher proportion of those with post-Leaving Certificate (or local equivalent) qualifications, at 15.7%. They are one of only three groups with higher rates than the Irish-born group (13.1%) in this category, along with those born in Africa (16.5%) and the UK (13.5%). The high proportions of those with secondary or post-Leaving Certificate qualifications among those born in EU-East may be reflective of the greater focus on vocational education in the education systems of some eastern European countries (Ulicna et al., 2016).

3.1.2 Educational attainment and age

Across the OECD countries, educational opportunities have expanded, resulting in an increased number of skilled young people (OECD, 2021). Younger generations have had much broader access to higher education, so for the purpose of assessing differences in higher education between migrant groups, we focus on the younger age group. Access to higher education also varies substantially by country of origin, so we consider the share of the working age population with tertiary education, and the difference between it and the 25–35 year old share.

Figure 3.1 shows the tertiary education rate for the 25–34 year age group and the working age group (15–64). Compared with figures from the 2022 monitoring report on integration, the proportion of Irish individuals in this age group with a third-level degree increased from 56% to 58%. For foreign-born residents, the proportion increased from 67% to 70%. The gap between the Irish- and foreign-born population in the 25–34 year age group has therefore increased only slightly since the previous monitor (from 11 to 12 percentage points).

FIGURE 3.1 SHARE OF 25–34 YEAR AGE GROUP WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION, 2021–2023 (POOLED)



Source: LFS 2021, 2022 and 2023 (pooled) weighted. Age 25–34 years.
Note: Figure shows percentages and the 95% confidence intervals by group. N = 22,219. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

All regions of birth had higher tertiary education rates for the 25–34 year old age group compared with the overall working age population. However, the size of this gap varied substantially. The gap was lowest for EU-East (1.3 percentage point rise, from 38.2 to 39.5%) and for 'Rest of the World' (1.1 percentage point rise, from 70.1% to 71.2%). By contrast, the gap between the younger group and the working age population was highest for those born in Ireland (16 percentage point rise, from 42% to 58%) and for those born in Africa (15.9 percentage points, from 58.6% to 74.5%). The diversity in the age distribution of educational attainment highlights substantial differences between migrant groups in Ireland.

To further investigate the extent to which differences in third-level education were related to the different age profiles of the groups, we use a regression model that controls for age (see Table A3.1). We find that almost all migrant groups were more likely to have tertiary education, even after accounting for differences in age and gender. However, migrants from eastern Europe were less likely to have tertiary education compared to those born in Ireland.

3.1.3 Place of completion of education

Previous sections have focused on differences by place of birth, as educational attainment is heavily dependent on the education system of the relevant country of origin and patterns in selective migration. However, high educational attainment may also reflect migrants' success in the Irish education system, if they completed some of their education in Ireland. Table 3.2 presents a breakdown of place of education by place of birth. Respondents were classified as having been educated abroad if the time since a respondent completed their formal education was greater than or equal to their length of time in the country.[60] If the time that had passed since they completed formal education was less than the length of time they had been in the country, they were classified as having been educated in Ireland. It should be noted that in some cases, respondents classified as educated in Ireland may have been enrolled in education abroad but completed their education remotely from Ireland.

Foreign-born residents (40.5%) were much less likely to complete their education in Ireland than Irish-born residents (93.6%). Again, there is substantial variation by place of birth. Those born in 'Other Europe' (26.4%), 'Rest of the World' (27.9%) and EU-East (30.3%) were least likely to have completed their education in Ireland. However, those born in the UK (63.1%) and in North America, Australia and Oceania (56.4%) were most likely to have completed their education here. As in

60 Educated in Ireland or abroad was calculated using the best available variables; however, it only represents the highest level of educational attainment achieved by respondents. For example, if someone arrived in Ireland five years ago and completed their third level education a year ago, they would be defined as educated in Ireland despite having received most of their education abroad.

the 2022 monitoring report on integration, the proportion of foreign-born residents educated in Ireland (40.5%) is much higher than the proportion of Irish residents educated abroad (6.4%). This is likely reflective of both the high levels of migration to Ireland for tertiary education, and the fact that Irish people who emigrate for education may not return to the country. Considering citizenship, those with non-Irish citizenship were much less likely to have completed their education in Ireland (29.7%) compared with foreign-born residents (40.5%) (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of reasons for migration).

TABLE 3.2 COUNTRY WHERE EDUCATION WAS COMPLETED, 2021–2023 (POOLED)

Country of birth	Educated in Ireland (%)	Educated abroad (%)	N
Irish	93.6	6.4	126,063
Non-Irish	40.5*	59.5*	33,171
Of which:			
UK	63.1*	36.9*	9,354
EU-West	32.8 *	67.2*	2,696
EU-East	30.3 *	69.7 *	7,616
Other Europe	26.4*	73.6*	1,696
NAAO	56.4*	43.6 *	1,807
Africa	47.3*	52.8 *	2,345
Asia	35.2*	64.9*	5,282
Rest of the World	27.9 *	72.1*	2,375
Citizenship			
Irish	90.4	9.6	140,383
Non-Irish	29.7*	70.3*	18,972

Source: LFS 2021, 2022, and 2023 (pooled) weighted. Working age population (18–64).
Notes: * denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from Irish nationals at p≤ 0.05. NAAO=North America, Australia, and Oceania.

The educational attainment of migrants who were educated in Ireland also differs from that of migrants educated abroad. Overall, foreign-born residents were more likely to have a tertiary degree if they completed their education abroad than if they completed their education in Ireland. This is the case for every group except for those born in EU-East. Those who were born in EU-East and completed their education in Ireland were more likely to have a tertiary degree (41%) than those who completed their education abroad (36.9%). This may reflect the greater vocational focus of eastern European education systems compared to the Irish system, indicating that those who complete their education in Ireland (and who are more likely to have grown up in Ireland) were more likely to continue into higher education than those who completed their education in eastern Europe.

For other groups, those who completed their education abroad have higher tertiary education rates than those who completed their education in Ireland.

However, the size of this gap differs. It is largest for those born in North America, Australia and Oceania (15.7 percentage points) and those born in EU-West (10.1 percentage points). Residents born in these places are therefore more likely to have been highly educated before they came to Ireland. However, rates are most similar for those born in the UK, with a tertiary education rate only 2.9 percentage points higher for those who completed their education abroad compared to in Ireland.

TABLE 3.3 PROPORTION OF MIGRANTS WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION BY PLACE WHERE EDUCATION WAS COMPLETED, 2021–2023 (POOLED)

	Educated abroad		Educated in Ireland		Difference (abroad – Ireland)
	% tertiary education	Total	% tertiary education	Total	
Country of birth					
Foreign born	59.3	17,605	54.9	13,857	4.4
Of which:					
UK	52.4	3,210	49.5	5,681	2.9
EU-West	75.2	1,655	65.1	903	10.1
EU-East	36.9	5,050	41.0	2,236	-4.1
Other Europe	63.7	1,125	57.9	438	5.8
NAAO	79.5	680	63.9	1,069	15.7
Africa	59.3	1,138	55.3	1,076	4.0
Asia	81.9	3,196	73.8	1,769	8.1
Rest of the World	71.2	1,551	66.4	685	4.8
Citizenship					
Non-Irish nationals	61.1	12,569	59.0	5,340	2.2%

Source: LFS 2021, 2022, and 2023 (pooled).
Notes: Totals of each group do not match Table 3.2 due to missing values in duration in the country or time since most recent education. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

3.2 EARLY SCHOOL LEAVING AMONG YOUNG ADULT MIGRANTS

Leaving school prematurely is associated with a range of adverse outcomes, including social exclusion, unemployment and poor health (European Commission, 2019; Smyth et al., 2019; Smyth and McCoy, 2009). The reasons why young people leave school prematurely are often interconnected and complex, involving a combination of micro- (individual), meso- (school) and macro- (national context) level factors. Migrant-origin young people, particularly those for whom English is a second language, may experience particular challenges in the education system of the host country. These young people have been found to be over-represented among early leavers from education and training (European Commission, 2021).

In Ireland, the retention rate to Leaving Certificate has increased slightly over time (91.5% in 2018 versus 91.7% in 2022), while the percentage of early school leavers has decreased (4.8% in 2018 vs 4.0% in 2022) (Department of Education and

Department of Further and Higher Education, Research, Innovation and Science, 2024).[61] The rate of early school leaving has decreased across Europe too, although it is particularly low in Ireland (European Commission, 2019).

Our analysis follows the Eurostat definition of early school leaving, which defines early school leavers as people aged 18 to 24 who completed at most a lower secondary education and who are not in further education or training.[62] Table 3.4 presents the proportion of people in this age group defined as early school leavers by region of birth. Early school leaving is low overall, with no statistically significant difference between Irish-born (3.3%) and foreign-born students (3.7%). However, non-Irish nationals (4.7%) are significantly more likely to be early school leavers than Irish nationals (3.2%). The situation becomes clearer when considering place of birth. While those born in both the UK and EU-West (both 6.4%) have higher rates of early school leaving than those born in Ireland (3.3%), those born in non-EU countries have significantly lower rates (1.6%). There is no statistically significant difference between those born in EU-East (4.3%) and those born in Ireland. What is puzzling is that the children of EU-West origin have higher rates of early school leaving, even though adults in this group have very high educational attainment (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). It should also be noted that the sample size of the EU-West group in this category is relatively low compared to the other groups. The overall picture is positive, with low early school leaving rates across all groups presented in Table 3.4.

61 Early school leavers are defined as those students who entered fifth year but did not sit the Leaving Certificate at the end of sixth year, or the year after (allows for one year of repeat).

62 The legal definition of early school leaving in Ireland refers to non-participation in school before reaching the age of 16 years or before completing three years post-primary education, whichever is later.

TABLE 3.4 PROPORTION OF RESIDENTS AGED 18–24 DEFINED AS EARLY SCHOOL LEAVERS BY PLACE OF BIRTH AND CITIZENSHIP, 2021–2023 (POOLED)

	Early school leavers (%)	Number of people aged 20–24
Place of birth		
Ireland	3.3	17,357
Born abroad	3.7	2,725
Of which:		
UK	6.4*	516
EU-West	6.4*	250
EU-East	4.3	728
Non-EU	1.6*	1,231
Citizenship		
Irish	3.2	18,574
Non-Irish	4.7*	1,544

Source: LFS 2021, 2022 and 2023 (pooled). Eurostat indicator of early school leaving.
Note: Square brackets indicate that the denominator is smaller than 100 and estimates should be interpreted with caution.

3.3 MIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRISH SCHOOLS

Most migrants in Ireland completed their education abroad (see Table 3.2). However, an increasing number of students of migrant origin are progressing through the Irish educational system. A Programme for International Assessment (PISA) study for Ireland (Donohue et al., 2023) shows that in Ireland, the proportion of migrant students is higher than the OECD average (17.4% vs 12.9%), with 8% first-generation and 9.4% second-generation migrants (Donohue et al., 2023; see also Table 3.5). By comparison, the proportion of migrant students stood at 10% in 2012 (OECD, 2023).

Table 3.5 presents PISA 2022 scores for Irish and migrant students in Ireland, as reported by O'Donohue et al. (2023).[63] The total number of students who participated in the assessment was 5,569.[64] Students of migrant origin (including both first- and second-generation immigrants) perform statistically significantly worse on reading and on mathematics. The gap between immigrants and non-immigrants is wider for reading (13 points) than for mathematics (8.2 points). However, the gap between first- and second-generation immigrants is much larger for reading than for mathematics, with second-generation immigrants achieving

63 PISA defines first-generation immigrant students as those who were born outside the country of assessment and whose parent or parents were also born in a different country, and defines second-generation immigrants as those who were born in Ireland but whose parent or parents were born in a different country.

64 Tests in English-medium schools were carried out in English, but students in Irish-medium schools or in schools with an Irish-language stream were offered the option to take the assessment in Irish.

17.5 points more on average than their first-generation peers in reading, but only 4.6 points more in mathematics. This is perhaps expected given that immigrants are far more likely to speak a language other than English or Irish at home. While only 0.8% of non-immigrant students spoke a different language to the test language at home, around 59% migrant-origin students did so.

However, this differed substantially across migrant generations, with first-generation migrant students in Ireland more likely to speak a language other than English or Irish at home (71.4%) than second-generation immigrant students (47.8%). Overall, around 11.1% of students speak a language other than the test language at home, a figure close to the OECD average (11.2%). Regarding students' economic, social and cultural status (ESCS), or socio-economic profile, migrant-origin students in Ireland reported significantly lower ESCS compared to their native counterparts, although the difference is smaller in Ireland than the average for OECD countries (Donohue et al., 2023).[65] After controlling for students' socio-economic profile and language spoken at home, performance differences between the two groups in mathematics in Ireland were not significant (OECD, 2023).

TABLE 3.5 MEAN SCORES OF IRISH SECOND LEVEL STUDENTS IN ENGLISH READING AND MATHEMATICS BY IMMIGRATION STATUS, PISA 2022

	Reading	Mathematics	Proportion of all students
	Mean (SE)	Mean (SE)	
Non-immigrant students	520.4 (2.4)	494.8 (2.2)	82.6%
Immigrant students	507.4*†	486.6*†	17.4%
Of which			
First-generation immigrant students	498.0 (5.8)	484.1 (4.0)	8.0%
Second-generation immigrant students	515.5 (4.6)	488.7 (4.3)	9.4%

Source: O'Donohue et al. (2023), Table 3.7 (mathematics) Table 4.7 (reading and proportions).
Note: * indicates that the average for immigrant students is statistically significantly different from the average for non-immigrant students. O'Donohue et al. (2023) do not report any tests for immigrants by generation. † indicates that the average for immigrant students was not reported by O'Donohue et al. (2023) but was calculated by the authors using the 'difference (non-immigrant – immigrant)' and the 'non-immigrant students' columns in the relevant tables. Standard errors are not available for these cells.

The number of migrant students surveyed by the OECD PISA is too small to distinguish different regions of origin. However, data collected by the Department of Education in 2023, as part of the Primary Online Database and Post-Primary Online Database, can shed light on the distribution of students by nationality in

65 This ESCS composite score is derived from three variables related to family background: parents' highest level of education in years, parents' highest occupational status, and home possessions.

Irish primary and secondary schools. In Irish primary and secondary schools, the largest non-Irish groups include students with nationalities from EU-East, Asia and 'Other Europe'. In second-level schools, the largest groups include EU-West, EU-East and 'Other Europe'. The 'Other Europe' category includes Ukrainian children, most of whom have come to Ireland since February 2022 (see Box 1.3). In recent years, the number of Ukrainian students in Ireland has increased – in June 2023, there were 11,267 Ukrainian students enrolled in primary schools, and in some schools (n=243), Ukrainian students made up 10% or more of the total enrolments (Department of Education, 2024a). As for secondary schools, in May 2023 there were 6,846 Ukrainian students enrolled in second level education, with Ukrainian students making up 10% of the student population across 31 schools.

TABLE 3.6 DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITY GROUPS OF STUDENTS IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 2023

Nationality (self-description)	Primary school (%)	Secondary school (%)
Irish	86.3%	87.0%
EU-East	4.1%	3.7%
Asia	3.3%	1.9%
Other Europe (non-EU)	2.3%	2.2%
Africa	1.3%	1.1%
EU-West	0.8%	2.1%
UK	0.5%	1.0%
Latin or South America	0.5%	0.4%
Dual nationality (Both non-Irish)	0.4%	0.0%
NAAO	0.4%	0.5%
Total count	556,084	416,575

Source: Authors' calculations, based on data collected by the Department of Education in 2023. NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

3.4 SUMMARY

This chapter focuses on differences in educational attainment and early school leaving between Irish- and foreign-born residents, as well as the educational attainment of migrant and non-migrant students in Irish schools. The Irish population is highly educated, and retention rates to the end of secondary school are high. Foreign-born residents are more educated on average, however, likely due to selection into migration and immigration policies favouring high-skilled migrants. Education levels differ substantially according to place of birth. Those with the highest rates of tertiary education were born in Asia, EU-West, North America, Australia and Oceania and 'Rest of the World'. Those born in the UK and Africa have lower rates of tertiary education but are still significantly higher than the Irish rate. Only those born in EU-East have a lower tertiary education rate than those born in Ireland. A logistic regression analysis showed that those from EU-East

were the only group less likely than those born in Ireland to have tertiary education, even after accounting for gender and age.

Levels of educational attainment also differ between those who completed their education in Ireland and those who completed their education abroad. While foreign-born residents as a whole were more likely to have tertiary education if they had completed their education abroad, the gap in education rates was largest for those born in North America, Australia and Oceania. Those born in EU-East were the only group more likely to have tertiary education if they had completed their education in Ireland.

There was no significant difference between those born in Ireland and those born abroad in terms of the proportion of young people who were early school leavers. However, those born in non-EU countries were significantly less likely to leave school early, while those born in the UK and EU-West were somewhat more likely to have done so. Results from the PISA study show that migrant students are performing well – after controlling for socio-economic background and language spoken in the home, the differences between native and migrant students' performance in mathematics is relatively small. However, in reading, non-migrant students perform better than their migrant-origin counterparts. Considering school-age children using administrative data from the Department of Education, the largest nationality group other than Irish in both primary and secondary schools is EU-East – those from eastern European countries. Other relatively common nationalities included those from Asia, other European countries, Africa and EU-West.

BOX 3.1 ACCESS TO EDUCATION UPDATE

Access to education

The Irish education system consists of primary, secondary, further and higher education. Children must start primary school before the age of six, although most start at the age of five. Education is mandatory from the age of 6 to the age of 16, or until the student has completed three years of second-level education, whichever comes later. State-funded education is available at primary and secondary level until the age of 18. Higher education fees vary considerably depending on the nature of the institution (private or public) and the residency status of the student. Students who have been living in a European Economic Area (EEA) Member State, Switzerland or the UK for at least three of the five years before starting the course qualify for 'free fees'.[66] Students still pay an annual 'student contribution', which for most universities is set at the maximum value of €3,000. Means-tested support is available to students who qualify for free fees from Student Universal Support Ireland (SUSI). Fees in private colleges and for non-EEA nationals are substantially higher.[67] Free fees and SUSI are not available for courses in private colleges.

Migrants have faced challenges in accessing schools in Ireland because of the prevalence of waiting lists and policies favouring children whose parents had attended the school (see Smyth et al., 2009). This has improved since the introduction of the *Education (Admission to Schools) Act 2018*, which represented a major reform of admissions policy.

Supports for immigrants in school

Additional English language support remains the main additional support for students with a mother tongue other than Irish or English. In early 2024, the Department of Education published a thematic report on provision for students who speak English as an additional language (EAL) in primary and second-level schools.[68] It focuses on the importance of: creating a welcoming and inclusive school environment; assessing language needs; and teaching and learning. The report made a number of recommendations for enhancing EAL learning outcomes (Department of Education, 2024b).

Since the war in Ukraine began, the number of Ukrainian children in Irish schools has increased substantially. In June 2023, there were 11,267 Ukrainian students enrolled at primary level. In May 2023, there were 6,846 such students enrolled at second-level schools. In some primary and second-level schools, Ukrainian students make up 10% or more of the total enrolments (Department of Education, 2024a). To address the needs of these and other students, various supports have been put in place for Ukrainians and other international protection applicants (Department of Education, 2024c).[69] Schools that enrol such children and young people receive additional special education teaching (SET) hours and additional special needs assistant (SNA) hours.

BOX 3.1 (CONTD.) ACCESS TO EDUCATION UPDATE

At present, a total of 225 temporary SET posts (127 in primary schools and 98 in post-primary schools) and 305 SNA posts (168 in primary schools and 137 in post-primary schools) have been allocated under this scheme. Schools can also apply for additional teaching resources under the New Entrant Allocation Scheme (NEAS) for EAL students. The Department has allocated 1,470 whole-time equivalent teaching posts under the scheme: 1,034 in primary schools and 436 in second-level schools.[70]

In order to support the transition of Ukrainians and other international protection applicants, the Department of Further and Higher Education, Research, Innovation and Science (DFHERIS) introduced the following schemes: the Temporary Tuition Fee Support Scheme (tuition fee support for undergraduate and post-graduate courses); a financial stipend for full-time higher education students, via the Post Leaving Certificate (PLC) Bursary for Displaced Persons – for people who attend an approved PLC course. Regional Education and Language Teams (REALT), operating under Education and Training Boards (ETBs), work to provide access to education for school-aged children and young people from Ukraine and international protection applicants, and to support their families and the schools in which they are enrolled. At present, a number of Ukrainian teachers operate in Irish schools, having been vetted by the Teaching Council.

English language provision for adults

There is no national strategy or policy initiative for publicly funded English language lessons for adult migrants in Ireland. English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) classes are provided by the 16 ETBs across Ireland. ESOL provision is also aimed at supporting those who have arrived from Ukraine. In 2021, new guidelines, a toolkit and resources were developed to help migrants to improve their English language skills through the further education and training framework.[71] The tuition involves developing an individual learning plan for each learner (Government of Ireland, 2021a).

66 The student must also fulfil one of the following six criteria as regards nationality and immigration status in Ireland: be a citizen of an EEA Member State or Switzerland; have an official refugee status; be a family member of a refugee and have been granted permission to live in Ireland; be a family member of an EU national with permission to stay in the State with residence Stamp 4EUFAM; have been granted humanitarian leave to stay in the country; or have been granted permission to remain in the State by the Minister for Justice and Equality, following a determination by the Minister not to make a deportation order under section 3 of the *Immigration Act 1999*.

67 Each third-level educational institution sets its own fee rates.

68 The report is based on 83 inspections conducted in 47 primary schools and 36 second-level schools.

69 International protection applicants are people who have left their country of origin and are seeking protection in another country.

70 For further information see https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/48639-information-for-schools-ukraine/.

71 See https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/0a203-minister-harris-launches-new-resources-to-help-migrant-learners-improve-their-english-language-skills/#:~:text=These%20resources%20also%20strive%20to%20enhance%20the%20role%20and%20importance.

CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX

TABLE A3.1 LOGISTIC REGRESSION (ODDS RATIO) OF HAVING THIRD-LEVEL EDUCATION FOR THOSE AGED 15–64, 2021–2023

Country of birth (ref. Irish)	Model 1	Model 2
UK	1.39***	1.18***
EU-West	3.52***	3.66***
EU-East	0.85***	0.88***
Other Europe	2.30***	2.47***
NAAO	3.33***	3.34***
Africa	1.87***	1.84***
Asia	5.11***	5.64***
Rest of the World	3.22***	3.55***
Age		1.68***
Gender (ref. Female)		
Male		0.73***
Survey year (ref. 2020)		
2021	1.00	1.00***
2022	1.03	1.03***
Constant		0.27
Observations	53,522	53,522

Source: Authors' calculations, from pooled LFS data for 2022–2024.
Note: ****p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.* NAAO= North America, Australia, and Oceania.

CHAPTER 4

Social inclusion and integration

Anousheh Alamir

This chapter analyses whether citizenship and place of birth are associated with poverty and social exclusion outcomes during the 2022–2023 period and investigate how these relationships have changed since 2020–2021.

Recent research showed that Irish labour participation quickly recovered following the end of the COVID 19-related lockdown, with little to no changes regarding pre-existing inequalities (Alamir et al., 2024). However, when focusing on income and living standards, Roantree and Doorley (2023) found that, in 2021, employment earnings for those at the bottom of the household income distribution fell due to a reduction in usual hours worked and in months worked full-time per year. In addition, Roantree and Doorley (2023) found a sharp rise in the rate of material deprivation since 2021, and that inflation led average real disposable income in 2022 to be lower than in 2020. While income inequality had been declining since 2017, the authors found that this trend stopped in 2021. Income poverty and deprivation also had a depressing effect on civic participation (formal and informal volunteering and political participation). Since the pandemic, the latter declined especially among the young and oldest age groups, as well as migrants from the European Union (EU) and outside the EU (ibid.).

The National Anti-poverty Strategy is committed to tackling poverty, which it defines as inadequate income and resources (material, cultural and social) that preclude people from having a standard of living that is regarded as acceptable by Irish society generally (Government of Ireland, 1997, p. 3). In their Roadmap for Social Inclusion 2020–2025, the Government added a definition of social inclusion to reflect the multifaceted nature of poverty:

> *Social inclusion is achieved when people have access to sufficient income, resources and services to enable them to play an active part in their communities and participate in activities that are considered the norm for people in society generally.* (Department of Social Protection, 2020, p. 11)

In their approach, the Irish Government recognises that certain groups within society are at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion than others, and that these groups may therefore require additional support. Migrants are one of the groups that are often found to be more vulnerable (Kraszewska et al., 2021). Indeed, while important for all, having a sufficient income and other resources to participate fully in society may be particularly important for migrants, as it is directly related to their integration into the host country. Social welfare entitlements and migrants' access to them are presented in Box 4.1.

BOX 4.1 SOCIAL WELFARE

The social welfare system in Ireland is administered by the Department of Social Protection. It is divided into the following main types of payments:

- Social insurance payments (for example Jobseeker's Benefit, Maternity Benefit);
- Social assistance or means-tested payments (e.g. Jobseeker's Allowance, Disability Allowance, Back To Education Allowance, etc); and
- Universal payments (e.g. Child Benefit).

To qualify for social insurance payments an individual must have made the necessary number of pay-related social insurance (PRSI) payments for the relevant scheme and satisfy certain conditions. Social assistance payments are made to those who do not have enough PRSI contributions to qualify for the equivalent social insurance-based payments and who satisfy a means test. Universal payments, such as Child Benefit, do not require a means test or insurance contributions.

EU law requires that EU nationals are treated equally to Member State nationals in regard to accessing social welfare. In practice, national administrative rules lead to differing levels of access. This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of a Habitual Residence Condition to social assistance payments and to Child Benefit, which means that applicants must show they are both resident in and have a proven close link to Ireland. A number of agreements between Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) ensure that, from 1 January 2021, all existing social security arrangements for Irish and UK citizens are maintained following Brexit.[72]

Arrivals from Ukraine who are living outside of communal accommodation have access to all mainstream income supports and Child Benefit (see also Box 1.3). As of 2024, arrivals from Ukraine living in state accommodation are entitled to a reduce social welfare allowance, in line with the Daily Expense Allowance as well as Child Benefit. International protection applicants and persons seeking leave to remain in the State are not entitled to Child Benefit. International protection applicants living in International Protection Accommodation Service (IPAS) accommodation are entitled to a weekly payment called the Daily Expenses Allowance (DEA). In cases where the IPAS could not offer accommodation applicants, they are entitled to a higher rate of DEA. (See Box 1.4.)

This chapter presents poverty and social exclusion statistics analysed according to place of birth and nationality (Irish versus non-Irish). It focuses on the core Zaragoza indicators for social inclusion relating to household income, material deprivation, self-reported health status and housing (see Appendix 1). The results presented are based on the analysis of the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). This a representative survey of private households and persons living therein. Thus, certain groups are excluded, including asylum seekers living in the

72 Ibid.

direct provision system and arrivals from Ukraine (see Appendix 2 for the list of excluded populations). The analysis in this chapter is based on a pooled sample for the years 2022 and 2023, which are the most recent years available.[73] In 2022, the SILC sample included 4,660 households and 11,393 individuals,[74] among whom 1,233 individuals were born outside Ireland. In 2023, it was 4,191 households and 10,199 individuals,[75] among whom 1,249 were born outside Ireland.

4.1 INCOME AND POVERTY

4.1.1 Household income

The first of the core Zaragoza indicators related to social inclusion is the median net household income. In this chapter, we report the median annual disposable household income and the median equivalised disposable household income recorded in the SILC surveys of 2022 and 2023.[76]

Total annual disposable household income is calculated by adding up all incomes from each individual living in a household (from employment, private pensions, received rent, interests, savings and social transfers), minus their total tax and social-insurance contributions. In SILC, these income data come from two reliable sources: the Department of Social Protection's social welfare data and the Revenue Commissioner's employee income data. In order to compare households, we present the equivalised household income, which accounts for differences in household composition such as age and household size. The annual disposable household income is adjusted according to the Irish equivalence scale. This scale gives a weight of 1 to the first adult (aged 14+), a weight of 0.66 to each additional adult, and a weight of 0.33 to each child (aged less than 14).[77] The equivalence scale for each household is the sum of these weights; the equivalised disposable income, then, is the total disposable household income divided by the equivalence scale and attributed to each individual.

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73 As in the previous monitoring reports on integration, we combine the data from two years. By pooling two years of data, we increase the total number of migrants in our sample so that we can report reliable statistics and follow the CSO statistical disclosure guidelines. According to the CSO guidelines, estimates for the number of persons where there are fewer than 30 persons in a cell are too small to be considered reliable and have the potential for statistical disclosure. Where there are 30–49 persons in a cell, estimates are considered to have a wide margin of error and should be interpreted with caution.

74 See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditionssilc2022/annex/.

75 See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditionssilc2023/annex/.

76 While much of the information collected in the SILC surveys relates to the current circumstances of a household during the year of interview, the income reference period is the previous calendar year. for example, during the 2022 survey, the income reference period is 2021.

77 See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditionssilc2023/backgroundnotes/.

In Table 4.1, we report the median annual disposable household income and median annual equivalised disposable household income across the various groups.[78] The overall median disposable household income increased from €56,981 in 2019–2020 to €63,158 in 2022–2023. However, the gap between the Irish-born and foreign-born populations remained relatively stable: the median disposable household income for Irish-born (€64,680) was higher than for foreign-born residents in Ireland, at €56,526, meaning that the median disposable household income of the foreign-born population was about 87% of the value of the median income for Irish-born residents. Disparities are even wider when taking citizenship into account, with Irish nationals having a median disposable income of €64,582 while the non-Irish population has one of €54,730 (see Table 4.1).

TABLE 4.1 YEARLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALISED INCOME, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

Place of birth	Disposable household income (median) €	Equivalised (needs adjusted) Income (Median) €	Observations (unweighted)
Ireland	64,680	27,602	19,110
Born abroad	56,526*	24,827*	2,482
Of which:			
UK	57,361*	26,318	823
EU-West	67,102	33,039	239
EU-East	54,066*	22,820*	552
Non-EU	56,119*	24,663*	868
All	**66,158**	**27,171**	**21,592**
Citizenship			
Irish	64,582	27,582	20,224
Non-Irish	54,730*	23,757*	1,368

Source: Author's calculations from pooled SILC 2022 and 2023 (income reflecting 2021 and 2022), weighted.
Notes: Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. * is to signal that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at $p < 0.05$.

When ordered from low to high, the pattern of the disposable household income distribution across the various groups changed from previous monitoring reports on integration. The median annual disposable household income, which used to be lowest for the UK-born population, is now lowest for the EU-East group, at €54,066, followed by the non-EU group, at €56,119, and the UK-born population, at €57,361. The EU-West group still has the highest median household income, at €67,102,

78 The median income is the midpoint of the income distribution once incomes have been sorted from lowest to highest.

which is slightly higher than the median annual disposable household income of the Irish-born population.

Using the equivalence scale, we find that while household composition differs across country-of-origin groups, a similar pattern emerges. Irish-born residents still have a higher median equivalised income (€27,602) than foreign-born (€24,827) (see Table 4.1). The EU-East group now has the lowest median equivalised income, at €22,820, followed closely by the non-EU and UK groups, at €24,663 and €26,318 respectively. The EU-West group remains at the highest median equivalised income, at €33,039.

4.1.2 Poverty rates

In this chapter we focus on three official poverty indicators that are commonly used to monitor poverty and social exclusion in Ireland (Department of Social Protection, 2007; 2021). The first indicator is the at risk of poverty (AROP) measure, which identifies individuals living in a household where the income is below the poverty line. This poverty line is calculated using an income threshold related to the mean or median income. The official poverty line used in Ireland and the EU is 60% of the median equivalised income.

The second indicator is a measure of material deprivation, which estimates a household's inability to afford a set of basic goods and services that are considered common across the overall population (Maître et al., 2006; Maître and Privalko, 2021). This measure is designed to capture the absolute standard of living, in contrast to the AROP indicator, which is a relative measure and might fail to capture any change in the standard of living of the population, particularly in periods of economic boom or bust. The basic deprivation measure includes 11 basic items (shoes, clothes, heating, etc.) that are regarded as essential to fully participate in society with a minimum standard of living. A household is considered materially deprived if its members cannot afford to have at least 2 of these 11 items.[79]

The last indicator is the consistent poverty measure, which is the official national poverty measure in Ireland and which corresponds to the overlap of the two

79 The 11 items are: two pairs of strong shoes; a warm waterproof overcoat; a new (not second-hand) clothes; a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day; a roast joint or its equivalent once a week; (having to go without) heating during the past year through lack of money; keeping the home adequately warm; buying presents for family or friends at least once a year; replacing any worn-out furniture; having family or friends over for a drink or meal once a month; and having a morning, afternoon or evening out in the past fortnight for entertainment.

previous measures. A household is considered consistently poor if it is both AROP and experiencing enforced deprivation.

In Table 4.2, we report the percentage of people who are experiencing poverty according to each of the three poverty indicators across the groups. Overall, the share of people who are AROP went from 12.3% in 2020–2021 to 11.5% in 2022–2023. On the other hand, the share in material deprivation has gone up, from 14% to 17%; and the share in consistent poverty remained at the same level – 4.3% in 2020–2021 and 4.2% in 2022–2023.

Irish-born people have a much lower AROP rate than migrants overall, at 11% and 14.5% respectively. However, there is substantial variation across the foreign-born groups. The EU-East group has a lower AROP rate than the Irish-born population, at 10.4%. On the other hand, those born in the UK- and non-EU have higher rates, at 13.4% and 20.4% respectively. The EU-West group, by contrast, has the lowest poverty rate of all, including with regard to the Irish-born population.[80]

The Irish-born population also has a lower deprivation rate than that of the migrant group, at 15.7% and 23.1% respectively. The EU-East has the highest deprivation rate, at 26.7%, followed by the non-EU and UK groups, at 23.7% and 21.8% respectively.

The consistent poverty rate is also lower for Irish-born people than for migrants, at 3.8% and 6.2% respectively. The EU-East, UK and the non-EU born groups have higher rates, at 6.3%, 5.2% and 7.4% respectively.

Previous monitoring reports have highlighted the higher consistent poverty rate for the non-EU born population. While this group cannot be further disaggregated in these data, results from McGinnity et al. (2023) and those presented in Chapter 2 of this monitor, combined with Laurence et al. (2023) on wages, suggest that there is likely to be considerable variation within the non-EU group in terms of deprivation and poverty.[81] As noted above, the fact that the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) data exclude international protection applicants and

80 We note however that there are fewer than 30 EU-West surveyed individuals living under each of these poverty measures, which is why we provide ranges rather than exact figures for that group.

81 Among the potential reasons, Chapter 2 depicts a clear difference in employment rates between the subgroups, with those born in Asia and the 'Rest of the World' having the highest employment rates in 2023 in Ireland, at 77% and 79.5% respectively, while those born in 'Other Europe' and Africa had the lowest rates, with 70% for each (compared to 72.5% for those born in Ireland). We note again that this analysis excludes those living in communal accommodation, as explained in Appendix 2.

arrivals from Ukraine living in communal accommodation means these migrants are excluded from the non-EU group in measures of poverty and deprivation.

TABLE 4.2 AROP, DEPRIVATION AND CONSISTENT POVERTY RATES, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

Place of birth	AROP (under the 60% median poverty line) (%)	Deprivation (enforced lack of two or more items) (%)	Consistent poverty (at risk + deprived) (%)	Observations (unweighted)
Born Ireland	11.0	15.7	3.8	19,110
Born abroad	14.5*	23.1*	6.2*	2,482
Of which:				
UK	13.4	21.8*	5.2	823
EU-West	[3–9]	[3–9]*	≤3	239
EU-East	10.4	26.7*	6.3*	552
Non-EU	20.4*	23.7*	7.4*	868
Citizenship				
Irish	11.1	15.9	3.9	20,224
Non-Irish	15.3*	25.3*	7.1*	1,368

Source: Author's calculations, from pooled SILC data for 2022 and 2023, weighted.
Notes: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different to the Irish value at $p < 0.05$. Square brackets indicate that the value (range) has to be interpreted with caution due to the small number of observations in the cell.

4.2 HEALTH STATUS

There is a strong association between social exclusion and health inequality (Marmot, 2015; Watson et al., 2016). Since migrants are more exposed to poverty and social exclusion there is a concern that this could have an impact on their health and, consequently, on their ability to participate in society. Access and use of healthcare services may also impact health outcomes. Recent work in Ireland has shown lower healthcare use among migrants. Barlow et al. (2022) found that those born outside of Ireland and the UK were less likely to have attended a general practitioner or consultant relative to Irish-born individuals, even after adjustment for a range of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals.

In this section, we compare the general health status of several migrant groups to that of the Irish-born population. As in the previous versions of this report, we focus on a measure of self-perceived health, which is one of the core Zaragoza indicators. This indicator is based on a question from the SILC in which all respondents aged 16 and over were asked to rate their health in general on a five-point scale, ranging from 'very good' to 'very bad'. This is a widely-used indicator that assesses people's perceptions of their health, and as such may differ somewhat from clinical assessments, though tests have shown it is a valid measure of physiological and mental health (Hamplova et al., 2022).

We show the percentage of people who indicated that their health status was good or very good, and the mean age of the respondents in Table 4.3. Four-fifths (80.2%) of the overall population aged 16 and over assessed their health as good or very good, which is slightly lower than the 82.5% reported in the 2022 monitoring report on integration.

TABLE 4.3 SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH STATUS, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

Place of birth	Good or very good health (%)	Mean age (rounded)	No. of individuals (16 and over)
Ireland	79.5	47	14,995
Born abroad	82.9*	42*	2,288
Of which:			
UK	74.9*	50*	798
EU-West	88.4*	41	220
EU-East	85.6*	39*	510
Non-EU	84.0*	40	760
All	80.2	46	17,283
Citizenship			
Irish	79.4	47	16,086
Non-Irish	85.7*	40*	1,197

Source: Author's calculations, from pooled SILC data for 2022 and 2023, percentages weighted; N unweighted.
Note: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < 0.05$.

As in previous years, a somewhat smaller share of the Irish-born group perceived their health as good or very good (79.5%) compared to the foreign-born group (82.9%). As mentioned in McGinnity et al. (2023), this is sometimes referred to as the 'healthy immigrant effect', and is often related to the positive selection of migrants in terms of factors such as age when compared to people who did not migrate from their country of origin (Ichou and Wallace, 2019; Nolan, 2012). This is shown in Table A4.1 in Appendix 4, which presents the predicted probabilities of self-perceiving oneself as being in good or very good health, with and without controlling for age. Without the age control, we see that people born in eastern Europe and outside the EU are significantly more likely than the Irish-born population to perceive themselves as healthy. This somewhat corroborates Table 4.3, which shows that these two groups are the second healthiest after the EU-West, but also that they are the youngest, on average. When controlling for age, Table A4.1 shows no significant differences in health between any subgroup and the Irish-born group. Thus, this 'healthy immigrant effect' seen in these subgroups does indeed seem to be mainly explained by the former being, on average, a younger population. On the other side, Table 4.3 shows that the UK has the highest average age, and also the lowest share of self-perceived healthy people, as found in previous monitoring reports on integration.

These measures of self-rated health are representative of migrants aged 16 and over, yet outcomes may be different for particular groups. For example, Duffy et al. (2022) found that the perinatal mortality rate for African-born mothers living in Ireland was almost twice that of Irish-born mothers, and suggested that this may be related to barriers to accessing appropriate perinatal healthcare services for African-born mothers. The study found that mothers born in other EU countries had a lower perinatal mortality rate than Irish-born mothers. Further studies on healthcare utilisation and outcomes of migrant groups could usefully supplement these indicators of self-assessed health.

4.3 HOUSING TENURE AND AFFORDABILITY

Having access to adequate and affordable housing is often considered a basic need (Russell et al., 2021), as well as an important component of integration (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016). Adequate housing allows migrants to work, participate in education, and participate in society more broadly. Moreover, in many societies, homeownership is considered a marker of social and economic success. However, migrants may face inequalities in housing tenure and affordability for various reasons. For instance, they may be younger, on average, or have different housing preferences if they do not intend to stay in Ireland for the long-term or due to a lower income, which may limit their ability to buy a home. In addition, they may be limited by the characteristics of the property market, and/or the banking sector and credit regulations of the host country, on top of facing discrimination in the rental housing market (Gusciute et al., 2022). Set against a backdrop of the current Irish housing market, which is characterised by limited availability and affordability, the challenges faced by some migrant groups may be especially large (McGinnity et al., 2022; Russell et al., 2021).

As in the previous monitoring reports, we present statistics for the indicator of housing tenure and two measures of housing affordability, distinguished by region of birth. Tenure status refers to the nature of the accommodation in which the household resides, as reported by the person in the household answering to the questions about their household (generally the head of the household) during the survey interview.[82] Since the Irish housing system is broadly comprised of three sectors, responses were classified into the following three categories: owner-occupied; rented in the private sector (with or without subsides from Government, e.g. the Housing Assistance Payment); and rented from a local authority (social housing).

82 The results reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are at the household level rather than at the individual level, unlike all the previous results. Migrant households are those where the household reference person was born outside Ireland.

Monthly rents have risen much faster than average wages in Ireland over the past decade (Russell et al., 2021),[83] making it increasingly hard to afford housing. The two housing affordability indicators presented here are based on the total housing costs relative to household income. The first measure of housing affordability is an indicator of high housing costs, which identifies households that spend more than 30% of their income on housing and is a commonly used measure in the literature (Corrigan et al., 2019), although these kinds of measures may not fully capture people's experiences (Sprong and Maître, 2023). The second measure of housing affordability is the AROP rate after housing costs used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), which identifies those whose equivalised income after rent and mortgage interest is below the poverty line (less than 60% of the median before rent and mortgage interest).[84] These are both commonly used measures of affordability but capture different aspects of affordability. For households with high overall incomes, a high proportion of income on housing costs may not necessarily translate into being AROP. Conversely, some families who are AROP after housing costs may not face housing costs that exceed 30% of their income.

In Table 4.4, we report the percentage of households living in the three tenure types across the various groups. We also present the average age of the household reference person (HRP) for each subgroup. Overall, most households live in a home that is owner occupied (69.4%), followed by those who rent in the private market (22%) or from a local authority (8.6%). These patterns are similar to the overall tenure figures reported in the previous monitoring report on integration. Age-wise, we see that homeowners tend to be older than renters, and that those born in Ireland are generally older than those born abroad, although there are disparities within the latter group. When focusing on homeowners, those born in eastern Europe have the oldest average HRPs (68 years old), followed by the UK (60), while the average Irish-born homeowner is 57. Among those living in local authority rented accommodation, those born in the EU-West have the oldest HRPs on average (65) while those born in the EU-East have the youngest (44), although these figures must be interpreted with caution due to the small number of observations in each cell. Finally, subgroups living in privately rented accommodation all have similar average HRP ages, at around 40 years.

83 The ratio of average monthly rent to the average monthly wage rose from 0.22 in 2012 to 0.31 in 2020 (Russell et al., 2021, Table 4.1).

84 See www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/hubs/p-wbhub/well-beinginformationhub/housingandbuiltenvironment/atriskofpovertyrateafterrentandmortgageinterest.

TABLE 4.4 HOUSING TENURE, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

Place of birth	Homeowners		Private rented		Local authority rented		No. of households (unweighted)
	%	HRP mean age	%	HRP mean age	%	HRP mean age	
Ireland	77.1	57	13.8	42	9.2	54	7,600
Born abroad	37.2*	52*	56.7*	40	6.1*	50	1,146
Of which:							
UK	60.4*	60*	29.6*	43	9.9	54	460
EU-West	52.9*	51*	[45-50]*	42	[<=5]	65	95
EU-East	25.0*	68*	70.8*	39	[4–9]*	44*	235
Non-EU	28.6*	50*	65.8*	40	5.6*	50	356
Citizenship							
Irish	74.9	57	15.7	43	9.3	54	8,210
Non-Irish	26.9*	47*	70.7*	38*	2.5*	50	536

Source: Author's calculations, from pooled SILC data for 2022 and 2023, percentages weighted; N unweighted. Households are classified based on the place of birth of the HRP. A small number of households living rent-free have been excluded from the analysis.

Notes: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < 0.05$. Square brackets indicate that the value (range) has to be interpreted with caution due to the small number of observations in each cell.

There are substantial differences in tenure status by place of birth. While the majority of Irish-born people continue to own their home, at 77.1%, this share is much lower among foreign-born residents, at 37.2%. The UK migrant group has the largest share of homeownership, at 60.4%, followed by the EU-West. In contrast, homeownership is much less common among migrants from the EU-East and non-EU groups; fewer than one in three households from these groups own their home.

As in previous reports, renting in the private sector is the most common tenure type among migrants, at 56.7% compared to 13.8% for Irish-born residents. Renting in the private sector is also more common among non-Irish nationals (70.7%) than among Irish nationals (15.7%)[85]. Households headed by an EU-East migrant are the most likely to live in privately rented accommodation, at 70.8%, followed by the non-EU group, at 65.8%. The share of households renting in the private sector is smaller for the UK group, at 29.6%, though still significantly higher than for Irish-born people.

Even though foreign-born households are less likely to own their home, they are generally also less likely to rent from a local authority (6.1%) than are Irish-born

85 The difference between non-Irish nationals and migrants is likely due to the fact that those in the UK-born group, many of whom are Irish nationals, make up a much greater share of migrants than of non-Irish nationals, and they are much less likely to rent privately (see Table 4.3).

households (9.2%). This is particularly true for the non-EU groups. This is likely to be due to a combination of factors. For example, some migrants will not have a long-term right to reside and thus will not be entitled to local authority housing.[86] Long waiting lists for access to social housing, given shortage of supply, may be an issue for recently arrived migrants. Some migrants may not satisfy the means test; others may not be aware of their entitlements. (See McGinnity et al., 2022, Section 1.3.2, for further discussion.)

The findings presented in Table 4.3 show a similar pattern to the findings from McGinnity et al. (2022), who analyse housing tenure of individuals using 2016 Census microdata and who are able to distinguish between more specific groups of migrants. They also find that EU-East migrants as well as some non-EU groups have particularly high rates of private renting (see Figure 4.2 in McGinnity et al., 2022).

Appendix Table A4.2 shows that age does not seem to explain much of the differences between the observed subgroups. Indeed, the multi logit estimation shows that there generally seems to be more private renters among those born abroad, and more people born in Ireland or the UK among those living in local authority rented households, whether or not age is taken into account.

Recent challenges with supply and housing cost mean that, overall, private rentals are much more expensive and offer much less security of tenure than owner occupation. Rented accommodation is also more likely to be overcrowded than owner-occupied accommodation (McGinnity et al., 2023), and non-EU migrants especially are much more likely to live in overcrowded accommodation (McGinnity et al., 2022).

In Table 4.5, we report the percentage of households that face high housing costs and that are AROP after rent and mortgage interest, as well as the average age of the HRP for each subgroup. Overall, more than one in ten households in Ireland face high housing costs, and more than one in five are AROP after deducting rent and mortgage interest. These rates are higher for migrants than for Irish-born: for migrants, the share of households with high housing costs is 36.5% compared to 9.2% for the Irish-born group. The AROP rate after housing costs is 37.6% for migrants compared to 18.6% for the Irish-born group. Faring worst among these groups are those born outside the EU, with almost half of them living with high housing costs, and 45% of them AROP after housing costs. These results suggest that, for a significant proportion of the Irish-born group, poverty risk is not directly

86 See https://www.gov.ie/en/circular/42023-circular-housing-412012-access-to-social-housing-supports-for-non-irish-nationals.

related to very high housing costs, while the opposite is true for migrants. Among the potential factors behind these disparities, we note that the average migrant HRP is younger than the Irish-born counterpart, in both groups, and that the former also tend to be renters more than homeowners, again contrary to the situation of the Irish-born group (as seen in Table 4.4).

TABLE 4.5 HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

Place of birth	High housing costs (>30%)		AROP rate after housing costs		No. of households (unweighted)
	%	HRP mean age	%	HRP mean age	
Ireland	9.2	49	18.6	56	7,693
Born abroad	36.5*	42*	37.6*	43*	1,158
Of which:					
UK	22*	48	29.6*	51*	467
EU-West	[25–30]*	50	[24–29]	49	95
EU-East	35.9*	39*	38.0*	39*	235
Non-EU	49.8*	40*	45.3*	43*	361
Citizenship					
Irish	10.8	49	20.1	55	8,310
Non-Irish	42.8*	39*	38.6*	40*	541

Sources: Author's calculations, from pooled SILC data for 2022 and 2023, weighted percentages. Households are classified based on the place of birth of the HRP.

Notes: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p < 0.05$. Square brackets indicate that the value (range) has to be interpreted with caution due to the small number of observations in each cell.

There is considerable variation in the shares of households facing housing affordability challenges across the migrant groups. In the UK-born group, 22% of households spent more than 30% of their income on housing costs, while these percentages are larger for the EU-West (25% to 30%), EU-East (36%) and non-EU (50%). In terms of the share of households that are AROP after rent and mortgage interest, the lowest percentage among the migrant groups is found for the EU-West group, at 24% to 29%; this is likely linked to their higher disposable income (Table 4.1) and lower poverty rates (Table 4.2), followed by the UK group at 30%. For the EU-East and non-EU groups, the rates are higher at 38% and 45% respectively.

The greater vulnerability of migrant households in relation to housing affordability partly reflects their greater tendency to be in accommodation that is rented in the private market, where costs are likely the highest (Corrigan et al., 2019; Disch et al., 2023; O'Toole et al., 2020). Indeed, results from a statistical regression model presented in Table A4.3 show that once we take account of tenure status and age, the predicted probability of facing high housing costs and being AROP becomes

smaller for all migrant groups, and, in some cases, the difference compared to the Irish-born group is no longer significant.

4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examines differences in poverty and social exclusion between Irish- and foreign-born residents following the COVID-19 crisis. It presents poverty and social exclusion statistics analysed according to individuals' region of birth, focusing on the core Zaragoza indicators for social inclusion relating to household income, material deprivation, self-reported health status and housing from 2022 to 2023.

As in previous monitoring reports on integration, we find that the surveyed population born in EU-West has both the highest disposable household income and equivalised (i.e. needs-adjusted) income. Other migrant groups, however, continue to show lower median incomes than the Irish-born. Similarly, when analysing poverty and deprivation indicators, those born in the EU-West have the lowest rates. Of concern is the higher poverty and deprivation rates found for other migrant groups: one in five non-EU migrants are AROP and over one-quarter of those of EU-East origin are experiencing material deprivation.

As noted above, the fact that the SILC data exclude international protection applicants and arrivals from Ukraine living in communal accommodation means these migrants are excluded from the non-EU group in measures of poverty and deprivation, even though their standard of living is likely to be lower than that of other migrant groups (on the basis of lower employment rates, welfare payments and living arrangements). Income poverty might be particularly challenging to measure for this group as their accommodation and meals are covered, but for those not in paid employment, the low level of payments mean that their income is likely to be below the poverty threshold, even accounting for meals and accommodation.[87] Future surveys could also consider capturing some measures of material deprivation for those living in communal accommodation.

The overall share of the surveyed population defining themselves as being in good or very good health went down, from 83% in 2020–2021 to 80% in 2022–2023. As in previous years, the share of Irish-born people who see themselves in that category is lower than the share of foreign-born people (80% vs. 83%). Analysis

87 Arrivals from Ukraine and international protection applicants living in communal or serviced accommodation are currently entitled to a weekly allowance of €38.80 per adult and €29.80 per child to cover daily expenses (see Box 1.3 and Box 1.4).

shows that when we account for age differences between the Irish and migrant population, these differences are no longer statistically significant.

When looking at housing tenure, the Irish-born population has the highest share of homeowners (77%), while those from eastern Europe have the highest share of private renters (71%) and those born in the UK have the highest share of living in social housing (10%). We also find that more than one out of ten surveyed households face high housing costs, and that more than one in five are at risk of poverty (AROP) after deducting rent and mortgage interests. These rates are much higher for migrants than for the Irish-born group. Faring worst among the former group are those born outside the EU, with almost half of this group living with high housing costs and 45% being AROP after housing costs.

This chapter shows how housing affordability challenges disproportionately affect migrants in Ireland. Those in the EU-East group do not have a high AROP rate before housing costs (Table 4.2), but after housing costs they do (Table 4.5), which might help explain their relatively high deprivation rate (Table 4.2). Statistical modelling indicates that a key part of the poverty risk after housing costs for this group is their concentration in the private rental sector. Those in the non-EU group are at even greater risk of poverty and social exclusion: they have the highest consistent poverty and AROP rates of all the groups considered, and they are the most likely to face high housing costs as a proportion of income.

The high rates of private renting and associated affordability issues mean that many migrants are particularly exposed to the current housing crisis and shortage of rental accommodation in Ireland. This underscores the importance of including housing in the successor strategy to the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 as a matter of urgency, though, of course, addressing major challenges more broadly in the Irish housing market will benefit migrants too, as they are disproportionately found in the private rental sector, in overcrowded accommodation and in homeless shelters (McGinnity et al., 2022). While beyond the scope of this study, the general housing shortage experienced in Ireland is also likely to result in longer stays for asylum seekers in the direct provision system and state-provided accommodation, as found by Murphy and Stapleton (2024).

CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX

Tables A4.1 to A4.3 present the results from logistic regression models predicting the odds of: being in good health; renting a place (privately or from the local authorities); facing high housing costs; and being at risk of poverty (AROP) after rent and mortgage interest respectively.[88] The results of such models are usually provided in terms of log-odds scale or in odds ratios (as is done in Chapters 2 and 3). As the interpretation of estimates can be complicated for this part of the analysis, especially in the multi logistic regression, we present the predicted probabilities here instead. For each outcome, we first present the predicted probabilities without accounting for any factors, which are similar to the results presented in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. We then present the predicted probabilities accounting for age, as well as tenure status for Table A4.3. We note that the number of observations differ between specifications, given the differing number of missing values between observed variables.

Table A4.1 shows that when not considering age, people born in EU-East and outside the EU are more likely to see themselves as being in good or very good health than the Irish-born population. However, when age is taken into account, these differences are no longer significant, suggesting that the main reason behind these disparities in health is the fact that these two groups (EU-East and non-EU) are on average younger than the Irish-born group.

Overall, the results suggest that once we take account of tenure status and age, the predicted probability of facing high housing costs and being AROP after rent and mortgage interest becomes smaller for all migrant groups, and, in some cases, they no long differ significantly from the Irish-born people. For example, before taking into account tenure status and age, about 36% of EU-East households faced high housing costs, which made them significantly more likely to spend more than 30% of their income on housing than Irish-born households. After accounting for tenure status and age, this percentage went down to 15%, which implies that their concentration in the private rental sector is a key factor explaining housing affordability challenges among EU-East migrants.

88 This measure is constructed by the CSO in the SILC database.

TABLE A4.1 LOGISTIC REGRESSION (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES) OF SELF-PERCEIVED HEALTH, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

	(Very) Good health	(Very) Good health – accounting for age
Ireland	0.75	0.76
UK	0.71	0.72
EU-West	0.81	0.78
EU-East	0.86**	0.79
Non-EU	0.84**	0.79
Observations	8,844	8,844

Source: Author's calculations, from pooled SILC data for 2022 and 2023.
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (compared to Irish-born).

TABLE A4.2 MULTI LOGISTIC REGRESSION (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES) OF TENURE, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

	Private rented	Private rented – accounting for age	Local authority rented	Local authority rented – accounting for age
Ireland	0.14	0.15	0.09	0.09
UK	0.30***	0.33***	0.10	0.10
EU-West	0.46***	0.39***	0.01	0.01*
EU-East	0.71***	0.51***	0.04	0.06
Non-EU	0.66***	0.52***	0.06*	0.07
Observations	8,746	8,746	8,746	8,746

Source: Author's calculations, from pooled SILC data for 2022 and 2023.
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (compared to Irish-born).

TABLE A4.3 LOGISTIC REGRESSION (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES) OF HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, 2022 AND 2023 (POOLED)

	High housing costs	High housing costs – accounting for tenure status and age	AROP after rent and mortgage interest	AROP after rent and mortgage interest – accounting for tenure status and age
Ireland	0.10	0.13	0.18	0.20
UK	0.22***	0.18	0.30**	0.25
EU-West	0.27**	0.17	0.25	0.22
EU-East	0.36***	0.15	0.38***	0.27*
Non-EU	0.51***	0.25***	0.45***	0.32***
Observations	8,677	8,677	8,746	8,746

Source: Author's calculations, from pooled SILC data for 2022 and 2023.
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (compared to Irish-born).

CHAPTER 5

Active citizenship

Keire Murphy, Ciára Dalton and Emma Quinn

Active citizenship is a crucial aspect of integration. The three active citizenship indicators from the Zaragoza declaration can give us information not only about subjective factors such as migrants' sense of connection to the host society, but also of their awareness of their rights and of the policy in the area. These are: the naturalisation rate, measured as the ratio of those who acquired citizenship through naturalisation to resident immigrants;[89] the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among elected representatives. This chapter presents these indicators as well as an overview of recent policy changes in the area, and supplements this with newly available data on volunteering. Box 5.1 presents an overview of access to Irish citizenship and Box 5.2 presents access to long-term residence in Ireland.

5.1 NATURALISATION

Figure 5.1 shows a significant increase in applications for naturalisation since 2021, following a somewhat steady rate since 2015. Applications for naturalisation reached their highest level in at least 10 years in 2023, with 22,570 applications, a 31% increase from 2022 and an 88% increase since 2021. Figure 5.1 also shows that there has been a significant increase in certificates issued since 2020, after a decline since 2014. In 2023, 18,269 certificates were issued, a 34% increase from 2022 and an 87% increase from 2021. In that year, 11% of the certificates issued were on the grounds of marriage to an Irish national. A total of 129 refusals were issued in 2023, a 67% decrease from 2022.

At the end of 2023, 30,645 applications for naturalisation were pending decision, a 32% increase from the applications pending at the end of 2022. Processing time has also decreased since 2021. Average processing time decreased from 30 months in 2021 to 22 months in 2022, and decreased further to 15 months in 2023. Median processing time also decreased, from 24 months in 2021 to 15 months in 2023.

89 Naturalisation refers to 'Any mode of acquisition after birth of a nationality not previously held by the target person that requires an application by this person or their legal agent as well as an act of granting nationality by a public authority', according to the European Migration Network's 'EMN asylum and migration glossary' (2024). This means that those who are citizens from birth are not included in these data.

FIGURE 5.1 NATURALISATION CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS, REJECTIONS AND CERTIFICATES ISSUED 2012–2023



Source: Correspondence with the Department of Justice, September 2024.

BOX 5.1 ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP

Irish nationality and citizenship

Citizenship describes the particular legal bond between an individual and the State, acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means, according to national legislation (EMN, 2023). In the Irish constitution, the individual member of the State is referred to as a 'citizen', but the status is referred to as 'nationality and citizenship'.[90] Citizenship by descent may be granted to a person whose parent was, or would have been (if deceased), an Irish citizen at the time of the person's birth, irrespective of their country of birth. The granting of such citizenship is automatic at birth.[91] Persons born in Ireland may be granted citizenship where they are born on the island to at least one parent who has Irish or British citizenship.[92] Persons born to non-Irish citizens may also be entitled to Irish citizenship where at least one of their parents has been legally resident in Ireland for three out of the previous four years prior to the birth (see Groarke and Dunbar, 2020).[93] Irish citizens may hold the citizenship of another country without giving up their Irish citizenship.

Naturalisation

An application for a certificate of nationality is considered under the *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956*, as amended. Foreign nationals living in Ireland may apply to the Minister for Justice to become an Irish citizen by naturalisation if they are over 18 years, or a minor who was born in the State after 1 January 2005. In general, the applicant must 'be of good character' and have had a period of five years of residence: one year's continuous reckonable residence in the State immediately before the date of application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable residence in the State amounting to four years.[94]

In 2023, the residence requirement for the naturalisation of children born in Ireland to non-Irish parents was reduced from five years to three years, with one-year of continuous residence in the State immediately prior to the date of the application for naturalisation (see Section 5.1.3 for further details).

Applicants are usually required to have been 'self-supporting' – i.e. not dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to application. Periods spent in Ireland as an asylum applicant, a student or undocumented are not considered when calculating reckonable residence.[95]

Aside from judicial review, there is no mechanism for challenging the refusal of an application. Currently, Irish citizenship acquired through naturalisation may be revoked no matter how long a person has been an Irish citizen, though a new procedure regarding revocations was introduced in 2024 (see Section 5.1.3).

BOX 5.1 (CONTD.) ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP

Application fees

The standard application fee payable by all applicants is €175. A further €950 is payable by successful adult applicants for naturalisation. The naturalisation fee is €200 in the case of minors and widows or widowers of Irish citizens. Persons granted refugee status and those recognised as stateless persons are exempt from payment of the naturalisation fee.

5.1.1 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens

Figure 5.2 shows the prevalence of European Economic Area (EEA) nationals and non-EEA nationals among naturalised citizens. The number of both EEA and non-EEA citizens being granted naturalisation has increased since 2021. The number of EEA citizens being granted naturalisation increased by 22% in 2023 compared with 2022, and by 44% compared with 2021. This represents a continued increase since the lowest numbers in 2020. The number of non-EEA citizens granted naturalisation increased by 38% compared with 2022 and 101% since 2021, a continued increase since the nadir in 2019.

The proportion of naturalisation certificates issued to EEA nationals has declined somewhat since 2021, but at a slower pace than the decline since 2019 when the trend of an increasing proportion of certificates issued to EEA nationals reversed. In 2023, 19% of naturalisation certificates were issued to EEA nationals. However, this may reflect the recategorisation of United Kingdom (UK) nationals as non-EEA following the UK's withdrawal from the European Union (EU) on 31 January 2020.

90 The EUDO Citizenship Observatory notes that while the two terms are commonly used as synonyms, and generally refer to the same status, they describe different elements of the relationship between the individual and the Irish State. Nationality relates to the external (international) dimension, whereas citizenship relates to the internal (domestic) dimension. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Glossary https://globalcit.eu/glossary/, search term 'nationality'.

91 *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956* (as amended), section 7(1).

92 *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956* (as amended), section 6(6).

93 *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956* (as amended), section 6A.

94 The applicant must intend in good faith to continue to reside in the State after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. See Section 5.1.3 for a recent amendment clarifying the situation of continuous reckonable residency.

95 There is now an obligation on the State to provide reasons for a refusal of an application for naturalisation (although this issue continues to be a source of some debate). In *AP v. Minister for Justice and Equality*, the Court stated the primary objective should be to seek the maximum disclosure possible (*AP v. Minister for Justice and Equality* [2019] IESC 47 [5.12]).

FIGURE 5.2 NATURALISATION CITIZENS BY FORMER NATIONALITY GROUP, 2012–2023



Source: Correspondence with the Department of Justice, September 2024.
Note: UK nationals recategorized as non-EEA in 2020.

Table 5.1 shows the top ten nationalities of naturalised citizens between 2018 and 2023. It shows that applications from the UK fell in 2023 (6% of certificates), after being the number one recipient of naturalisation certificates since 2020. The most common country of origin in 2023 was India (14%) – this was the first time India was a top country of origin since 2015.[96]

96 Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice, September 2024.

TABLE 5.1 NATURALISATION BY FORMER NATIONALITY 2018–2023 (TOP 10)

2018		2019		2020		2021		2022		2023	
Poland	1,463	Poland	926	UK	941	UK	1,186	UK	1,256	India	2,502
Romania	819	UK	664	Poland	757	Poland	819	India	1,177	Nigeria	1,173
UK	684	Romania	552	Romania	538	India	746	Pakistan	1,068	Pakistan	1,068
India	628	India	513	India	465	Nigeria	743	Romania	894	Romania	1,006
Nigeria	478	Nigeria	304	Nigeria	227	Romania	720	Poland	874	UK	1,005
Pakistan	364	Latvia	221	Brazil	179	Pakistan	612	Nigeria	783	Poland	990
The Philippines	319	The Philippines	191	The Philippines	157	Brazil	333	Syria	635	China	857
Latvia	308	Brazil	187	Latvia	146	China	292	Brazil	524	Brazil	843
China	234	China	159	Pakistan	136	Latvia	237	China	389	Syria	730
Brazil	218	USA	154	US	132	The Philippines	216	The Philippines	333	The Philippines	699
Other	2,695	Other	1,910	Other	1,788	Other	3,867	Other	5,657	Other	7,396

Source: Data received from Research and Data Analytics Unit, Department of Justice, September 2024.
Note: China includes Hong Kong.

Other top nationalities remained similar to previous years, including Nigeria (6%), Pakistan (6%) and Romania (6%), followed by the UK. Poland, which was also frequently the top country of origin in the last ten years also dropped to the sixth most common in 2023. Other countries of origin were similar to previous years with the exception of Syria, which entered the top ten for the first time in 2022 and remained in the top ten in 2023.

5.1.2 Citizenship indicators

The naturalisation rate is measured as the ratio of those who acquired citizenship to the number of resident immigrants in a given year. It captures information on the opportunities to naturalise (policies) as well as on a range of other contextual factors such as immigrants' motivation to naturalise, duration of residence and settlement in the country (Huddleston et al., 2013). This section presents separate annual naturalisation rates for non-EEA and for EU nationals. In order to produce the most up-to-date and precise indicator possible, we use administrative data on residence permissions to calculate a rate for non-EEA nationals. A similar rate is provided for EU nationals; however, because residence permission data are not available for this group, we report an indicator compiled by Eurostat.[97] These data are less up-to-date but allow us to consider naturalisation of EU nationals.

Citizenship indicator for non-EEA nationals

Figure 5.3 shows the annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals (excluding the UK). The indicator refers only to those aged 16 and over, as non-EEA nationals under 16 are not required to register with immigration services in Ireland. It shows a continuous decline in the share of non-EEA citizens naturalising between 2013 and 2019, at which point the trend reversed somewhat. It shows that the rate has plateaued at around 4% since 2021. The trend since 2021 in particular shows increased naturalisations, but also an increased total number of residence permissions, leading to a similar proportion. The number of residence permissions held by non-EEA citizens increased by 71% between 2021 and 2023.

97 The different sources used are the reason why one indicator is based on non-EEA nationals and one is based on EU nationals.

FIGURE 5.3 CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER, 2012–2023



Source: Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice, September 2024.

A total of 140,467 non-EEA (excluding UK) nationals aged 16 and over naturalised between 2005 and 2023.[98] This indicates that a substantial proportion of the population of non-EEA origin has now acquired Irish citizenship, albeit a lower proportion than in previous years due to recent increases in the non-EEA population. As in previous monitoring reports on integration, we estimate the proportion of the population of non-EEA origin that has naturalised. We report the proportion of the resident adult population of non-EEA origin (defined as the currently registered non-EEA adult population, plus those previously naturalised and resident in Ireland) who have acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation. To estimate the population of naturalised citizens who are currently resident, we assume a 10% outflow (i.e. emigration and deaths) among naturalised Irish citizens.

In 2023, we estimate that, using our standard methodology (i.e. excluding UK nationals, beneficiaries of temporary protection (BoTPs) and international protection applicants who are not included in residence permission data), 29.7% of the currently resident population of non-EEA origin has naturalised since 2005.[99] Including BoTPs into the total number of residents,[100] the proportion naturalised drops to 26.1%. This compares to an estimated 13% at the end of December 2009 in the 2010 monitoring report on integration (McGinnity et al., 2011), 37% in 2019 (McGinnity et al., 2020) and 38.2% in 2021 (McGinnity et al., 2023).

98 Correspondence with the Department of Justice, September 2024.
99 Based on data received from the Department of Justice, September 2024.
100 This is calculated using CSO estimates of BoTPs aged 18 and over who are still residing in the country, based on administrative activity. We use the figure of 57,672, as per the CSO's 'Arrivals in Ukraine Series 12', February 2024.

Citizenship indicator for EU nationals

Table 5.2 shows the Eurostat estimate for the proportion of EU citizens who acquired citizenship between 2013 and 2022 (the latest indicator available). As shown in the table, the rate increased steadily between 2013 and 2018 before dropping between 2019 and 2021. The year 2022 showed an increase once again, to the highest level since 2018, at 0.79%. The lower Irish citizenship acquisition rate for other EU nationals in Ireland is consistent with the pattern in other EU countries.[101]

TABLE 5.2 CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR EU NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER, 2013–2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
EU residents who acquired citizenship as a share of EU residents (%)	0.45	0.72	0.76	0.80	0.87	0.90	0.63	0.52	0.68	0.79

Source: Eurostat (migr_acqs), extracted October, 2024.

5.1.3 Policy issues related to naturalisation

The *Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023* made several amendments to naturalisation law.[102] One amendment reduced residence requirements for the naturalisation of children born in Ireland to non-Irish parents from five years to three years.

Another amendment related to the process for naturalising minors. Prior to the amendment, applications for minors included an assessment of the residency permissions and good character of the parents. This changed to an assessment only of the residency and good character of the minor applicant themselves. In reality, according to the Department of Justice, good character is assessed from the age of 10 upwards. For those aged 10 to 13, only serious crimes are taken into consideration. For applicants aged 14 onwards, the regular adult applicant character assessment is employed (Potter et al., 2025).

Another amendment clarified the calculation of continuous residency, following some confusion around the question of how long somebody could be outside the State in the year prior to their application for naturalisation – when 'continuous

101 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_active_citizenship.

102 The nationality-related provisions of the Act made amendments to the *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956.* See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_active_citizenship.

residency' was required (Law Society of Ireland, 2021). The amendment states that an applicant may be outside of the State for 70 days in total, and an additional 30 days in exceptional circumstances.[103]

The Act also clarified the law in relation to citizenship ceremonies. The new amendment allows the Minister to dispense with the requirement that citizenship ceremonies be attended in person for a person to make the declaration of fidelity to the State, and to undertake to follow the laws of the State and respect its democratic values (Potter et al., 2025).

Online citizenship applications were also introduced in 2023, to improve the efficiency of citizenship applications.[104] The same Regulation introducing the online applications also removed the requirement for statutory declarations by the applicant on submission of an application and the need for referee signatures for forms (Department of Justice, 2023).

In July 2024, changes were also made to the process for revoking the citizenship of naturalised citizens,[105] following a 2021 Supreme Court judgment that found the previous revocation process to be unconstitutional.[106] Under the new procedure, where the Minister decides to revoke citizenship, the individual will have access to a committee of inquiry, which will operate independently of the Minister, with the power to affirm or reject the decision of the Minister.

5.2 LONG-TERM RESIDENCE

Long-term residence is a permanent residence status for migrants who have been resident in the host country for a period of time (often five years), which offers the same basic socio-economic rights as citizens of the host country. Such a status is provided for in the majority of EU Member States, under Directives 2003/109/EC and 2011/51/EU.[107] Ireland has not opted in to either Directive, although the Department of Justice is reviewing a potential opt-in to the recast Directive under discussion at EU level. Currently resident non-EEA nationals therefore have much more limited access to permanent residence than elsewhere in the EU. In Ireland, an administrative long-term residence is open to employment permit holders (and

103 Section 8 of the *Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023* inserts a new section 15C into the *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956*.
104 *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Regulations 2023*.
105 Court, Civil Law, *Criminal Law and Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2024*.
106 *Damache v. Minister for Justice* [2021] IESC 6. This was because under the previous process, while an individual had the right to request a committee of inquiry to examine a Minister's decision to invoke citizenship, the Minister was not obligated to accept the committee's findings.
107 Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011 amends Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection. In 2022 a proposal for a recast was introduced.

their dependent spouses) and scientific researchers only. While a statutory long-term residence status has been planned by Irish policymakers since 2008,[108] this has still not been put on a statutory footing.

BOX 5.2 ACCESS TO LONG-TERM RESIDENCE

Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence status. The current administrative scheme allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for a continuous period of five years or more, on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses) or scientific researchers, to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residency scheme is available to those who are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five years' work, have been made redundant.

A small number of non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who are of 'good character' are permitted to remain in Ireland 'without condition as to time'. They receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit (Becker, 2010).

Following a period of particularly low applications (less than 200) for long-term residence between 2014 and 2020, there has been an increasing trend since 2021, with the figure reaching 470 in 2023 (see Table 5.5). However, numbers remain low and this has not led to an increase proportional to the share of non-EEA nationals with residence permissions. Long-term residence permit holders accounted for just 0.6% of the total number of non-EEA nationals holding residence permits in 2023.

As discussed in previous years, this low rate is likely related to both the Irish long-term residence scheme and naturalisation. Ireland's long-term residence scheme has been criticised as having 'some of the most restrictive and discretionary policies in the EU' (MIPEX; see Solano and Huddleston, 2020) and Ireland ranked 39th out of 56 countries reviewed by MIPEX (a migrant integration policy index that measures various dimensions of integration policies in 56 countries). However, Ireland ranks ninth in MIPEX for naturalisation policies. Naturalisation may therefore be preferable for many, in particular as both require five years of residence.

108 *Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008*.

TABLE 5.3 APPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM RESIDENCE (LTR), SELECTED YEARS, 2017–2023

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
New applications for LTR	108	144	160	191	318	415	470
Non-EEA nationals holding LTR	1,484	1,272	1,125*	1,051	1,219	1,450	1,606
Number of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' permissions (aged 16 and over)	128,066	142,286	168,297	155,317	169,687	234,057	289,432
Share of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' permissions (aged 16 and over) who hold LTR	1.2%	0.9%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%

Source: Data Analytics Unit, Department of Justice. September 2024.

5.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In the period 2022–2024, voters participated in local and European elections in June 2024. The local election, where all 'usual' residents can vote and run for office, in particular is of significant importance here, as there was a noteworthy increase in the number of running candidates with a migrant background – over 120 candidates in total (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b).[109] This is more than double the 56 candidates with a migrant background who ran in the 2019 local elections (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024c). For 81% of these candidates, this was their first election contest. Twenty-one candidates with a migrant background were elected – which is double the amount seen in 2019 (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024a). Even with this increase, councillors with a migrant background represent just 2.2% of the total number of local councillors (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b).

Among the running candidates with a migrant background, a higher proportion ran as part of a political party than as independents. In 2019, over half of all migrant candidates ran as independents, while in this election cycle, independent candidates made up only one-third of all migrant candidates (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024c). Interestingly, all successful candidates were party nominees, which was also the case in 2019 (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b).

Women made up just 22% of candidates and 26% of elected councillors in the general cohort. However, migrant women accounted for 49% of candidates with a migrant background, and 55% of elected councillors with a migrant background are women (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b). While beyond the scope of this

109 'Election candidate of a migrant background' includes all those born abroad, including naturalised Irish citizens, as well as second-generation Irish people born to migrant parent(s) (see Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b, p. 5).

report, earlier research has also shown lower voter registration rates among migrants in Ireland (Lima, 2020).

5.3.1 Violence and harassment towards candidates with a migrant background

In this context of an increase in the number of candidates from a migrant background running and getting elected, there has also been an increase in instances of violence and harassment towards these candidates. According to the Immigrant Council of Ireland, who surveyed 32% of candidates with a migrant background, 10% of election candidates with a migrant background did not canvass during their campaign out of fear of anti-migrant violence (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b). A further 18% said they limited canvassing due to racism and harassment they received at the doors of their constituencies (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b). Almost three-quarters (74%) of candidates reported that they had been victims of racism and harassment during their election campaign, while 81% reported experiencing some form of abuse on social media (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2024b). This is not unique to Ireland. A report evaluating violence against immigrant-background politicians in Sweden found higher levels of abuse towards migrant candidates compared to non-migrant candidates (Håkansson and Lajevardi, 2024). It should also be highlighted that harassment towards politicians is not unique to those from a migrant background. A report from University College Dublin (UCD) found that 94% of politicians in Ireland and 72% of political staff encountered some form of threat, harassment or violence (Siapera et al., 2024). Immigration was the biggest issue linked to receiving abuse, with 67% of TDs and senators and 46% of political staff highlighting immigration as a specific issue related to the abuse.

5.4 VOLUNTEERING

Citizenship and long-term residence are just two elements of active citizenship. To get a fuller picture of integration in this domain, these should be ideally supplemented with indicators on other forms of civic participation such as membership in organisations, political engagement, protesting or volunteering (Huddleston et al, 2013). Previous monitoring reports have not considered volunteering in detail due to a lack of data. Census 2022 contained a question on volunteering for the first time since 2006, and in 2024 a Central Statistics Office (CSO) special release provided important new insights on volunteering among non-Irish nationals.

Census 2022 showed that, compared to Irish nationals, non-Irish nationals are less likely to volunteer: 15% of Irish nationals volunteered in at least one activity,

compared to 11% of the non-Irish population.[110] Table 5.5 shows that this difference is strongly driven by sports-related volunteering among Irish nationals. Table 5.6 shows the ten citizenship groups with the highest levels of participation in at least one voluntary activity. Rates of participation were highest among African nationals (21%), with half of African nationals who volunteered doing so with a religious or church group (Table 5.7). United States (US) citizens also showed high participation in volunteering, with 20% doing so in 2022, mainly for social or charitable organisations and within their community. The lowest levels of volunteering were seen among nationals of eastern European countries, with 7% of Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian citizens involved in at least one voluntary activity.[111]

TABLE 5.4 VOLUNTEERING BY CITIZENSHIP GROUP

Citizenship	All persons	Total persons involved in volunteering	% of group involved in volunteering
Ireland	4,283,490	629,199	15%
Non-Irish	576,204	64,782	11%
Of which:			
Africa	34,761	7,442	21%
US	13,412	2,663	20%
Germany	12,390	1,959	16%
UK	83,347	12,383	15%
Australia	3,481	486	14%
India	45,449	5,874	13%
France	13,893	1,781	13%
Other America	12,988	1,558	12%
Other Asia	41,820	4,570	11%
Brazil	27,338	2,771	10%

Source: Data from Census 2022. CSO (2024).
Note: Persons involved in at least one voluntary activity.

Table 5.7 shows that while sports volunteering dominates volunteering among Irish nationals (43%), this is not the case among non-Irish nationals, for whom the largest type of volunteering is that provided to social or charitable organisations

110 The question was, 'Do you regularly engage in helping of voluntary work in any of the following activities without pay?' Response categories were: a social or charitable organisation; a religious group or church; a sporting organisation; a political organisation; in your community. See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p.cpsv/censusofpopulation2022spotlightseriesvolunteeringinireland/backgroundnotes/. The question was 'Do you regularly engage in helping of voluntary work in any of the following activities without pay?' Response categories: a social or charitable organisation; a religious group or church; a sporting organisation; a political organisation; in your community. See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/pcpsv/censusofpopulation2022spotlightseriesvolunteeringinireland/backgroundnotes/.

111 See https://data.cso.ie/table/F9025.

(36%), closely followed by community volunteering (34%). This is consistent with much earlier estimates of volunteering for sport in Ireland from the Irish Sports Monitor for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 (combined), which found much higher rates of volunteering for sport among Irish and UK nationals than among other nationalities (McGinnity et al., 2012, Figure 4.3).

TABLE 5.5 TYPE OF VOLUNTEERING BY CITIZENSHIP GROUP, %

Citizenship	Social/ charity	Religion	Sport	Political	Community
Ireland	27%	17%	43%	2%	32%
Non-Irish	36%	28%	17%	2%	34%
Of which:					
Europe	39%	18%	18%	2%	38%
Africa	32%	50%	12%	1%	26%
Asia*	34%	33%	10%	1%	39%
Americas**	36%	36%	14%	2%	30%

Source: CSO (2024).
Note: Persons involved in at least one voluntary activity. Multiple types of volunteering are possible. *India, China and other Asia. **USA, Brazil, 'other America'.

Roantree et al. (2024) considered the relationship between income poverty and deprivation and civic participation, using the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC).[112] They too find lower civic participation among people born outside Ireland/the UK, compared to those born in Ireland. In general, the authors find that material deprivation depresses rates of civic participation. However, in comparison to deprived Irish individuals, those born outside the EU who are also experiencing deprivation report a higher level of civic participation. The authors observe that this may reflect greater involvement in religious-based volunteering, but this could not be tested.

In the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021–2027), Member States are encouraged to promote exchanges with the host societies through volunteering. Ireland's strategy to support the community and voluntary sector refers to the importance of the sector for supporting migrants, but does not discuss engaging migrants as volunteers (Department of Rural and Community Development, 2019).

5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Both applications for naturalisation and grants of naturalisation have increased significantly since 2021, with 2023 seeing the highest level of applications since at

112 The measure of civic participation combines survey responses on three indicators that capture informal volunteering, formal volunteering and participating in political activities.

least 2012 and the highest level of certificates issues since 2014. Applications have increased by 88% since 2021, and certificates issued increased by 87% since 2021. Processing times have decreased, but increases in applications mean that there were over 30,000 applications pending at the end of 2023, a 32% increase on the end of 2022. While naturalisation has therefore increased among both EEA and non-EEA citizens, it has increased at a higher rate for non-EEA citizens. This follows continued policy reforms to improve the efficiency of the citizenship application process, including the introduction of online citizenship applications in 2023.

On the other hand, due to recent significant increases in residents of non-EEA origin in Ireland, the proportion of naturalised citizens as a proportion of all residents of non-EEA origin has dropped, after increasing consistently over the last ten years. The data continue to show very low rates of long-term residence permissions, likely due to restrictive long-term residence policies, which may make naturalisation preferable to many.

The 2023 elections saw a significant increase in migrant participation, with almost double the number of candidates from a migrant background running compared with the 2019 local elections, and also double the number elected. However, councillors with a migrant background still represent just 2.2% of the total number of local councillors. While this represents progress in terms of political participation among migrants, concerns have arisen in relation to incidents of harassment and violence towards migrant candidates.

Newly available data on volunteering from Census 2022 show that non-Irish nationals are less likely to volunteer than Irish nationals, although this varies significantly by citizenship group. For example, the data revealed that African nationals are more likely to volunteer than Irish nationals, while nationals of eastern European countries are significantly less likely to volunteer.

CHAPTER 6

Challenges for policy and data collection

Frances McGinnity

This report presents an overview of the integration outcomes of migrants living in Ireland, using the best and most recently available data. By comparing the foreign-born and Irish-born populations on a range of Zaragoza integration indicators, the report aims to contribute to our understanding of how migrant groups in Ireland are faring across a range of life domains.

Integration has important implications for the well-being of migrants and their descendants, as well as for the host society. Monitoring reports on integration help to identify areas where migrants may need additional support, and can assist in keeping integration on the policy agenda, which is particularly relevant considering the mainstreaming approach to integration policies in Ireland. Both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU) continue to emphasise the importance of monitoring integration (Huddleston et al., 2013; OECD, 2023).

This chapter summarises the findings of this monitoring report, considers some implications for future data needs and highlights policy issues that have persisted or emerged.

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The context has changed considerably since the previous monitoring report on integration (McGinnity et al., 2023), which analysed data from 2022. A booming labour market has led to labour shortages and some reform of the employment permit system, and a considerable rise in employment permits granted (see Box 2.1). At the same time, increased energy prices and high inflation have led to a fall in real incomes for the second year running alongside an increase in deprivation in Ireland (Roantree et al., 2024). There is a continued acute shortage of social housing and affordable rented accommodation (Disch et al., 2024).

As discussed in Chapter 1, the migration context has also changed. While it continues to be the case that the majority of people migrating to Ireland do so for education and employment reasons, as well as family reasons and returning Irish migration, recent flows of protection-related migration represent a shift in Ireland. International protection applications have increased from historically low levels by European standards over the last 20 years to closer to or higher than the European average per capita. At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine displaced

large numbers to Europe, leading to the largest flow of forced migrants to Ireland, with almost 110,000 people having arrived to date.

Chapter 2 shows a broadly positive picture of migrants' labour market integration. Employments rates were high overall in Ireland in early 2024, with the overall migrant employment rate even higher than that for the Irish-born population, a pattern that has persisted since the initial post-COVID-19 period (2022). However there was a rise in the unemployment rate for migrants in 2024, especially for young migrants, even as unemployment fell for Irish-born people. Taking a longer-term view, employment rates of migrants in Ireland seem particularly sensitive to the economic cycle, with higher employment than Irish-born people when the economy is booming, and higher unemployment during recession periods. In 2024, even groups that previously had low employment and high unemployment rates, such as African migrants, did not differ from the Irish-born group in terms of employment and unemployment. The country-of-origin group that now appears most disadvantaged in the labour market statistics is 'Other Europe'. This may be partly explained by arrivals from Ukraine living in the community but not employed; Central Statistics Office (CSO) data show employment rates are lower for this group.[113] Many forced migrants are not included in labour market data, and estimates using administrative data in Chapter 2 show much lower employment rates among this group.

Chapter 3 considers the skills and achievements of both adult migrants and children in school. While Ireland has internationally high rates of educational attainment, particularly among younger adults, migrants overall have an even higher proportion of people with a tertiary education than the Irish-born group. At age 15, data from the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) study in 2022 show that migrant-origin children have lower scores in English reading than their Irish peers, though the gap is much smaller for second-generation migrants (those born in Ireland to migrant parents). Mathematics scores are also lower for migrant children than Irish-origin children, but overall the gap is much smaller than for English reading.

Chapter 4 considers social inclusion indicators for 2022–2023. Rates of material deprivation have risen in Ireland for the population as a whole in the past two years (Roantree et al., 2024), and Chapter 4 shows how both EU-East migrants and non-EU migrants now have high rates of material deprivation and consistent poverty,

113 As discussed in Section 1.4, an estimated 58,000 arrivals from Ukraine were living in serviced accommodation in Q1 2024. The total estimated arrivals still living in the State in February 2024 was circa 82,000, suggesting around 24,000 arrivals from Ukraine were living in the community. See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/fp/p-aui/arrivalsfromukraineinirelandseries12/#:~:text=Tables%20and%20Maps,earlier%20(07%20January%202024).&text=*%20Note%20that%20PPSN%20allocations%20are%20to%20the%204th%20February%202024.

in spite of high rates of employment. These estimates do not include migrants living in communal accommodation, who, if they are not employed, are likely to be income poor given the low payment rates they receive. In addition, all migrant groups are over-represented in private rented accommodation – in particular EU migrants. Both EU and non-EU migrants are significantly less likely to live in social housing than Irish-born people.

Chapter 5 shows how the number of people naturalising has increased, particularly for non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals. This follows continued policy reforms to improve the efficiency of the citizenship application process, including the introduction of online citizenship applications in 2023. However, due to an increase in the total number of non-EEA residents, the number of naturalised citizens as a proportion of the total population of non-EEA origin has decreased. The 2024 local elections saw a significant increase in migrant participation, though councillors from a migrant background represent just 2.2% of councillors overall, and concerns have been raised in relation to harassment of migrant candidates. In terms of civic engagement, new data on volunteering show non-Irish nationals overall are less likely to volunteer than Irish nationals, though the difference is entirely driven by volunteering for sport. Rates of social and religious volunteering are higher among non-Irish nationals, with considerable variation by national group.

6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In terms of employment rates, most migrants in Ireland are faring well. Migrant employment recovered quickly after the COVID-19 pandemic, and Chapter 2 shows how in 2023 and 2024 high employment rates were maintained among all migrant groups. Yet Chapter 2 presents headline indicators only, with no assessment of job quality such as wages and working conditions. We know from other research that some groups, particularly eastern European nationals, earn significantly lower wages and face poorer working conditions (Laurence et al., 2023). From Chapter 3, however, we see that migrants have higher educational attainment on average. One potential explanation for migrants having higher educational attainment but lower wages on average is that qualifications earned abroad are not recognised by employers as equal to equivalent qualifications earned in Ireland. Thus, greater efforts may be needed to improve recognition of foreign qualifications among employers, alongside raising awareness of the National Academic Recognitions Information Centre (NARIC) system and adapting the NARIC system to be more responsive to employer needs.[114]

114 See Box 2.1 for discussion, and https://www.qqi.ie/what-we-do/the-qualifications-system/national-academic-recognition-information-centre.

Chapter 2 also shows how labour market integration can be difficult for those who have come to Ireland seeking protection.[115] In mid-2018, international protection applicants were granted access to the labour market after six months (if they have not yet received a decision) and 2023 work permission figures show considerable uptake. Yet Chapter 2 estimates employment rates to be much lower for both protection applicants and arrivals from Ukraine than for most migrants. Recent governance responses to support integration, including Local Authority Integration Teams (LAITs) and Community Integration Forums, may provide further support for these groups. In recognition of the fact that targeted supports may be required for those who came to Ireland seeking protection, four-person LAITs continue to be rolled out across each of Ireland's local authorities. These provide support in accessing integration services to international protection applicants, resettled refugees and beneficiaries of temporary protection (BoTPs) (Murphy and Stapleton, 2024). International examples of community-based/driven programmes for migrant integration, such as local mentorship schemes or intercultural centres that promote interaction between migrants and local host communities, might be helpful in this regard (Schmidtke, 2018).

Chapter 2 shows how, after over a decade of labour market disadvantage (O'Connell, 2019; Cronin et al., 2018), the rise in employment rates among migrants of African origin identified in 2022 (McGinnity et al., 2023b) has persisted in 2023 and 2024. This may in part be due to a change in rules for international protection applicants' employment, discussed above, as a significant proportion of some African groups are likely to have come through the protection system (Privalko et al., 2023). The strong demand for workers in Ireland currently, along with financial pressure on families due to increased cost of living, are also likely to be factors in high employment rates.

In the context of inflation and cost-of-living challenges in Ireland, poverty and deprivation have risen for some migrant groups, particularly after housing costs (Chapter 4). Despite relatively high employment rates, migrant groups with low incomes and experiencing deprivation may be most vulnerable to the cost-of-living crisis in Ireland. This underlines the importance of targeted supports for those on very low incomes to help face the cost-of-living crisis, though Doorley et al. (2023) showed that uprating core social welfare payments in line with inflation would have provided better protection against poverty compared to the impact of the 'once-off' measures. Any uprating of core social welfare payments would also need to apply to payments paid to international protection applicants and arrivals from

115 This research does not investigate whether this is due to length of time spent within the international protection system and thus excluded from the labour market, the trauma and disruption experienced prior to and during migration, or the stigma attached to being an asylum seeker or from an ethnic minority.

Ukraine living in serviced accommodation, given the low rate of benefits they receive (see Boxes 1.3 and 1.4).

Housing and homelessness were not identified as issues in the now expired Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2020, yet findings from Chapter 4 suggest that, compared to the Irish-born group, migrants are more likely to be in private rented accommodation and to experience affordability problems associated with housing. EU-East migrants in particular are very exposed to the private rental sector and associated high housing costs: their risk of poverty is not particularly high before housing costs but becomes very high after housing costs are added. McGinnity et al. (2022) found that renting is not only an issue for recently arrived migrants, and also that migrants were more likely to be in overcrowded accommodation and living in homeless shelters. These challenges reflect mainstream housing challenges in Ireland, such as severe shortages of both social housing and affordable rental housing (Disch and Slaymaker, 2023; Disch et al., 2024). Yet migrants may face additional challenges and barriers – lack of knowledge of how the housing system operates, accessing finance for house purchase, language barriers, housing discrimination. Migrants are also less likely to have wider family networks to support them such as by providing short-term assistance with housing challenges (Murphy and Stapleton, 2024). Migrants may also face administrative barriers to accessing housing and homelessness supports, and a lack of clarity among service providers about the rights and entitlements of migrants has also been reported (Murphy and Stapleton, 2024).

Finding suitable and affordable accommodation is particularly challenging for those moving out of direct provision centres who have been granted international protection status. As of end May 2024, almost 6,000 people with international protection status were still living in International Protection Accommodation Services (IPAS) accommodation, representing 26% of the total (31,000).[116] Murphy and Stapleton (2024) found that this group experience major additional challenges in accessing housing in Ireland. Added to this is the fact that the numbers needing assistance has grown recently, without a commensurate increase in resources and support staffing. Murphy and Stapleton (2024) identify the need for a multi-agency approach, with a potential role for the new LAITs, and training for frontline staff in local authorities.

Chapter 3 shows how migrant children are faring reasonably well in terms of achievement at age 15, though first-generation migrants have lower scores in English reading. Research evidence suggests that maintaining English language

116 See https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2024-06-11/647/#:~:text=There%20are%20currently%20over%2031%2C000,the%20end%20of%20February%202022. The total figure is based on https://assets.gov.ie/296602/aef95641-7d5d-4b26-bbc6-e0519c58eb57.pdf.

support for migrant students is very important (Darmody et al., 2022; Sprong et al., 2023). In order to plan effectively, policymakers need to know: the proportion of students at primary and secondary level who require English language tuition; the budget requirement; and the effectiveness of this tuition. This is particularly important in a context where many new young arrivals have very little knowledge of English.

The Migrant Integration Strategy 2017–2021 aimed to ensure all migrants can actively participate in Irish communities, workplaces and politics. A review of this strategy criticised the lack of a rigorous implementation process (Kavanagh et al., 2023). It suggested reducing the number of actions, and a greater focus on key priority objectives and an implementation plan. In addition, the development of clear outcome indicators would facilitate the assessment of progress. Monitoring, indicators and evidence therefore must be a core part of any successor strategy. Coordinating with other relevant plans, such as the National Action Plan Against Racism (NAPAR), the National Strategy for Women and Girls, and the White Paper on Ending Direct Provision, will also be important to avoid duplication and learn from successes in other policy areas.

This report and related research suggest progress in some areas, for example in the employment rates of African-born people in Ireland. However, they also highlight areas where issues remain, such as English language provisions for adults, or areas where difficulties have arisen since the strategy was developed, such as access to housing for migrants, harassment of migrant election candidates and a rise in the salience of immigration. This underscores the importance of a timely follow-up strategy, which can effectively meet the changing needs of the migrant population in Ireland.

6.3 ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION

The findings of any integration monitoring exercise will only be as good as the data and evidence on which they are based. The monitoring report on integration series largely draws on repeated national social surveys, which provide a meaningful and cost-effective way of comparing a representative sample of migrants with the host population on an ongoing basis. This enables the assessment of a 'migrant gap' – how, for example, migrants' housing tenure compares with that of the Irish-born population. However, these surveys were not designed to survey migrants, so it is important to consider how well the migrant population is represented.

Some important indicators of integration are migrant-specific, such as sense of belonging, integration into social networks, contacts with origin country, intentions to stay and identity. This type of migrant-specific information is best captured in dedicated surveys, yet Ireland still lacks a large representative survey

of the migrant and refugee populations, as is common in many other European countries (e.g. the IAB–BAMF–SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany). As integration is a process rather than a state, following migrants over time is a particularly powerful way to assess integration, so ideally any migrant survey would have a longitudinal element. Meanwhile, the *Growing Up in Ireland* cohort study offers considerable potential in analysing the development of migrant children and young people (Darmody et al., 2022). Special modules to existing surveys could also be used to field migrant-specific questions on an ongoing basis. Assessment of the role of English language skills in labour market outcomes could be used to inform both our understanding of the migrant wage gap in Ireland, as well as a strategy for the development of English language provision for adult learners.

Efforts need to be continued to encourage the participation of foreign-born residents in these surveys. This is particularly important for harder-to-reach groups, such as migrants with limited English-language skills and those who move house frequently. The addition of migrant or ethnic-minority boost samples, which is common practice in some other European countries, would allow for finer-grained distinctions of migrant groups; this is important given that more general categories likely hide considerable diversity.[117]

Household surveys such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) have never surveyed those living in communal accommodation. This issue has been acknowledged since integration monitoring began (McGinnity et al., 2011), though until 2022, the number of residents in communal accommodation was small relative to the whole migrant population. The large number of those now living in communal accommodation (an estimated 86,000 in Q1 2024, see Section 1.4) means this is even more of an omission in this monitoring report. At present, it seems the best strategy to address this would involve supplementing indicators from the surveys with an analysis of administrative data provided by the CSO and the Department of Social Protection to report on the arrivals from Ukraine in Ireland and also to report on international protection applicants, if that data were available. However, this approach is unsatisfactory. Surveying migrants in communal accommodation would present challenges, and might need to be limited to headline indicators of employment and material deprivation, for example. Notwithstanding considerable challenges in the housing market in Ireland, in the medium term, the expectation would be that

117 For examples of boost samples in large longitudinal surveys, see https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/topic-page/ethnicity-and-immigration/ in the UK and https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.440347.en/projects/iab-soep_migration_sample.html in Germany.

these migrants will move to autonomous housing and thus fall under the scope of household surveys.

In the context of the sudden, unprecedented arrival of a large number of Ukrainians, which has continued since 2022, albeit at a slower pace more recently, alongside historically high numbers of international protection applicants coming to Ireland, there is an urgent need for data following people in Ireland who seek protection from political persecution and violent conflicts. Integration outcomes could be quite different for this group due to their different profiles, reasons for migrating, or policy in relation to this group. It is therefore important to understand how this group, in particular, are faring, and where additional supports may be needed.

It should also be noted that integration outcomes may differ spatially across Ireland. Where migrants live and how they integrate into local communities depends on the specific characteristics of the area concerned and the supports available, in addition to the migrant's own characteristics. Migrants are a highly diverse group, with different skills, reasons for coming to Ireland and linguistic and cultural backgrounds. These characteristics can interact with the characteristics of the communities in which migrants settle in ways that affect integration outcomes. The importance of local-level governance in integration has been acknowledged through the development of the LAITs, Community Integration Forums, and local-level integration plans in several counties across Ireland. However, the data in this report do not capture potential spatial differences in outcomes, which may be of interest for future research.

A recurring theme of monitoring reports is that ethnicity is rarely measured in Ireland, either in surveys or administrative data. Documenting the extent of discrimination and disadvantage over time should form an integral part of any anti-racism strategy, so as to both motivate the implementation of new measures to combat racism and monitor their effectiveness (McGinnity et al., 2021). For this, more and better data on the ethnic background of Irish residents are needed, reflecting the renewed focus on racism and discrimination in public and policy debates, illustrated by the publication of the NAPAR (see Box 1.1). The Equality Data Strategy, when published, has considerable potential to increase momentum in this regard. Collecting evidence is also important for establishing the extent to which unequal outcomes experienced by migrants and ethnic minority groups are a result of discrimination (McGinnity et al., 2021). Updated information from field experiments on discrimination, in housing among migrants and ethnic minorities (following Gusciute et al., 2022) or in the labour market (McGinnity and Lunn, 2011), could add considerably to our knowledge of discrimination in the current context and help inform measures to address it.

Migrant integration is a two-way process. For social integration, the response of the population in Ireland is also an important consideration. Laurence et al. (2023) showed that attitudes to immigration are still relatively positive in Ireland, in both historical and international comparison. Yet they report that attitudes became somewhat more negative in the most recent period and, in particular, that the salience of immigration has increased, with media reports and political discussion in Ireland now featuring immigration much more than in the past. Much of the media reporting has been centred around challenges communities face in integrating migrants. Considering local-level drivers of integration, Laurence et al. (2024b) find that disadvantaged communities that have seen a recent rise in the number of immigrants show more negative attitudes towards immigration, even after accounting for their own personal or household circumstances (such as household financial strain). It is not the case that migrants are more likely to live in disadvantaged communities, but where they do, this influences community attitudes. This indicates that broader economic and social conditions matter for migrant integration, and policies in these areas should also consider potential impacts on integration and social cohesion. However, research also shows that positive contact with migrants can help non-migrants overcome negative stereotypes (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Laurence et al., 2023; 2024b), highlighting the importance of adequate funding for integration initiatives in communities.

In the medium term, a broader consideration of the impact of migrants and migration on the economy in Ireland could also usefully inform current debates on migration and its impact. This could include: updating earlier research in Ireland investigating the impact of migrants and migration on wages and wage inequality (Barrett et al., 2011); migrants' receipt of social transfers (Barrett et al., 2013); and, more broadly, the fiscal impact of migration. These questions have been analysed extensively in other contexts, but not recently in Ireland. (See Dustmann and Preston, 2024, for an analysis of this in the UK, or Hennessey and Hagen-Zanker, 2020, for a comparative analysis.)

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APPENDIX 1

Definition of indicators

TABLE A1 INDICATORS AND DEFINITIONS

Indicator	Definition	Data source
1. Employment		
Employment rate	Proportion of population of working age (15–64) who are employed	LFS
Unemployment rate	Proportion of labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15–64) who are unemployed	LFS
Activity rate	Proportion of adults of working age (15–64) who are in the labour force (employed and unemployed)	LFS
Self-employment rate	Proportion of employed population who are self-employed (that is working in their own business or farm for the purpose of making a profit)	LFS
2. Education		
Highest educational attainment	Share of population aged 15–64 with third-level, PLC, upper secondary or no formal/lower secondary education	LFS
Share of 25–34 year olds with third-level educational attainment*	Share of 25–34 year olds with third-level education	LFS
Share of early leavers from education and training*	Share of population aged 20–24 with no more than lower secondary education and not currently in education	LFS
Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in reading and mathematics	Mean achievement scores in English reading and mathematics at age 15 by English language ability and generational status	PISA (OECD)
3. Social inclusion		
Median net income	Median net (household and equivalised) income of the immigrant population and the Irish population	SILC
AROP rate	Share of population with net disposable income of less than 60% of national median	SILC
Deprivation rate	Proportion of population living in households that lack two or more basic items such as food, clothing or heat	SILC
Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good	Share of population aged 16+ perceiving their health status as good or very good	SILC
Ratio of property owners to non property owners among immigrants and the total population	Percentage of property owners, private renters and local authority renters among immigrant and Irish household respondents	Survey of Income and Living Conditions

TABLE A1 (CONTD.) INDICATORS AND DEFINITIONS

4. Active citizenship		
Share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship (best estimate)	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population who have acquired citizenship (best estimate)	Department of Justice
Share of immigrants holding permanent or LTR permits	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population granted LTR (best estimate)	Department of Justice
Share of immigrants among elected representatives	Share of immigrants among elected national representatives	Immigrant Council of Ireland

Notes Employment and unemployment are defined in this table and elsewhere in this report using the standard International Labour Organization (ILO) definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey interview for one hour or more, or who were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview but were available to start work in the next two weeks and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the Live Register of unemployment and from the individual's own self-assignment of their principal economic status. * indicates where definitions of the indicators differ slightly from those proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. Share of 25 to 34 year olds with third-level educational attainment instead of the share of 30 to 34 year olds with third-level educational achievement; share of early leavers from education and training aged 20–24 instead of 18–24. The estimates of the non-EEA population do not include UK nationals or beneficiaries of temporary protection. AROP=at risk of poverty; EEA=European Economic Area; LFS=Labour Force Survey; LTR=long-term residence; PISA=Programme for International Student Assessment; PLC=Post Leaving Certificate; SILC=Survey of Income and Living Conditions.

APPENDIX 2

Survey data used in this report

LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a large-scale nationally representative survey of households in Ireland and is administered quarterly by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Its main objective is to provide estimates of short-term indicators of the labour market (employment and unemployment). The survey is continuous and targets all private households in the State. The total sample per calendar quarter is approximately 32,500, achieved by first selecting 1,300 blocks and then randomly sampling households. Households are asked to take part in the survey for five consecutive quarters and are then replaced by other households in the same block. Interviews are mixed mode – both face-to-face and by phone. The survey results are weighted to agree with population estimates broken down by age, sex and region, and an additional adjustment on the basis of nationality. See https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/surveybackgroundnotes/labourforcesurvey/ for further details.

There are a number of reasons why the LFS may under-represent the experiences of some migrant groups. Firstly, the LFS is a survey of private households only, so certain groups are excluded in the selection of the sample. The LFS is weighted to agree with population estimates, so the gross population totals also reflect those living in communal accommodation (asylum seekers living in direct provision and arrivals from Ukraine). However, because communal accommodation is not surveyed, the employment and education estimates for particular (non-EU) groups may not adequately reflect those from country-of-origin groups who were living in communal accommodation. Secondly, information is collected by interviewers, most of whom are not bilingual, which leads to a concern that immigrants with poor English language skills may be under-represented. Thirdly, those whose status in Ireland is illegal/irregular may be more likely to refuse to participate, as are those who have had difficult experiences with those public authorities in their country of origin.

Table A2.1 shows which countries are assigned to which place-of-birth groups.

TABLE A2.1 PLACE-OF-BIRTH GROUPS

Place-of-birth group	Countries
Ireland	Ireland
UK	United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland)
EU15 excluding Ireland and UK (EU-West)	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
EU16 to EU27 (EU-East)	Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia
Other Europe (non-EU/UK)	Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Gibraltar, Iceland, Jersey, Kosovo (UNSCR1244), Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Monaco, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Norway, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Vatican City.
North America, Australia and Oceania (NAAO)	Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu , United States of America, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna
Africa	Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic Democratic of Congo, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Asia	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North), East Timor, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Republic of Korea (South), Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam

TABLE A2.1 (CONTD.) PLACE-OF-BIRTH GROUPS

Place-of-birth group	Countries
Rest of the World	Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Southern Territories, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Oman, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Saint Barthelemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen

Source: Correspondence with CSO LFS team; Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC).

Notes: The Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) is the primary data source to measure and monitor poverty and social exclusion in Ireland with indicators such as income poverty and material deprivation. It has been conducted every year by the CSO since June 2003; information is collected from January to June with household interviews being conducted on a weekly basis. The income reference period for SILC is the previous calendar year. The income reference period is the 12 months immediately prior to the date of interview. The SILC survey involves both cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions. The cross-sectional element involves data on households that entered the sample in 2009 (referred to as panel or wave 1), whereas the households in the survey for the second, third or subsequent times are considered to be longitudinal households.
The sampling frame used is the 2016 Census , and there have been recent adjustments to the sample design (for further details, see: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditionssilc2023/backgroundnotes/).
SILC data are weighted to be representative of the target population of private households and persons living therein. The sample is adjusted by age, sex, region, household composition and tenure status. Those living in communal accommodation are excluded from the population totals (https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditionssilc2023/backgroundnotes/). Given the sample design of the SILC, forced migrants living in communal accommodation are not included in poverty and other integration indicators presented in Chapter 4. Similar to the LFS, migrants with language difficulties and irregular migrants are likely to be underrepresented.

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